ON APRIL 30, the Supreme Court brought to a close a significant reproductive rights case in recent Indian legal history by declining to hear a curative petition filed by All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Delhi (‘AIIMS ‘) against the Court’s earlier order permitting the medical termination of a seven-month pregnancy of a 15-year-old girl. The minor was said to have attempted to commit suicide on two occasions since the factum of pregnancy was revealed to her.
Additional Solicitor General (‘ASG’) Aishwarya Bhati, representing AIIMS, argued that there was a high likelihood of the foetus being born alive if the procedure went ahead at the stage, and warned that the termination could cause irreversible health complications for the minor girl. However, the bench comprising Chief Justice of India (‘CJI’) Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi underscored the reproductive autonomy of women while allowing the termination. Despite the pregnancy having crossed the statutory limit, the Court held that compelling a minor to continue an unwanted pregnancy would violate her rights to dignity, autonomy, and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Bhati had argued that what the Supreme Court would decide in this case would become the law of the land. Notably, the CJI remarked, "This should have been the law of the land in 2014*, when this Court unnecessarily interfered! What kind of...we are forcing a rape victim only because law does not adequately protect her? This is the unfortunate jurisprudence that at one point developed!"
In the present case, the pregnancy arose out of a consensual relationship between two minors. According to the law, however, owing to the girl’s minority, this is treated as rape.
Pertinently, the Court asked the Centre to consider lifting pregnancy termination deadline of 24-weeks for rape victims, especially when the victims are children.
Background of the Case
In the first week of April, the mother (appellant in the present case) noticed unusual abdominal heaviness in her 15-year-old daughter and, upon medical examination on April 10, discovered that the minor was approximately 27 weeks pregnant. The appellant approached several doctors and clinics seeking termination of the pregnancy, but all refused to perform the procedure. She then moved the Delhi High Court seeking permission for termination.
On April 21, after the Medical Board had submitted its report, the High Court dismissed the plea, observing:
“It is of the opinion that continuation of the pregnancy is less likely to have adverse effects on the minor than termination of the same, which, according to it, carries significant risks, including to her future reproductive health. The psychiatric and psychological assessment of minor-N has not revealed any major psychiatric disorder in the past or at this point of time, and only some signs of emotional distress and adjustment difficulties related to pregnancy were seen. More importantly, as per the Medical Board, in case of delivery at present, the baby would be born alive, although it would require active resuscitation at birth.”
The matter was then appealed before the Supreme Court, where a bench of Justices B. V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan on April 24, 2026, set aside the High Court’s order and permitted the termination of the pregnancy. AIIMS subsequently filed a review petition, which the Court dismissed, criticising the institute for attempting to “defeat the constitutional rights of the minor daughter of the appellant.”
AIIMS thereafter filed the curative petition.
An incremental jurisprudence of reproductive autonomy
The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (‘MTP Act’) was amended in 2021, to raise the upper gestation limit from 20 to 24 weeks for specific vulnerable categories, including rape survivors, incest victims, minors, and differently-abled women. Beyond 24 weeks, for any reason other than foetal abnormality, the law offers no route which forces rape survivors including minors to approach courts.
While dealing with the curative petition, CJI Surya Kant lamented the Supreme Court's failure to bring about changes in medical termination of pregnancy laws at an earlier point. "First judgment in this country was authored by me. On this point. Unfortunately, this Court stayed that judgment. Otherwise law could have been well settled at that time,” the CJI remarked.
He was referring to a case decided in 2009, during his tenure as a judge in the Punjab & Haryana High Court, concerning the Nari Niketan rape case involving a mentally disabled woman. The pregnancy came to light only at a later stage. The bench led by Justice Kant directed the termination of the pregnancy, holding that it was in the best interest of the victim. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court stayed the High Court’s order and prevented the termination, observing that terminating the pregnancy at an advanced stage of 19 to 20 weeks would pose significant health risks to the victim and therefore could not be said to be in her best interests.
