ON SEPTEMBER 24, 2025, THE KARNATAKA HC while hearing X Corp v. Union of India & Ors., upheld the Union government’s authority to issue “takedown” orders under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (‘IT Act’), read with Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology Intermediary Rules, 2021 (‘IT Rules’). In doing so, the High Court effectively read down the Supreme Court’s well-reasoned decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India—a 2015 landmark judgement in India’s free speech jurisprudence.
The High Court’s order is troubling not only on its merits but also because it reflects a conspicuous judicial attempt to dilute a settled precedent, privileging restriction over the enhancement of free expression—an inversion of constitutional commitment to deliberative democracy.
Rule 3(b) of the IT Rules, 2021, is a colorable provision, directly contrary to Shreya Singhal
In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act, declaring it unconstitutional for violating the fundamental right to free speech. The Supreme Court held that the section was vague, overbroad, and failed to distinguish between protected speech—such as discussion and advocacy—and punishable speech, like incitement to violence. In contrast, the Supreme Court upheld Section 69A, which enables the blocking of content, observing that it was “a narrowly drawn provision with several safeguards.” The Supreme Court’s validation of the provision was explicitly contingent upon the government’s strict compliance with the procedural safeguards outlined in the Blocking Rules, 2009.
In doing so, the High Court effectively read down the Supreme Court’s well-reasoned decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India.
However, in X Corp’s case, the Karnataka High Court upheld the constitutionality of the Sahyog Portal, which was created to automate notices to intermediaries to remove unlawful online content, effectively circumventing the procedures and safeguards built into Section 69A. This parallel blocking mechanism, exercised by the Union of India under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act read with Rule 3(b) of the 2021 Rules, constitutes a dubious and colourable exercise of power. Put differently, by relying on these provisions, the government appears to contravene the principle that what cannot be done directly can be done indirectly.
The High Court, however, neither considered this aspect nor engaged with it, and instead justified its decision by stating that “the 2011 regime addressed in Shreya Singhal is now supplanted by the newer 2021 Rules and must be interpreted on its own terms.”
Sahyog will allow millions of police officers to issue takedown orders
As per X Corp, the petitioner, “the recent order from the Karnataka Court will allow millions of police officers to issue arbitrary takedown orders through a secretive online portal called the Sahyog. This new regime, it is to be noted, firstly, has no basis in the law; secondly, circumvents Section 69A of the IT Act; thirdly, violates Supreme Court rulings; and fourthly, infringes Indian citizens' constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expression”. In the final analysis, the apprehension of X Corp is neither unfounded nor misplaced.
Shreya Singhal safeguards under Section 69A vs. Section 79(3)(b) notices
As clarified in Shreya Singhal, blocking under Section 69A of the IT Act is permissible only on the narrow grounds enumerated in Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which includes, inter alia, security of the State or public order, and must follow strict procedural safeguards. These safeguards include a reasoned written order by a competent authority, review by a committee, and an opportunity of hearing for the intermediary (and often the content originator). In perilous contrast, however, notices under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act issued through Sahyog could target any content deemed ‘unlawful’ by multiple agencies, including state authorities, without any requirement of a hearing or detailed order thereby rendering the procedural safeguards as enumerated in Shreya Singhal nugatory.
In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court even upheld Section 79 as an “exemption provision.” However, it found that the phrase “upon receiving actual knowledge” must be interpreted narrowly to ensure that intermediaries are not forced to make subjective judgments about content. The Supreme Court further held that this knowledge must be “through the medium of a court order.” The X Corp argued before the High Court that the government’s use of Section 79(3)(b) of IT Act and Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules circumvents the very safeguards the Supreme Court deemed essential for constitutional validity.
However, the Karnataka High Court rejected this contention and, while upholding the constitutionality of the Sahyog portal, characterised the portal as an instrument of “public good,” created under the authority of Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act and Rule 3(b) of the 2021 Rules. It stands to be questioned which umbilical cord of the law or authority connects Sahyog portal with public good!
X Corp argued that compelling intermediaries to monitor and remove content under Sahyog undermines the Supreme Court's ruling in Shreya Singhal, but the Karnataka High Court held that the 2011 regime addressed in Shreya Singhal is now supplanted by the newer 2021 Rules and must be interpreted on its own terms.
A misinterpretation of precedent by Karnataka HC
The Karnataka High Court, in order to suggest that there has been a shift in judicial thought post-Shreya Singhal, placed reliance on three decisions of the Supreme Court—Ajit Mohan (2022), Just Rights for Children Alliance (2024), and Ranveer Gautam Allahabadia (2025). A closer examination, however, reveals that none of these cases are relevant to the issues before the High Court, and their reliance is therefore misplaced.
In Ajit Mohan, the Supreme Court was concerned with the competence of the Delhi Legislative Assembly to summon witnesses, including a Facebook executive, in relation to the 2020 Delhi riots. While the judgment contains observations on the challenges posed by digital platforms, it does not in any manner suggest that procedural safeguards for restricting online content may be dispensed with.
In Just Rights for Children Alliance, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether mere possession of child sexual abuse material constitutes an offence under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 While the High Court relied on stray observations from this judgment regarding intermediary liability under Section 79(3)(b), it failed to appreciate that in Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court expressly mandated a court order for content takedown. The ratio in Shreya Singhal cannot be diluted through selective reliance on dicta in subsequent cases addressing altogether different questions.
