Judgment Summary: Supreme Court’s decision denying bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam

ON JANUARY 5, 2026,  the Supreme Court of India provided a definitive legal framework attempting to balance national security laws with personal liberty. The Division Bench led by Justices Aravind Kumar and N.V. Anjaria, adjudicated on the bail pleas of seven individuals accused under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (‘UAPA’) in connection with the 2020 North East Delhi communal riots.

While the Court ordered the release of five accused persons, including Gulfisha Fatima, Shifa ur Rehman, Meeran Haider, Saleem Khan, and Shadab Ahmed, it refused to grant bail to student activists Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, categorizing them as “architects” of the alleged conspiracy.

The Bench has clarified that it is not abdicating its duty by condemning the duo to continue languishing in prison; rather, it is fulfilling a statutory obligation. Both Imam and Khalid, who have been incarcerated for nearly six years awaiting trial, have been granted the liberty to renew their prayer for bail on completion of the examination of the protected witnesses or upon continued stagnation of the trial for another year.

In its 140-page judgment, the Court distinguished the two sets of reliefs largely based on the alleged roles assigned to the different individuals by the prosecution. These roles are categorised into two categories - central and peripheral, depending upon the varying degrees of participation.

“Where the attribution suggests a central or organising role in the alleged design, the need for circumspection before constitutional intervention displaces a statutory embargo is correspondingly greater. Conversely, where the role is peripheral or episodic, prolonged incarceration may more readily assume a punitive character,” the Court has held.

While the roles assigned to the different individuals played a significant part in the curation of reliefs, they were not the only variables considered by the Court. The other considerations included the gravity of the offence alleged to have been committed, the prima facie strength of the accusation at the limited threshold contemplated by Section 43D (5) of the UAPA, the integrity of the trial process and the risks associated with the release, which range from the possibility of influencing the witness and evidence tampering to undermining the fairness of the trial.

“In prosecutions alleging organised activity, the assessment of such risks may differ from that in ordinary criminal cases,” the Court has emphasised, while adding that this does not presume guilt, but recognises that bail decisions are necessarily “forward-looking” in terms of ensuring an effective trial.

The Court posited that it is not confined to a binary choice of continued custody and unconditional release. It can also issue other constitutionally significant directions to address the vice of delay, including expeditious trial, prioritisation of witnesses, or periodic review of progress.

Delay and Article 21: The Najeeb principle

The judgment begins by addressing the argument of delay and its consequent effect on the right to life and liberty, wherein the Court has refused to examine the existence of a delay in abstract terms, confining its inquiry to whether the nature of the delay constitutionally eclipses the statutory embargo placed by Section 43D (5).This provision requires the Court to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the accused, based on the police report and deny bail if it has reason to believe that such a case is made out.

“Article 21 has never been understood as operating in isolation from law,” the Court has declared while stating that delay cannot be examined in a vacuum and must be assessed in light of the nature of the allegations and the statutory framework.

However, it clarifies that it is not engaged in a comparison between the Constitution and a statute, nor is it laying down a mechanical approach that may be adopted while granting or denying relief in case of delay. Rather, it has sought to find a principled approach through which a constitutional court is to examine a bail plea raised on the grounds of delay in trial and prolonged incarceration, in prosecution under the UAPA.

“The constitutional promise is not that liberty will be unregulated, but that deprivations of liberty will not be arbitrary, unconscionable, or unfair,” the judgment notes. It emphasises that the UAPA is a special statute enacted to address offences against the security of the State and the stability of civic life. It is therefore covered under the expression “procedure established by law,” which aims to strike a balance between liberty and accountability.

Referring to its decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021), the Court has held that while the judgment provides that constitutional courts can grant bail despite statutory bars if the trial is unlikely to conclude soon, it does not create a mechanical rule for automatic release by mere passage of time in every case.

The judgment acknowledges that Najeeb provides an indispensable constitutional safeguard against unconscionable detention and recognises that the prolonged incarceration is a matter of serious constitutional concern. However, it refuses to let it be the sole determinant.

“The jurisprudence of this Court does not support a construction whereby delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory regime enacted by the Parliament to address offences of a special category,” the Court has asserted.

The Court has further stated that whether the continued detention has become “constitutionally unjustifiable” must be assessed in light of the gravity of the alleged offence, the attributed role, the statutory context, the limited prima facie material, the trajectory of the trial, the causes of delay, and the availability of intermediate remedies.

Further, the Court has noted that that the delay was not solely due to the “prosecutorial inertia” but was also influenced by the complexity of the case, the number of accused, and procedural manoeuvres by the defense. 

The Court has also opined that Article 21 also encompasses life and security of the community, which the State is obligated to protect. 

Statutory framework of Section 43D(5): The “Gatekeeping” Inquiry

The judgment notes that the criminal offences addressed in the UAPA transcend ordinary breaches of penal law. They implicate the sovereignty, integrity, and security of the State, and are rarely confined to isolated acts. They are the culmination of organised conspiratorial activities that unfold over time.