Over the last two decades, researchers have however noted that the Supreme Court has gradually developed an incremental jurisprudence of reproductive autonomy, steadily expanding constitutional protections around dignity, privacy, bodily integrity, and decisional freedom in matters of pregnancy and abortion. Yet, this jurisprudence is still evolving, with courts in some cases permitting abortions beyond the statutory limits prescribed under the MTP Act, while denying them in others.
In K.S. Puttaswamy (2017), several individual opinions recognized that reproductive rights fall within the ambit of the right to privacy, building upon the Suchita Srivastava (2009) decision on reproductive autonomy. In doing so, the Puttaswamy Court placed reliance on the following observations:
“There is no doubt that a woman's right to make reproductive choices is also a dimension of “personal liberty” as understood under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
….
Taken to their logical conclusion, reproductive rights include a woman's entitlement to carry a pregnancy to its full term, to give birth and to subsequently raise children. However, in the case of pregnant women there is also a “compelling State interest” in protecting the life of the prospective child. Therefore, the termination of a pregnancy is only permitted when the conditions specified in the applicable statute have been fulfilled. Hence, the provisions of the MTP Act, 1971 can also be viewed as reasonable restrictions that have been placed on the exercise of reproductive choices.”
In 2018, a Division Bench comprising Justices Kurian Joseph and Sanjay K. Kaul rejected a 20-year-old petitioner’s plea to terminate a 25-week pregnancy, underscoring the limitations imposed by the MTP Act. During the proceedings, the Court observed that the unborn child should have been represented in court instead of the mother. “You should make the mother hear her child’s heartbeat,” Justice Joseph reportedly said and that the mother might later “regret killing the baby” if she were to reconcile with her husband.
A two-judge Bench comprising Justices Hima Kohli and B.V. Nagarathna in 2023, initially allowed the termination of a 26-week pregnancy, observing that an unwanted pregnancy would result in a responsibility which the mother does not consider herself fit to shoulder. The Bench had directed that in the event the foetus was born alive, necessary medical procedures, including incubation, should be undertaken. However, in X v. Union of India (2023), a three-judge bench led by the then-CJI D,Y, Chandrachud recalled this order and did not accede to termination on the ground that there was neither a substantial foetal abnormality nor an immediate threat to the life of the mother. This was despite the AIIMS report recording that the petitioner was suffering from postpartum psychosis accompanied by suicidal tendencies.
The Court observed:
“Under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court has the power to do complete justice. However, this power may not be attracted in every case. If a medical termination were to be conducted at this stage, the doctors would be faced with a viable foetus. One of the options before this Court, which the email from AIIMS has flagged, is for it to direct the doctors to stop the heart beat.
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In the absence of a direction to stop the heart beat, the viable foetus would be faced with a significant risk of lifelong physical and mental disabilities. The reports submitted by the Medical Board speak for themselves.”
However, in A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra (2024), CJI Chandrachud expressed reservations about the MTP Act not allowing termination of pregnancy above the upper limit of 24 weeks in the case of victims of rape and incest. The Court, however, stopped short of striking down the provision. Instead, it left the question open for a future constitutional challenge in an “appropriate proceeding.”
In H v. Union of India (2024), placing strong emphasis on the right to life of a 28-week-old foetus, the Supreme Court rejected a 20-year-old unmarried woman’s plea for medical termination of pregnancy. The Court observed that “the child in the womb has a fundamental right to live.”
In A (Mother of X) (2026), a two-judge Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Nagarathna refused to allow the statutory time limits under the MTP Act to override constitutional scrutiny, and directed that the petitioner, who had crossed 18 years of age, be permitted to undergo medical termination of pregnancy. The order read:
“Ultimately, the denominator is the fact that the child to be born is not out of a wedlock and secondly, the mother to be of the child does not want to bear such a child. If the interest of the mother is to be taken note of, then her reproductive autonomy must be given sufficient emphasis. The court cannot compel any woman, much less a minor child, to complete her pregnancy if she is otherwise not intending to do so; that would be more traumatic for a minor such as the appellant’s daughter in the instant case.”