Finally, in Ranveer Gautam Allahabadia, the primary issue was whether multiple FIRs could be consolidated. The Supreme Court’s suggestion that the Union explore regulatory proposals consistent with Article 19(2) cannot be read as an endorsement of a regulatory framework devoid of the procedural safeguards emphasised in Shreya Singhal.
In sum, the judgments invoked by the High Court neither depart from nor dilute the ratio of Shreya Singhal. By misinterpreting them, the High Court sought to create an artificial impression of judicial divergence, when in fact the doctrinal position remains unchanged: restrictions on online speech must adhere strictly to the constitutional safeguards recognised in Shreya Singhal.
It stands to be questioned which umbilical cord of the law or authority connects Sahyog portal with public good!
Karnataka High Court erroneously rules Shreya Singhal inapplicable for relying on U.S. Reno Case
The High Court observed that ‘the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal was broadly based upon the judgment of the American Supreme Court in Reno (1997) and therefore, “the wholesale importation of American doctrines, particularly in the realm of free speech, cannot be the touchstone for interpreting the provisions of the Indian Constitution.”
This inference is erroneous for two main reasons. First, in the entire judgment of Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court referred to Reno only once, and in arriving at its final conclusion, it relied primarily on a catena of its own judgments such as Kedar Nath Singh (1962), Ram Manohar Lohia (1965), and Kameshwar Prasad (1958). Second, even if the Supreme Court’s judgment were to suffer from any infirmity, it is settled that only a larger Bench of the Supreme Court can read down or overrule such a decision; a High Court cannot supplant its own reasoning to pass an order contrary to the precedent laid down by the Supreme Court.
Karnataka High Court erroneously read Article 19 in isolation
The Karnataka High Court erroneously held that X Corp, being a foreign company, cannot claim protection under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, and interpreted Article 19 in isolation. The attention of the Court was drawn to the fact that, in addition to X Corp, several intervenors in the case are Indian citizens, but this argument did not find favor with the High Court.
It is essential to note that the “silos” approach outlined in A.K. Gopalan (1950) has been read down by a series of Supreme Court judgments. In K.S. Puttaswamy (2017), the Supreme Court cited the dissenting opinion of Justice Fazl Ali in A.K. Gopalan, observing that “fundamental rights are not isolated and separate but protect a common thread of liberty and freedom.”
Consequently, even if X Corp cannot invoke Article 19, the protections under Article 14 — the arbitrariness and discrimination tests —- would still permeate and constrain every action of the State.
Karnataka High Court judgement is inconsistent with Bombay High Court’s “Fact Check Unit Case”
On September 26, 2024, the Bombay High Court struck down the amendment to Rule 3(1)(b)(v) of the IT Rules. The 2023 Amendment to the IT Rules 2021 allowed the Fact Check Unit, notified by the Union government, to identify “fake or false or misleading” online content related to the business of the Central Government and demand intermediaries to remove it from the internet. The Bombay High Court, inter alia, struck down the rule on two main grounds:
That the rule violates the principle of natural justice by vesting the central government with the final say on online speech made about their affairs and by affording no opportunity to hear the author before their speech is censored.
That the parent legislation – the IT Act – does not provide any power to the central government to draft rules establishing a Fact Check Unit.
That unlike the American Constitution, the Indian Constitution specifically envisages a list of eight grounds on which the government could restrict citizens’ right to free speech. The fake, false, or misleading speech acts are not recognized as legitimate grounds under Article 19(2).
However, in X Corp’s case, the Karnataka High Court overlooked all the aforementioned grounds—first, that Sahyog violates the principles of natural justice as no opportunity of hearing is provided to the intermediary before content removal; second, that the parent legislation (the IT Act) does not empower the Union to create such a portal; and third, that the issuance of notices under Section 79(3)(b) through Sahyog could produce a chilling effect on freedom of speech and expression, as any content deemed ‘unlawful’ by multiple agencies may be targeted.
The judgment delivered by the Karnataka High Court in X Corp’s case is per incuriam, as it disregards the binding decision of the Supreme Court.
Diluting doctrine of precedent
The judgment delivered by the Karnataka High Court in X Corp’s case is per incuriam, as it disregards the binding decision of the Supreme Court. It is well settled that an order of the Supreme Court can only be overruled or modified by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court; a High Court cannot supplant its own reasoning to pass an order contrary to the precedent laid down by the Supreme Court. In Lalu Jela and Ors. v. State of Gujarat (1961), the Gujarat High Court rightly observed that ‘it is also not open to Judges of a High Court to criticise a judgment of the Supreme Court on the ground that they did not apply their mind to the construction of various parts of the section and that therefore their observations are only casual and not binding…’. Thereafter, this doctrine of precedent was fortified by several recent judgments, such as Dr. Shah Faesal v. Union of India (2020), wherein the Supreme Court underscored that the doctrine is crucial to ‘further the goal of certainty, stability and continuity in our legal system.’”
The Karnataka High Court’s ruling undermines the doctrinal consistency of India’s free speech jurisprudence. By reading down Shreya Singhal and endorsing an extra-legal regulatory mechanism, the Court has tilted the balance towards executive overreach at the expense of constitutional safeguards.
It is almost inevitable that this order will be appealed - X has expressed its inclination to do so. What remains to be seen is whether the Supreme Court will reaffirm its role as a bulwark of free expression or allow judicial indiscipline to erode established precedent. In any case, the High Court’s order deserves to be set aside—not only for its flawed reasoning but also for departing from the well-settled doctrine of precedent.