Analysing the legislative intent in this backdrop, the judgment notes that Section 43D (5) is a “conscious departure” from the general principles governing bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which necessarily circumscribes the nature of the judicial scrutiny permissible at the stage of considering the bail pleas of the accused.

The Court has held that the expression “prima facie true” contemplates an inquiry of statutory plausibility, not evidentiary sufficiency. Therefore, the Court must conduct a threshold inquiry of limited but real content to satisfy itself as to whether the material placed on record by the prosecution discloses the existence of ingredients essential to the commission of the alleged offence without going into possible defences or competing factual narratives. 

It states that this inquiry must be accused-specific rather than case-centric. It is directed to the role attributed to the individual and explicitly rejects a collective or undifferentiated approach to bail just because multiple individuals are named in the same conspiracy.

The Court has further held that the provision prohibits mini-trials. It does not contemplate a forum for evaluating defences, weighing the probative value of evidence, or assessing the probability of conviction at the bail stage, as such premature adjudication would amount to institutional overreach that would risk prejudging issues reserved for a full trial.

The Court has further held that in conspiracy cases, it must distinguish between conspiratorial centrality, which includes roles involving conceptualisation, direction, orchestration, or mobilisation of unlawful activity, and conspiratorial association, including roles that are episodic, peripheral, or substitutable.

The Court has thus laid down the three-pronged test, which needs to be satisfied for Section 43D (5) to apply:

1. If the material discloses a prima facie case satisfying the statutory ingredients.

2.  If the accused’s role reflects a real and meaningful nexus to the prescribed activity, rather than mere association.

3. If the statutory threshold is crossed qua the individual accused.

Expanding the scope of “Terrorist Act” under Section 15

The Court has interpreted the scope of a “terrorist act” within the broader “process-based” conception of criminality found in the UAPA. It states that culpability under the Act is not limited to the final execution of a violent act. It extends to preparatory conduct, facilitation, abetment, and the conspiracy itself.

The Court has categorically held that Section 15 is not restricted to the use of conventional weapons such as explosives or firearms. It highlighted the legislative use of the phrase “by any other means of whatever nature” in Section 15(1), ruling that this expression cannot be rendered redundant. It further held that to limit the definition only to physical carnage would “unduly narrow” the provision and ignore the plain language.

The Court has noted that the statutory definition of “terrorist act” includes conduct intended to disrupt supplies or services essential to the life of the community. It held that acts that threaten the economic security of the State are explicitly encompassed within the statutory definition of Section 15.

Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, the Bench observed that calls for coordinated and synchronised road blockades (chakka jams) intended to paralyse the city and cut off essential supplies prima facie fall within the ambit of a “terrorist act”.

The Court has further noted that the emphasis of the provision is not on the specific “instrumentality” used, but on the design, intent and effect of the act. It held that any act done with the intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India qualifies as a terrorist act, regardless of whether immediate physical harm is caused.

The Court has also held that, read with Section 18 (conspiracy), the law ensures that liability extends to those who conceptualise and contribute to the “build-up” of the act, not just those who execute the final violent deed.

The Court has ruled that when protests are designed to cause a total breakdown of public order and coincide with international events to destabilise the State, they cross the line into the realm of Section 15. The reasoning of the Court, in effect, could be deduced to mean that certain peaceful protests also may be considered to fall within the ambit of Section 15’s expanded reading.

How the Court evaluated the roles of the appellants

The cornerstone of this judgment is the Court’s rejection of a “collective” approach to bail in conspiracy cases, with Justice Kumar emphasising that even in a joint conspiracy, the Court must perform an “accused-specific” inquiry. 

Therefore, in the backdrop of the findings and principles enunciated above, the Court has evaluated the roles assigned to every appellant by the prosecution and individually determined the outcome of their bail pleas as follows:

Sharjeel Imam: Bail denied for being identified as an ideological driver and mastermind whose role was “qualitatively different” and foundational to the conspiracy.

Umar Khalid: Bail denied as he is characterised as a “central” and “architectural” figure who conceptualised the conspiracy and called for road blockades to coincide with the visit of the then-US President Donald Trump, to internationalise the issue.

Shifa ur Rehman: Bail granted since the role was considered limited to logistical facilitation without strategic control over the conspiracy’s course.

Saleem Khan: Bail granted on application of the principle of parity with other co-accused already released on bail.

Meeran Haider: Bail granted as he was found to have peripheral or episodic involvement compared to the primary conspirators.

Shadab Ahmed: Bail granted since the material did not show the “centrality” required to sustain a continued pre-trial embargo under Section 43D(5).

Gulfisha Fatima: Bail granted as she was viewed as a “site-level executor” or local facilitator whose role was derivative rather than strategic.

What are the bail conditions? 

For the five individuals granted bail, the Court has imposed strict conditions to ensure the integrity of the trial, which inter alia include:

1. Execution of personal bond of Rs 2,00,000/- with two sureties, each.

2. Restriction to the National Capital Territory (‘NCT’) of Delhi.

3. Prohibition against tampering with evidence or contacting witnesses.

The Court has emphasised that for Khalid and Imam, the gravity of their central role outweighed the plea of delay at this stage.  They can, however, reapply for bail after one year or on completion of the protected witness examination.