ON SEPTEMBER 15, THE SUPREME COURT closed the matter concerning the Vantara zoological facility at Jamnagar, Gujarat. Accepting the report of a Special Investigation Team (‘SIT’), the Court declared that the acquisition of animals had taken place in full regulatory compliance and that no foul play had been found.
The proceedings were swift: a public interest petition filed on August 7 was followed by the constitution of the SIT on August 25. The SIT filed its report in “sealed cover” by September 12. Within 17 days of being constituted, the SIT had cleared Vantara of all allegations. The Court accepted its findings in toto.
The speed, the sealed-cover procedure, and the eventual closure of the matter drew sharp public commentary. Congress MP Jairam Ramesh, for instance, remarked on the judiciary’s selective efficiency, noting that while millions of cases languish for years, this one was concluded “expeditiously and categorically” in just over a month.
Yet, the debate over judicial priorities, sealed covers, and preferential speed is familiar territory. Senior Advocate Harish Salve’s submissions in court even offered persuasive reasoning for confidentiality. Pointing to concerns about commercial secrecy, reputational narratives, and global scrutiny, he argued that the Court’s acceptance of a sealed report did not seem reasonless.
This article, however, argues that a deeper case of arbitrariness lies elsewhere - in a rather unnoticed corner of the order - mentioned in passing in the myriad reports that have extensively covered the Vantara judgment.
The SIT filed its report in “sealed cover” by September 12. Within 17 days of being constituted, the SIT had cleared Vantara of all allegations.
Paragraph 13 of the September 15 order records the top Court’s “appreciation” for the SIT’s “commendable thoroughness”. The Court directs that an honorarium of Rs 9,00,000 be paid to three members (two former Judges and a former Police Commissioner). The fourth member, an IRS officer still in service, was exempted, though the Court directed Rs 2,00,000 to be paid to a retired forest officer who assisted the SIT.
The problematic aspect of this direction is not the remuneration itself. Nine lakhs may well reflect the expertise and expeditiousness of the probe. The problem lies in the method of determination. The Court’s order does not disclose the basis for fixing this figure, nor does it clarify whether such payments fall within any established framework.
By directing the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (‘MoEFCC’) to make these disbursements, the Court effectively authorises an expenditure from the public exchequer without reference to any statutory guideline or executive sanction. Whether the amounts are ultimately drawn from a contingency head or from standard budget allocations for the Ministry’s internal litigation, the absence of transparency raises questions of financial accountability.
If every court-constituted SIT is funded likewise, with non-uniform standards for remuneration, and unreasoned judicial discretion - these decisions risk drifting into brazen arbitrariness.
It is, therefore, perhaps useful to examine how the Supreme Court has approached honorarium/remuneration for SITs in the past. Unsurprisingly, there are hardly any cases that refer to SITs and make mention of payments or remuneration to their members. Most cases that decide on whether they must constitute an SIT, however, make detailed justifications as to why they have resolved to do so. They make note of the “egregious violations” or “constitutional jeopardy” they intend to protect the system from by soliciting clarity through an SIT. Two cases in point are Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India (2011), and Manohar Lal Sharma (Pegasus Spyware) v. Union of India, (2023) (Pegasus).
While in Jethmalani, the reasons for constituting the SIT were “complexity” of the matter and the Court’s interest in ensuring fulfilment of “constitutional obligations”, in Pegasus, it was the compelling prima facie case made out by the Petitioners that indicated a likely and alarming violation of privacy and other protected fundamental rights.
While in Jethmalani, the reasons for constituting the SIT were “complexity” of the matter and the Court’s interest in ensuring fulfilment of “constitutional obligations”, in Pegasus, it was the compelling prima facie case made out by the Petitioners.
In both these SITs, the teams were led by Retired Supreme Court Justices. Most notably, in both instances, the Court made prior accommodation for “remuneration” or “honorarium” apart from logistical and ancillary expenses, as a part of the order constituting these investigatory bodies. For instance, in Jethmalani, the Court expressed that “the former judges of this Court so appointed to supervise the Special Investigation Team are entitled to their remuneration, allowances, perks, facilities as that of the judges of the Supreme Court”. Similarly, in Pegasus, the Union of India was asked to, in discussion with the Judge heading the SIT, make requisite payments in the form of remuneration for the members in the SIT.
