ON NOVEMBER 6, 2025, the Supreme Court held that in cases where the police are already in possession of documentary material furnishing a cogent basis for the arrest, the written grounds of arrest must be furnished to the arrestee upon his arrest.
A Bench comprising Chief Justice of India (‘CJI’) B.R. Gavai and Justice Augustine George Masih handed down this ruling.
The Bench further held that it is only in exceptional circumstances such as offences against the body or property committed where the criminal is caught in the act—where informing the grounds of arrest in writing upon arrest is rendered impracticable, that it would be sufficient for the police making the arrest to convey the grounds of arrest orally to the person at the time of arrest.
However, even in those cases, a written copy of the grounds of arrest must be supplied to the arrested person within a reasonable time and in no event later than two hours prior to the production of the arrestee before the magistrate for remand proceedings.
“The remand papers shall contain the grounds of arrest and, in case there is delay in the supply thereof, a note indicating the cause for it shall be included for the information of the magistrate,” the Bench ordered.
The Bench held that if the time frame for supplying the grounds of arrest in writing is not adhered to, the arrest would be rendered illegal, entitling the release of the arrestee.
The Bench, however, clarified that upon such release, an application for remand or custody, if required, shall be moved along with the reasons and necessity for the same, after the supply of the grounds of arrest in writing setting forth the explanation for non-supply thereof within the above stipulated schedule.
“On receipt of such an application, the magistrate shall decide the same expeditiously and preferably within a week of submission thereof by adhering to the principles of natural justice,” the Bench ruled.
How did the issue arise before the Bench?
On July 7, 2024, a BMW car, driven at high speed, collided violently with the complainant’s scooter from behind. The force of the impact propelled both the complainant and his wife onto the car’s bonnet, whereby the complainant was thrown to the side, and tragically, his wife became ensnared between the vehicle’s front left wheel and bumper. The driver, who was the petitioner before the Supreme Court, persisted in his reckless flight, dragging the victim, thereafter absconding without rendering assistance or reporting the incident to authorities.
The victim succumbed to the severe injuries sustained in this collision, while the complainant sustained minor injuries. A First Information Report (‘FIR’) was registered at Worli Police Station under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Initial investigative steps included the identification of the offending vehicle through CCTV footage, and the discovery near Kalanagar Junction Flyover of the damaged BMW alongside the driver, co-accused Rajrishi Rajendra Singh Bindawat and Rajesh Shah, father of the petitioner. Arrests soon followed, with Bindawat being taken into custody on the same day.
The petitioner was arrested on July 7, 2024. The petitioner assailed his arrest before the Bombay High Court. The High Court, on November 25, 2024, though acknowledging the procedural lapse in the arrest, upheld the validity of the arrest due to the petitioner’s conscious awareness of the gravity of the offence, supported by substantial evidence and the petitioner’s evasion of arrest, thereby justifying custody despite the missing written grounds.
It was this judgment that the petitioner challenged before the Supreme Court, contending that the grounds of arrest as mandated under Section 47 of the BNSS 2023 were not informed to him in writing.
When the matter came up for hearing before the Supreme Court for admission, it refused to interfere with the High Court’s order but agreed to examine the question of law. The Bench had also ordered the interim release of the petitioner during the pendency of the appeal. The Bench thus framed two issues, namely:
(a) Whether in each and every case, even arising out of an offence under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC 1860”) now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS 2023), it would be necessary to furnish the grounds of arrest to an accused either before arrest or forthwith after arrest; and
(b) Whether, even in exceptional cases where, on account of certain exigencies, it will not be possible to furnish the grounds of arrest either before arrest or immediately after arrest, the arrest would be vitiated on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 50 of the CrPC 1973 (now Section 47 of the BNSS 2023).
Constitutional and statutory framework
Article 22(1) of the Constitution provides that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest.
The constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22 of the Constitution has also been incorporated by Parliament in Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 47 of the BNSS 2023), which provides that the person arrested is to be informed of the grounds of arrest and of the right to bail.
Section 50A of the CrPC 1973, now Section 48 of the BNSS 2023, casts a duty upon the person arresting to inform such grounds of arrest to his friend, relative or any other person nominated by the arrested person.
The Bench extensively referred to the decisions of coordinate Benches in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2023); Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) and Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana (2025).
In Pankaj Bansal, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of furnishing grounds of arrest under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (‘PMLA’). The Court held that the manner in which such grounds are to be communicated must be efficacious and substantive, which must fulfil the essential objective and mandate of the constitutional provisions. It was further held that there exists no plausible justification as to why a written copy of the grounds of arrest ought not to be provided to the arrestee as a standard procedural requirement without any exception.
In Prabir Purkayastha, the Supreme Court, while commenting on Article 22, observed that the language used in Article 22(1) and Article 22(5) regarding the communication of the grounds is identical. The Court noted that the interpretation of the scope of Article 22(5) would also apply to Article 22(1) concerning the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest. The Prabir Purkayastha case pertained to an arrest under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The Court further held that non-compliance with this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would render the custody or detention illegal.
In Vihaan Kumar, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to the detenue and, additionally, to his relatives is not merely a formality. It enables the detained person to know the reasons for his arrest and provides the necessary opportunity, through his relatives, friends or nominated persons, to secure his release at the earliest possible opportunity, thereby actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Bench’s reasoning
Answering the questions framed by the Bench, the Bench first identified the objective behind Article 22(1).
It opined that the mandate of Article 22(1) for furnishing grounds of arrest stems from the fundamental principle of providing an opportunity to a person to defend himself from the accusations that are levelled against him leading to his arrest.
