ON APRIL 13, 2026, the Bench of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma, Delhi High Court, heard the arguments, and reserved judgment, in the recusal petition filed by the former Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal, along with a few other accused, in the Delhi Excise Policy case.
Arguing in person, Kejriwal contended that the previous orders passed and the Court’s conduct in the present revision petition raise reasonable apprehensions in the mind of the applicants regarding a fair and unbiased hearing before Justice Sharma. It would therefore be proper for the Judge to recuse herself from the matter. He provided ten specific reasons as to why these apprehensions have arisen.
The petition for recusal or transfer of matter has been filed by Kejriwal while a challenge to an order of a Delhi court discharging him and 22 other accused in the Liquor Policy case is ongoing. The discharge order that came on February 27, 2026 had noted that the evidence adduced in the chargesheets did not raise “grave suspicions” against the accused. However, in a challenge to the order by the CBI, Justice Sharma noted that the discharge order was prima facie erroneous, leading Kejriwal to file the recusal plea.
Read more about the background of the case and the order discharging the accused here.
Arguing in person, Kejriwal contended that the previous orders passed and the Court’s conduct in the present revision petition raise reasonable apprehensions in the mind of the applicants.
‘March 9 order, participation in Adhivakta Parishad’: Ten grounds cited by Kejriwal
First, Kejriwal averred that the relevant test for likelihood of bias is the reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the mind of the party, and not the integrity of the Court. Relying upon Kanaklata v. NCT of Delhi (2015), he contended that an earlier strongly worded order against oneself in similar circumstances is a reasonable ground for fearing a potentially prejudicial order. It was also submitted that a previous finding of the Court on a matter of law must be distinguished from a finding on a matter of fact. While in the former case the judge may not necessarily disqualify themselves, it has been held in State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak (1998) that in the latter case, disqualification becomes the proper course of action.Kejriwal then averred that when Justice Sharma dealt with his bail application in the Excise Duty case, and his challenge to arrest previously, the orders in the cases were so conclusive that he felt that the Court had ‘almost declared him guilty’. Such statements revealed a preconceived notion in the mind of the presiding judge. This raises the apprehension in the minds of the parties about whether the Court will be able to reevaluate such categorical statements in the present case. This apprehension arises more so due to the completely contradictory Session Court’s decision discharging the applicants of all allegations.
Secondly, Kejriwal pointed out that Justice Sharma, in an order passed on March 9, seemed predisposed to the opinion that the trial court’s order discharging the applicants was prima facie erroneous with respect to certain issues. The fact that a decision given by the trial court after analysing 40,000 pages worth of evidence was held erroneous after a short, urgent hearing raised further concerns.
As his third and fourth reasons, Kejriwal referred to the Court decision to adjourn the Enforcement Directorate proceedings related to the present case, and to stay the disciplinary proceedings against the Investigating officer as directed by the trial court, respectively. He submitted that these reliefs were granted even though neither the ED nor the IO was a party to the case, and no such relief was prayed for.
Kejriwal also submitted, as the fifth reason, that the March 9 order had been passed without allowing the accused to be heard or serving any notice to them in advance.
“This court has had MP/MLA roster since 5 January. We analysed the revision petition. There is no other case which is being heard at this speed,” Kejriwal argued, “These two cases are pertaining to important political opponents. . ." The undue haste with which the Court has approached the case, he noted, raises doubts in the minds of the accused regarding the capacity of the judge to hear the case in an unbiased manner.
The ED and Central Bureau of Investigation (‘CBI’) routinely have all their arguments accepted by Justice Sharma, with nearly every request being turned into a favourable order. For instance, Kejriwal noted that even though the revision petition filed by the CBI was generic and did not contain specific counters against the findings related to the accused made in the Session’s Court order,, the High Court had admitted the revision application.
Finally, Kejriwal brought up Justice Sharma’s participation in events of the Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad, the legal wing of the Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh. This, he argued, created a reasonable apprehension of bias in a politically sensitive case, regardless of any explicit ideological statements. He also cited remarks by Home Minister Amit Shah on social media discussions about how Kejriwal will be forced to appeal against the High Court’s decision to the Supreme Court.
Senior Advocate Shadan Farasat, representing Vijay Nair, contended that while considering an application for recusal, the Judge must not only consider the judicial perception of the matter, but also the perception of the person making such an application.
‘Judge must see perception of person making recusal application’: Applicants
Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde, representing Manish Sisodia, another accused who had filed the recusal application, argued that previous findings of the Court in bail applications of his client gave the impression that the Court had already convicted the accused. Hegde argued that the jurisprudence on recusal, since the time of Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (1852), has held that the slightest apprehension about the propriety of the judge in the eyes of the public or one or more of the parties should be considered with utmost seriousness. Once a public statement is expressed as a reasoned opinion by any individual, it is very difficult to go back on such a statement. Senior Advocate Shadan Farasat, representing Vijay Nair, contended that while considering an application for recusal, the Judge must not only consider the judicial perception of the matter, but also the perception of the person making such an application. In criminal cases, even more caution should be shown, as an individual’s liberty is at stake.
‘Apprehension of bias cannot be based on fantasy’: Solicitor General
Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, representing the CBI, countered that the purportedly strong observations made by Justice Sharma in the earlier bail applications of Kejriwal and Sisodia were a legislative mandate. As per Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, he contended that the Court was required to establish a prima facie opinion about the allegations against the accused. He thereafter asserted that the Court in the orders dismissing the bail applications had clarified that the findings were purely concerning the bail application and were prima facie opinions.
Concerning applicants’ arguments about judicial biasness, Mehta contended that biasness must stem from an extrajudicial source. Citing R.K.Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009), Subrata Roy Sahara vs Union of India (2014) and Amarinder Singh vs Parkash Singh Badal (2009), he averred that apprehensions of biasness cannot be based upon fantasy, and the Court had to apply its discretion to determine if the apprehensions are indeed valid. In the present case, no question of bias arises as most allegations concern the judge’s statements under the judicial imprimatur. He contended that the mere ground of an unfavourable judicial decision against the accused is not enough to establish judicial biasness.
Regarding the arguments on Justice Sharma’s presence at Adhivakta Parishad’s events, he pointed out that several Supreme Court judges had attended such events. Adhivakta Parishad, Mehta emphasised, was merely an association of advocates and does not have any political affiliations.
Finally, regarding the Kejriwal’s averments on the distinctly expeditious manner in which the case was heard, Mehta simply contended that matters related to MPs/MLAs are usually heard with such alacrity.
The applicants responded that the cases cited by Mehta concerning previous unfavourable decisions were related to judicial opinions on points of law and not on points of fact. In the present case, Justice Sharma's decisions in previous cases were conclusive statements on the matter of fact itself, and therefore indicate judicial bias. Hegde concluded that in such matters, recusal is not only the easier but also the wiser policy.
The Court concluded its hearing on the issue and has reserved its judgment.
Case: Central Bureau Of Investigation v. Kuldeep Singh (Criminal Revision Petition No. 134/2026)