Finally, both the Pegasus and Jethmalani cases saw the Respondent (Government) offering to extend their resources or agencies for the investigation intended to be achieved. The Court, instead, added an additional layer of independence to the co-operation extended by the Government, directing supervision and participation of Retired Judges. In other words, they merely extended the willingness of the Government to incur the expenditure for investigation into a more appropriate format - one sensitive to the gravity of the matters and the independence it demands.
In contrast, none of these elements finds mention in Vantara. In the Court’s previous Order (of August 25), the Judges observed that the petitioners make accusations of a “wide amplitude” referring exclusively to, “[...] news and stories appearing in the newspapers, social media and diverse complaints by non-Governmental organisations [...]”.
In paragraph 3, the Court states in no ambiguous terms that “these petitions are only allegations with no material of probative worth. There appears to be no supporting material [...]” and that “a petition resting on such unsupported allegations does not deserve in law to be entertained, rather warrant dismissal in limine.” The standard of justification for the constitution of an SIT that Jethmalani and Pegasus seemed to posit is simply absent.
The August 25 order in Vantara, in paragraph 7(c), also makes explicit directions for accommodation, lodging, travel, logistics and secretarial support for the members of the SIT. There is no prior mention of remuneration or honorarium whatsoever. The honorarium component originated only in the final order, after having wrapped up the SIT’s investigation (to the extent of the three members in question).
There is also no indication of the Union government (or State governments in the list of Respondents) ever showing willingness or suggesting the creation of an investigatory team or body for this matter, either. The Order seems to suggest that it was decided and demanded of the Government unilaterally by the Court. All three standards implicitly emanating from Pegasus and Jethmalani - a test of sufficient gravity for constitution, prior direction for remuneration, and express willingness of some manner from the government - go for a toss in the Vantara order.
There is also a question of why the taxpayer must, normatively speaking, bear the burden of such expenses. The Court has, on several occasions, admonished “busybodies” for filing sensational or frivolous PILs. Where a matter is reluctantly admitted, investigated, and ultimately found baseless, it is logical that the costs of inquiry be borne by the petitioner. That approach would align financial responsibility with the source of judicial burden.
However, the only censure of the petitioner, the Vantara order passed down, is a loose remark that such allegations “deserve not just complete rejection but deprecation.” This mismatch of a moral reproach on one side and misplaced fiscal demands of the public purse on the other highlights a structural imbalance in how judicially-driven inquiries are financed.
Even if public expenditure is justified in certain cases, the amounts cannot be rounded off and awarded in lump sums without clear benchmarks. Certain High Courts have adopted fixed schedules or guidelines for fees payable to amicus curiae. A similar framework for SITs would allow for both consistency and predictability.
A transparent framework that is publicly declared, consistently applied, and legally authorised is a glaring necessity that shrieks for attention from Vantara order.
The differential standard in the Supreme Court’s approach is also striking. In 2021, ex-CJI D.Y. Chandrachud dismissed a petition by an advocate seeking recovery of amicus fees, remarking: “When you appear as amicus, don’t ask for a fee. Do it as service to the institution.” If amicus curiae - often senior members of the bar or even former judges - are expected to render unpaid service to the Court, the absence of comparable expectations for SIT members stands out as a glaring inconsistency.
In contrast, in 2021, when a retired Judge overseeing the Bengal post-poll violence probe declined an offered honorarium of Rs 10 lakhs, it made headlines and invited generous praise from the judiciary. That was an act of personal integrity.
This piece, however, is not a plea for such judicially demanded or personally driven selfless service. It is a call for an institutional method. Some order, rhyme and reason while splurging from the public purse. A transparent framework that is publicly declared, consistently applied, and legally authorised is a glaring necessity that shrieks for attention from Vantara order. Generosity towards those who assist the Court must never come at the cost of financial accountability and public trust.