IN A LANDMARK JUDGMENT that could reshape the constitutional architecture of arrest and remand, the Supreme Court on November 6, 2025, held that every person arrested in India must be informed of the grounds of arrest in writing, and in a language they understand. The ruling, delivered in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra (2025), does more than reaffirm an existing procedural safeguard—it constitutionalises it.
The Bench of Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice A.G. Masih declared that “the constitutional mandate of informing the arrestee the grounds of arrest is mandatory in all offences under all statutes including offences under IPC 1860 (now BNS 2023).” In one sentence, the Court bridged a doctrinal gap that had persisted between special statutes like the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (‘PMLA’) or Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (‘UAPA’), and ordinary criminal law under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNS’).
From Procedure to Constitutional Right
For decades, the right to know the grounds of arrest existed more as a ritual than as a reality. Police officers were expected to “inform” an accused of the reason for arrest, but there was no clear constitutional requirement to do so in writing. In Pankaj Bansal (2023) and Prabir Purkayastha (2024), the Court had insisted that written grounds be furnished under special statutes like the PMLA and UAPA - but left ambiguous whether the same protection extended to ordinary offences.
The decision in Mihir Rajesh Shah changes that. The Court located this obligation not merely in statute but in the fundamental rights framework. Citing Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution, the Bench held that “the requirement of informing the arrested person the grounds of arrest, in the light of and under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, is not a mere formality but a mandatory binding constitutional safeguard.”
For decades, the right to know the grounds of arrest existed more as a ritual than as a reality.
This elevation - from a statutory duty to a constitutional command - marks a paradigm shift. It transforms what was once seen as bureaucratic paperwork into the very threshold of legality for every arrest. Failure to comply, the Court ruled, “renders the arrest and subsequent remand illegal and the person will be at liberty to be set free.”
The Two-Hour Rule: A Constitutional Timeline
In perhaps its most operationally significant direction, the Court set a clear constitutional timeline: the written grounds of arrest must be supplied “within a reasonable time and in any case at least two hours prior to production of the arrestee for remand proceedings before the magistrate.”
This two-hour rule does not emerge from legislation but from constitutional reasoning. The Court described it as a “judicious balance between safeguarding the arrestee’s constitutional rights under Article 22(1) and preserving the operational continuity of criminal investigations.”
By setting this threshold, the Court transformed the abstract right to liberty into a measurable administrative duty. For magistrates, this means that the absence of written grounds in the remand record can no longer be overlooked. Custody cannot be authorised merely because the police have produced an accused, it must now be justified on paper.
Reading Liberty Through the New Codes
The judgment’s significance deepens when viewed through India’s ongoing criminal law transition. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’) replaced the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’); the BNS replaced the Indian Penal Code, 1860; and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (‘BSA’) replaced the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Section 47 of the BNSS - akin to Section 50 of the old CrPC - requires that a person arrested be informed of the grounds of arrest. But until now, this remained a procedural obligation, not a constitutional one. Mihir Rajesh Shah fuses the procedural and constitutional dimensions, breathing life into the new codes through Article 21’s guarantee that “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”
The Court recognised that arrest affects not just the accused but “family, friends, relatives, affecting their psychological balance and overall social well-being.” It explicitly linked custodial conditions and mental health to constitutional dignity - a rare acknowledgment that liberty is lived, not abstract.
Language, Comprehension, and the Meaning of Rights
The judgment’s insistence that the grounds of arrest be communicated “in a language understood by the person arrested” is perhaps its most profound human rights intervention. “The failure to supply such grounds in a language understood by the arrestee renders the constitutional safeguards illusory,” the Bench warned.
This recognition echoes the spirit of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)—that liberty cannot exist without the ability to understand the basis of its restriction. In a multilingual democracy where millions encounter the law through translation, this insistence on linguistic comprehension transforms access to justice into a constitutional right.
The Court’s formulation also prevents perfunctory compliance. Oral intimation alone, it noted, is prone to “factual disputes which often result in conflicting claims between the arrested person and the investigating agency.” Written communication, on the other hand, provides a verifiable constitutional record.
Judicial Supervision as a Constitutional Imperative
By shifting the emphasis from police discretion to judicial oversight, the judgment quietly recalibrates the balance of power between the State and the citizen. The requirement that police make an entry recording who was informed of the arrest, and that magistrates verify compliance before granting remand, effectively constitutionalises the first appearance of an accused in court.
This restores a vision of the magistrate not as a passive signatory to remand orders but as an active guardian of liberty. In doing so, Mihir Rajesh Shah aligns with the spirit of D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997), where the Court first articulated procedural guarantees against custodial abuse.
However, Mihir Rajesh Shah goes further: it turns those guarantees into a written record enforceable in every case, not just in instances of egregious violation.
By shifting the emphasis from police discretion to judicial oversight, the judgment quietly recalibrates the balance of power between the State and the citizen.
Beyond the Individual: Institutional Implications
The Court’s reasoning extends far beyond this single case. In a criminal justice system where arrests often precede investigation, and where pre-trial incarceration is the norm, Mihir Rajesh Shah introduces accountability into the first moment of State coercion.
It demands institutional discipline. Police stations will now need to maintain documentary evidence of compliance; magistrates will have to verify it; and defence lawyers can invoke this ruling to challenge illegal remands.
In practical terms, it may slow down the mechanical pace of arrest - but that is the price of constitutionalism. As Justice Masih observed, “The obligation to inform the grounds of arrest to the arrestee is not just a mere procedural formality… it flows from the fundamental right of personal liberty.”
A Constitutional Revival
At its heart, the judgment reclaims a vision of constitutionalism where rights are not ornamental promises but operational duties. It affirms that liberty is protected not only through grand principles but through the smallest procedural acts that give those principles life.
By requiring written, comprehensible grounds of arrest within a definite time frame, the Supreme Court has turned the ordinary process of arrest into an act of constitutional significance. It reminds both the police and the judiciary that power must always begin in reason and that liberty begins with understanding.
The ruling is thus not just about arrest. It is about how the Constitution breathes through the daily grammar of criminal law.