It added that the salutary purpose of informing the grounds of arrest is to enable the person to understand the basis of his arrest and engage legal counsel to challenge his arrest, remand or seek bail and/or avail of any other remedy as may be available to him/her under law.
Commenting further on Article 22(1), the Bench said the intent of the constitution makers while incorporating the provisions was not to create any exceptional circumstances; instead, it reads as “No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest….”
The Bench noted that it casts a mandatory, unexceptional duty on the State to provide the arrested person with the grounds of such arrest with the objective of enabling that person to defend himself by consulting a legal practitioner of his choice.
The Bench also highlighted that this mandate is without exception, that it is not statute-specific, and that it is grounded in the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Bench also reasoned that the arrested person must be given early access to legal assistance to enable him to defend himself and oppose the remand.
It added that the purpose of securing legal assistance before remand is not merely symbolic, but it is to ensure that the accused is afforded an effective opportunity to oppose the prayer for police custody and to place before the magistrate any circumstances that may warrant refusal or limitation of such custody.
The Bench referred to the decisions in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) and Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994) to underscore the humiliation that the arrest of a person can bring for the person so arrested. The Bench said the arrest of an individual invariably impacts not only the person arrested himself, but also the persons associated with him, i.e., family, friends, relatives, etc., affecting their psychological balance and overall social well-being.
“The stigma attached to arrest undermines a person’s social dignity and results in consequences that reverberate beyond the individual but also extend to their social circle,” the Bench said.
The Bench emphasised that the police officer making an arrest must be cautious while arresting a person and ought to satisfy himself, after a reasonable investigation, as to the person’s complicity and also the effect as well as the need of arrest.
The Bench stated that, despite long years of independence, the police still maintain their colonial image and are primarily viewed as an instrument of oppression and harassment, and are undoubtedly not regarded as a friend of the public.
On the mode of informing grounds of arrest, the Bench opined that it would not be ideal to read out the grounds of arrest to a person who is arrested, as he may not be in the frame of mind to remember the contents of the grounds that are read out to him.
It observed that if the authorities are permitted to read out the grounds and claim compliance with the constitutional and statutory mandate, the very purpose of the constitutional protection would be nugatory.
The Bench reiterated that the mode of communicating the grounds of arrest must be such that it effectively serves the intended purpose as envisioned under the Constitution of India, which is to enable the arrested person to get legal counsel, oppose the remand and effectively defend himself by exercising his rights and safeguards as provided in law.
The Bench further observed that there is no harm in providing the grounds of arrest in writing in the language the arrestee understands. This approach, the Bench said, would not only fulfil the true intent of the constitutional mandate but would also be beneficial for the investigating agency to prove that the grounds of arrest were informed to the arrestee when a challenge is made to the arrest on the plea of non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest.
What follows if grounds of arrest are not furnished either prior to arrest or immediately after the arrest?
The Bench observed that it is well settled that if the grounds of arrest are not furnished to the arrestee in writing, this would result in breach of the constitutional and statutory safeguards, hence rendering the arrest and remand illegal, and the person will be entitled to be set at liberty.
Noticing that the law is silent with regard to the mode, nature or the time and stage at which the grounds of arrest have to be communicated, the Bench observed that Article 22 says ‘as soon as may be’, which would obviously not mean prior to arrest but can be on arrest or thereafter.
The indication is as early as it can be conveyed. There may be situations wherein it may not be practically possible to supply such grounds of arrest to the arrested person at the time of his arrest or immediately.
Illustrating such a scenario, the Bench observed that in a case involving a murder being committed in front of a police officer, it may not be possible for the officer to provide the grounds of arrest in writing before the arrest or forthwith on the arrest to the accused. A rigid insistence upon informing of written grounds of arrest before or at the time of effecting the arrest or immediately thereafter may result in the police officer not being able to discharge their duty and responsibility efficiently and effectively.
“The constitutional safeguards, valuable as they are, cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to allow them to metamorphose into a procedural impediment that handicaps the law-enforcing agencies in the due lawful discharge of their duties. Therefore, a balance between compliance with the constitutional as also the statutorily mandated safeguards on the one hand vis-à-vis the effective discharge of lawful statutory law-enforcement duties and responsibilities cast upon the State agencies must be struck,” the Bench highlighted.
The Bench also referred to another situation where the investigating officer has sent a notice for appearance of the accused to join the investigation, pursuant to which the accused has joined the investigation. The investigating officer, after perusal of the material available before him and/or on interrogating the accused, makes up his mind that the arrest of the accused person is required for further investigation or has other reason(s) for arrest. In such cases, the Bench observed, since the accused is under the supervision of the investigating agency and there exists no apprehension of him absconding, it becomes incumbent upon the police officer to supply the grounds of arrest in writing on arresting the accused person.
“This can also be followed, for instance, in cases involving offences which are primarily based on documentary evidence/records, economic offences such as under the PMLA where the grounds of arrest in writing shall be furnished to the arrested person on arrest simultaneously,” the Bench held.
Summing up its conclusions, the Bench directed:
The constitutional mandate of informing the arrestee of the grounds of arrest is mandatory in all offences under all statutes including offences under the IPC 1860 (now BNS 2023);
The grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing to the arrestee in the language they understand;
In case where the arresting officer is unable to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing on or soon after arrest, it should be done orally. The said grounds should be communicated in writing within a reasonable time and in any case at least two hours prior to the production of the arrestee for remand proceedings before the magistrate;
In case of non-compliance with the above, the arrest and subsequent remand would be rendered illegal and the person will be at liberty to be set free.