THE MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT’S recently released draft labour policy, Shram Shakti Niti 2025 is a puzzling document. In one section, it claims that the policy derives its legitimacy and moral authority from the Constitution of India, and the rights and protections guaranteed by it. However, in the next section, it highlights the “Indic worldview” of labour — śrama — being “a sacred and moral duty” that sustains “social harmony, economic well-being, and collective prosperity”.
The document explains:
“...Shram Shakti Niti 2025 envisions the world of work as a moral compact between the State, industry, and workers—rooted in dharma (duty), fairness, and social harmony—thereby reaffirming India’s civilisational belief that the dignity of labour is inseparable from the dignity of life”
…
“Ancient texts such as the Manusmriti, Yajnavalkyasmriti, Naradasmriti, Sukraniti, and Arthashastra articulated this ethos through the concept of rajadharma, emphasising the sovereign’s duty to ensure justice, fair wages, and the protection of workers from exploitation. These early formulations embedded the moral basis of labour governance within India’s civilisational fabric, centuries before the rise of modern labour law”.
Unfortunately, the two world-views—the reconstituted “ancient ideals” and “modern labour law”—are irreconcilable, since in one the status of work is determined by tradition and scripture, while in the other it is negotiated through struggle; in one the worker exists to serve society, in the other she is entitled to the wealth she creates; in one power relations are hierarchical and eternal, in the other they are contestable and transformable; and in one the voice of the worker is suppressed in the name of social harmony, while the other recognises it as central to democracy and justice.
Unfortunately, the two world-views—the reconstituted “ancient ideals” and “modern labour law”—are irreconcilable.
The Shram Shakti Niti fails to recognise that modern labour law is based on a rejection of a duty-based view of work; instead it upholds the rights-based view. The policy is notable less for its proposals than for what it reveals: an attempt to recast India’s labour governance framework to sideline constitutional principles, international commitments, and the lived realities of working people. By describing work as a “sacred and moral duty”, the policy seeks to introduce religious and scriptural conceptions (that reinforce caste and gender based hierarchical division of labour) to conceal and justify the extreme exploitation and deteriorating conditions of the working people.
The illusion of technological empowerment
The policy aims to align the “timeless values” of our ancestors with the recent Labour Codes, in particular the Code on Wages, 2019 and the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020 (‘OSH Code’).
The overall claim of the policy is to address the “structural shifts” in India’s labour market — driven by “digitalisation, green transitions, and new employment forms such as gig and platform work”— by setting up a unified (digital) framework for “social protection, skilling, occupational safety, and technology-led governance”.
In this model, the Ministry of Labour & Employment will become an Employment Facilitator, “enabling convergence among workers, employers, and training institutions through trusted, AI-driven systems”. The National Career Service (‘NCS’) will be installed as India’s Digital Public Infrastructure for Employment, serving as “the technological backbone for inclusive job matching, credential verification, and skill alignment”.
The policy highlights seven “interlinked strategic objectives” that constitute its mission: (1) Universal Social Security; (2) Occupational safety and health; (3) Employment and future; (4) Women and youth empowerment; (5) Ease of compliance and formalisation; (6) Technological & green transition; (7) Convergence and good governance.
Let us look at each of these in turn.
(1) Universal social security
The Policy neither explains the content of social security nor outlines a pathway for its universal implementation. Instead, it relies on the Code on Social Security, 2020 (‘SS Code’), which excludes a large portion of informal workers from its scope. It does so by setting a minimum threshold for the application of the SS Code, and consequently covering only establishments with a specific number of workers. Further, the SS Code leaves it to the discretion of the Central and State Governments to notify schemes for unorganised workers, without establishing a minimum social security floor or providing guidance on the essential components such schemes must include.
The Policy does not explain how safety and health at the workplace will be improved.
(2) Occupational safety, health and working conditions
The Policy does not explain how safety and health at the workplace will be improved. Instead, it falls back upon the OSH Code, which, in one stroke, repealed all sector-specific legislations that contained detailed safety measures applicable to particular sectors, and simultaneously failed to include health and safety measures that would apply to all workers in place of those sector-based legislations. This is particularly egregious since the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work designate health and safety as a fundamental right.
(3) Employment and future
Two critical threats to decent work in India are the simultaneous rise in unemployment and the replacement of permanent or regular employment with casual, contract, fixed-term, and gig work. These forms of employment are marked by precarious working conditions, lack of regulation, and the absence of social security benefits. The Policy offers no actionable programme to create meaningful and secure jobs for India’s workforce, particularly for the youth and future generations.
(4) Women and youth empowerment
In employment, women face discrimination not only in wages but are also relegated to the most menial tasks and “care” work. In India, more women are engaged in informal employment than male workers. Even within the formal sector, women predominate in unskilled, temporary, or contract-based jobs.
Although discrimination is outlawed, government data shows that male workers in medium skilled jobs earn about 21 percent more than women doing similar work. This wage gap is even greater among casual and informal workers. The new policy does not explain how it will create decent, well-paid, and “skilled” employment for women, particularly in sectors traditionally not considered “women’s jobs.”
