EARLIER TODAY, a bench comprising CJI Surya Kant and Justice Joymayla Bagchi delivered the judgment upholding the validity of the Special Intensive Revision (‘SIR’) of the electoral rolls in Bihar.
“Before any representative government can count votes, it must first know whose votes may be counted. The story of democracy is therefore not only a story of voting, but also of identifying the persons entitled to participate in the choice of government,”wrote CJI Kant while opening the judgment.
Background
Bihar’s last SIR was conducted in 2003. Since then, electoral rolls were revised through summary revisions.
On June 24, last year, the Election Commission of India (‘ECI’) invoking its powers through Article 324 of the Constitution of India and Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (‘RP Act’), issued an order directing a SIR of the electoral rolls for every Assembly constituency in Bihar, ahead of the November 2025 elections.
The exercise was undertaken within a remarkably short span despite Bihar’s projected 2023 population of 12.7 crore, accounting for nearly 9.1 per cent of India’s total population. This had raised concerns about the scale, speed, and feasibility of such a revision.
For the 2025 SIR, the 2003 electoral roll was treated as probative evidence of eligibility, with persons listed therein presumed eligible unless rebutted. Those absent from the 2003 roll were required to submit Enumeration Forms by July 25, 2025.
When the draft electoral roll was published in August 2025, nearly 65 lakh electors were excluded for failure to submit the required forms. Following scrutiny and subsequent additions, 21.53 lakh eligible electors were added, while 3.66 lakh names were ultimately deleted.
The final electoral roll published in September 2025 recorded 7.42 crore electors, down from the initial 7.89 crore.
Petitioners’ contention
The petitioners had contended that the SIR exercise was unconstitutional, arbitrary, exclusionary and disproportionate.
Firstly, they argued that the ECI's reliance on Article 324 as a freestanding reservoir of plenary power was flawed and ECI's residuary power operates only in “interstitial spaces” not occupied by Parliamentary legislation. Reliance was placed on Mohinder Singh Gill v Chief Election Commissioner (1978) and A.C. Jose v Sivan Pillai (1984). Since Parliament had already enacted the RP Acts (1950 and 1951) and the 1960 Electoral Rules, the ECI could not leapfrog or circumvent this existing statutory framework to create a new regime of enumeration.
Secondly, they challenged the ECI’s use of Section 21(3) of the 1950 Act, which allows for special revisions. The provision is, they argued, constituency-specific and does not authorise a sweeping statewide revision. A special revision is envisaged as an extraordinary measure, only to be used when Section 21(2) is rendered inapplicable, and one that is meant to be deployed in exceptional circumstances, confined to specific geographical units where an identified exigency warrants departure from the routine revision process.
Thirdly, they maintained that a name already on the electoral roll carries a presumption of validity and regularity under Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and by forcing existing electors to re-establish their credentials, the ECI placed an “affirmative burden” on citizens to prove their status anew, which strikes at the foundation of the statutory scheme. Reliance was placed on Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer (1995) where the Court held that electors whose names appear on the electoral roll are entitled to a presumption of citizenship, and that this presumption cannot be displaced except by following the procedure prescribed by law.
Fourthly, the petitioners contended that using the 2003 roll as the baseline was arbitrary, as there was no evidence that 2003 rolls were more accurate than subsequent ones. They also asserted that the ECI bypassed Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules, which mandates individual notice and a reasonable opportunity for a hearing before a name is deleted due to death, migration, or disqualification. They argued that missing the enumeration deadline led to automatic, arbitrary exclusion without these safeguards.
The Court held that the SIR served a legitimate constitutional purpose of ensuring inclusion of eligible voters as more than two decades had passed since the last intensive revision in 2003, and there existed systemic inaccuracies in the rolls.
Finally, the petitioners argued that determining citizenship is the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Home Affairs under the Citizenship Act, 1955, and the ECI cannot usurp this function under the pretext of roll revision.
Respondents’ contention
The respondents, primarily the ECI, argued that the SIR was a valid exercise of the Commission’s constitutional mandate and was necessary to ensure the integrity of the democratic process.
Firstly, they contended that while Parliament can make laws under Article 327, that power is ‘subject to the provisions of this Constitution,’ meaning legislation cannot extinguish the ECI's core constitutional functions. Reliance was placed on Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission of India (1971), to argue that The ECI is not a subordinate delegate of Parliament and acts in its own right as the constitutional repository of electoral superintendence. It can issue directions to fill vacuous areas where the law is silent.
Secondly, they argued that Section 21(3) of the RP Act allows for a special revision ‘in such manner as [the ECI] may think fit’ and this frees the Commission from the rigid procedural limitations that govern ordinary summary revisions under Section 21(2). They maintained that the term ‘any constituency’ in the statute can legally encompass all constituencies in a state if common reasons (such as statewide migration) justify the exercise.
The ECI noted that the last intensive revision in Bihar was in 2003, and two decades of summary revisions had led to significant inaccuracies. Using the 2003 roll as a baseline was rational because it was the last roll prepared through a rigorous, intensive house-to-house verification. They also pointed to the availability of show-cause notices, speaking orders by Registration Officers, and a two-tier appeal mechanism as robust protections against arbitrary deletion
Lastly, the ECI argued that the duty to maintain accurate rolls under Articles 325 and 326 flows directly into the power to verify citizenship, as non-citizens are expressly disqualified from registration while clarifying that they were not making a final legal adjudication of citizenship status but rather a prima facie enquiry into eligibility for the limited purpose of enrolment.
The Court clarified that ECI is empowered to scrutinise the citizenship status of individuals for the purpose of maintaining electoral rolls, but this power is strictly limited in scope and consequence.