(5) Ease of compliance and formalisation
The primary aim of the Policy appears to be to provide a red carpet for Big Tech and AI-sector employers to operate in India with minimal regulatory obligations. The Policy weakens inspection mechanisms by proposing “inspections through risk-based algorithms,” adding to a series of existing measures such as single-window clearances and self-certification under the new labour codes — all of which collectively work to undercut inspection. It is, therefor,e paradoxical to claim improved standards of occupational health and safety while simultaneously prioritising “ease of compliance” for employers.
(6) Technology & green transition
Digitisation of labour mechanisms, without a corresponding effort of increasing digital access to the most marginalised sectors will only exclude the majority of the informal workforce. A large proportion of these workers — most of whom are in the unorganised sector — lack reliable access to the internet or digital devices and face compounded barriers of technological and financial illiteracy. Even for those who own mobile phones, poor connectivity often restricts internet access and, in some cases, directly undermines livelihoods. A case in point is the experience of NREGA workers, many of whom have reported losing daily wages due to digital attendance and monitoring systems that are riddled with technical malfunctions and patchy network coverage.
The Policy’s emphasis on digitisation and credential verification through the NCS carries a risk of systematic profiling of workers, potentially leading to discriminatory treatment. Research commissioned by the ILO supports this concern. Further, while the Policy states its intention to comply with OECD AI Principles, it does not explain how India’s regulatory framework will be made consistent with these standards. It also says little about how data collection and use will be regulated, despite its heavy emphasis on building a “Digital India.”
(7) Convergence and good governance
A central aim of the Policy is to promote a vision of “Digital Worker India,” where every worker is empowered through technology. To achieve this, it proposes a digital labour governance framework including unified worker registration, e-grievance redressal, and benefit portability through secure digital identities.
While the goal is ambitious, it is unlikely to be realised given India’s stark digital divide. For instance, only 56 percent of women aged 15 and above in India own mobile phones, compared to 98 percent in the United States and 95 percent in the United Kingdom. Digital literacy levels are similarly low. Without a complementary and inclusive digital policy ensuring universal connectivity, affordable device access, and digital literacy, the push to digitise labour governance will end up being exclusionary rather than empowering.
Any comprehensive digital labour policy, it is obvious, must focus not only on expanding technology use but to also address how to mitigate risks to decent work arising due to new technologies and algorithmic forms of labour control. Instead of strengthening the Ministry of Labour & Employment’s role as the authority responsible for implementing labour laws, the Policy recasts the Ministry’s role as an “employment facilitator” that offers training and facilitates “convergence” between workers and employers. This purported convergence is an eye wash, and is only meant to extend employers a free hand in their operations.
Any comprehensive digital labour policy, it is obvious, must focus not only on expanding technology use but to also address how to mitigate risks to decent work arising due to new technologies and algorithmic forms of labour control.
The Policy also invokes India’s historical “guild” systems as examples of tripartite governance. However, in practice, the Policy undermines existing tripartite structures. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 established a tripartite system recognising the unequal bargaining position of workers and requiring the state to mediate and ensure justice for the weaker party. Sadly, the State has completely abdicated its role as an effective mediator and has refused to interfere with the unfair labour practices of the employers, allowing free play by the latter.
Constitutional and international obligations
The new labour policy reads like a bouquet of buzzwords and slogans—“inclusivity,” “equitable working conditions,” “harmony between stakeholders,” “ease of doing business,” “training and skilling.” But these are flimsy substitutes for constitutional guarantees and international obligations, which are systematically evaded.
There is no clarity about what constitutional rights are enshrined under the seven strategic objectives of the policy. By focusing solely on economic progress, the Policy sidelines social progress entirely. The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which India is bound to uphold as an ILO member, calls for strengthening collective bargaining, but the policy seeks to formalise the workforce through digital systems, individualising labour issues while weakening the collective bargaining power of workers.
It is clear that the interests of employers are at the heart of this new policy, with its repeated emphasis on “training”, “skilling”, “ease of compliance”, and “convergence”. It has nothing to say about the worsening labour crisis in India: from growing informalisation and declining conditions of work. Instead, it stresses on digital registration and database-building, as though enrolling workers in systems will automatically create job security, enforce rights, or create fair working conditions.
The policy has been drafted without consulting labour unions and organisations that represent diverse groups of workers across the country. The absence of meaningful consultation has been criticised by labour unions, who see the policy as “favouring employer profits over workers’ rights and social security”. Others have pointed out that it does not specify the categories of workers (gig worker, agricultural worker, factory workers, MNREGA workers, or migrant workers), each of which require different policy approaches.
A labour policy must be premised on constitutional commitments, international obligations, and labour realities. It must be drafted through inclusive consultations with labour unions, worker groups, and civil society. It must deliver enforceable measures for meaningful and accessible universal social security, mitigate unemployment, formalise informal work, and guarantee living wages, gender equity, safe workplaces, and democratic tripartite governance. The Shram Shakti Niti is not such a policy.