Issues
The Court was faced to deal with first, the very authority of the Commission to
embark upon the impugned exercise; second, the procedure and methodology adopted in carrying out the exercise, including the method prescribed by the Commission to ascertain the
citizenship of the voters; and third, the propriety of its timing, given that elections to the Bihar Legislative Assembly were slated for November 2025.
The four questions framed by Court were: (i) whether the ECI has power to conduct the SIR; (ii) whether the SIR is founded on a legitimate purpose, and if so, whether the measures adopted by the ECI are proportionate to the object sought to be achieved; (iii) whether the procedure adopted by the ECI in conducting the SIR is contrary to, or in violation of, the provisions of RP Act and the Electors Rules, 1960; and (iv) whether, in the exercise of its constitutional mandate of preparation and maintenance of electoral rolls, and in furtherance of the statutory conditions governing such registration, the ECI is empowered to scrutinise the citizenship status of persons seeking inclusion or continuation in the electoral roll?
What did the Court hold?
On the first issue, the Court affirmed that Article 324 vests the ECI with the plenary power of superintendence over the preparation of electoral rolls, complementing rather than competing with Parliament’s law-making power under Article 327. Where legislation is silent or inadequate to meet emerging contingencies, Article 324 acts as a “reservoir of power.”
The Court also ruled that Section 21(3) of the RP Act allows the ECI to override standard procedural rigours. The word ‘any constituency’ can mean all, which can enable a statewide revision when cogent state-level reasons (such as rapid urbanisation) exist.
On the question of purpose and proportionality, the Court held that the SIR exercise served a legitimate constitutional purpose of ensuring inclusion of eligible voters as more than two decades had passed since the last intensive revision in 2003, during which migration, urbanisation, duplicate entries, and deceased voters had created systemic inaccuracies in the rolls. The Court also found a rational nexus between house-to-house enumeration and accurate rolls, and noted that safeguards (including show-cause notices, appeals, claims and objections procedures, acceptance of Aadhaar for verification, and legal assistance for marginalised groups) adequately balanced the procedural burden. The judgment also read:
“86. This Court cannot sit in review of whether the process and methodology adopted by the Commission to conduct the SIR is the most optimal or appropriate course of action. It is not open to this Court to supplant its own judgment in matters that concern the implementation of an exercise which the Commission, endowed with institutional expertise and vested with constitutional authority, is uniquely suited to undertake.”
On the question of validity of procedure, the Court found that SIR was validly grounded in Section 21(3) of the RP Act, which empowers the ECI to direct a special revision ‘in such manner as it may think fit.’ The Court emphasised that this provision allows departures from ordinary summary revision procedures to address exceptional situations. It further held that safeguards were effectively built into the SIR through claims and objections processes, suo motu inquiries by Electoral Registration Officers, and issuance of show-cause notices prior to final deletion. The Court also upheld the ECI’s documentation requirements, finding that it was based on rational criteria to verify eligibility. It also clarified that inclusion in the electoral roll creates only a rebuttable evidentiary presumption and does not bar the ECI from conducting a broader verification exercise.
Finally, the Court clarified that ECI is empowered to scrutinise the citizenship status of individuals for the purpose of maintaining electoral rolls, but this power is strictly limited in scope and consequence. A decision to exclude a person by ECI, it held, only affects their entitlement to be on the electoral roll and their right to participate in the electoral process and does not divest an individual of their citizenship claims, nor does it assume finality on their legal status as a citizen. Para 176 of the judgment reads:
“We have no hesitation in adding that this assessment is necessarily prima facie and contextual. Where the material furnished by an individual does not inspire confidence or give rise to doubt, the Commission is within its authority to decline enrolment or to initiate action for deletion, strictly in accordance with law. Such action, however, must be understood in its proper perspective. It does not amount to a declaration that the individual is not a citizen of India; it merely reflects the Commission’s inability to be satisfied, for electoral purposes, that the statutory conditions are met.”
Therefore, the Court ruled it is incumbent upon the ECI to refer the individuals whose name has been deleted to the competent authority within the Central Government for a formal adjudication in accordance with the law and any deletion from the roll on these grounds remains subject to the outcome of that final adjudication.
Ultimately, the competent authority was instructed to decide these cases in accordance with the law, ideally before the next election. The Court also clarified that any person domiciled in Bihar whose name was wrongly deleted on other grounds such as being incorrectly marked as absent, dead, shifted, or a duplicate retains the right to challenge the Commission’s decision through judicial review.
Individuals wrongly excluded may now have to fight parallel battles before different authorities – first, to restore their names on electoral rolls and second, to defend their citizenship claims.
Implications of the judgement
The 124-page judgment has already drawn comparisons with the infamous ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) decision which said that no person could file a writ of Habeas Corpus (to challenge unlawful detention) during an Emergency. Advocate Prashant Bhushan told the PTI that the decision “virtually gives a blank cheque to the ECI to conduct elections as it pleases” while simultaneously placing no emphasis on transparency and insufficient real-time judicial scrutiny.
While the Court clarified that exclusion from electoral rolls does not automatically extinguish citizenship status, the direction to forward names of persons deleted over doubtful citizenship to the Central Government has raised alarms of blurring the distinction between electoral eligibility and nationality. In this context, previous statements by Bihar’s Chief Minister, Samrat Choudhary, suggesting that persons excluded during the SIR would be denied welfare benefits and could even have their bank passbooks cancelled also become equally concerning.
Individuals wrongly excluded may now have to fight parallel battles before different authorities – first, to restore their names on electoral rolls and second, to defend their citizenship claims. In a legal system already marked by delay and unequal access to remedies, the burden will undoubtedly fall most heavily on the poor and marginalized.
Case: Association For Democratic Reforms & Ors. v. Election Commission of India & Ors WP (C) 640/2025