While hearing the appeal in the present case, Justices Nagarathna and Bhuyan had noted on April 24, 2026:
“No court ought to compel any woman and more so a minor child, to carry a pregnancy to full term against her express will….What is of relevance is the choice of the pregnant woman rather than the interest of an unborn child. It is easy to say that if the pregnant woman is not interested in raising the child, she may give away the child in adoption and therefore must be compelled into giving birth to the child. However, that cannot be the correct approach, particularly, in cases where the child to be born is unwanted. In such a situation, directing the pregnant woman to give birth to the child against her wishes and to forcefully continue her pregnancy would negate the welfare of the pregnant woman and make it subordinate to the child yet to be born.”
The order further clarified that the mere passage of time cannot extinguish a woman’s reproductive choices:
“This argument rests on the untenable presumption that delay means acquiescence, disregarding the manifold reasons that may account for late presentation of pregnancy including but not limited to delayed detection due to irregular menstrual cycles or lack of reproductive awareness, limited access to healthcare services, financial constraints that impede timely medical consultation, and hesitation to disclose a pregnancy coercion, abuse, or lack of familial support: all of which may prevent earlier disclosure.”
While hearing the curative petition, CJI Surya Kant also observed that the doctors appeared to be placing disproportionate emphasis on the unborn child rather than the suffering endured by the minor girl. Medical opinion, the Court held, cannot override the choice of the woman if the pregnancy is not wanted by her. Following the dismissal of a review petition and the rejection of a curative petition filed by AIIMS seeking recall of the April 24 order, the Court issued a contempt notice to the institute.
What the cases collectively demonstrate is that abortion access beyond MTP statutory limits is still evolving based on judicial discretion. The MTP Act's 24-week ceiling has never been struck down, but the Court’s interpretation creates a patchwork of case-by-case relief rather than systemic reform. The 2026 ruling, while significant, still doesn't conclusively resolve the underlying constitutional question of whether a woman's reproductive autonomy categorically overrides statutory gestational limits, particularly in contexts involving minors or survivors of rape.
That question remains open for a future challenge or a legislative change. Until that question is definitively answered, will abortion access remain a matter of which courtroom a woman finds herself in?
For many minors, disclosing a pregnancy can carry the threat of violence, stigma, or shame. In such circumstances, the 24-week limit might be a window that may close before they have information, resources, or the safety to act. In the current framework, courts function as the last resort, but pregnant persons require legal representation, time, and confidence to navigate them. Females who know lawyers, live in cities, can afford to file petitions and appear before benches, may navigate the system. Those who cannot, do not.
Critics also argue that statutes such as the MTP Act continue to constrain women’s reproductive autonomy by making access to abortion contingent on medical authorisation at every stage of pregnancy.
Medical Autonomy vs. Women's Autonomy
Abortion in India is not a right. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (‘BNS’), which replaced the Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’), continues to criminalise abortion. Section 88 of the BNS (Causing miscarriage), is a direct carryover from the colonial-era IPC and the provision itself traces its origins to Sections 58-60 of Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, (‘OAPA’) which made procuring miscarriage a punishable offence and carried a maximum penalty of penal servitude for life. The provisions of OAPA were largely carried forward from an earlier British legislative prohibition, Offences Against the Person Act 1837, according to which procurement of miscarriage could attract the death penalty if the woman was considered ‘quick with child’, or imprisonment and transportation in other cases.
The MTP Act only carves out exceptions to that criminalisation. Its primary function is to shield registered medical practitioners from criminal liability when they terminate pregnancies in accordance with the prescribed statutory limits and after obtaining the requisite medical opinions. Medical approval is thus prioritised over women's autonomy by design and this became particularly evident in the present case when no medical institution was willing to terminate the pregnancy, and the High Court dismissed the petition, relying heavily on the opinion of the Medical Board.
This framework has been criticised for reinforcing bureaucratic hurdles in access to abortion care and for placing procedural constraints that may delay or impede timely reproductive healthcare.
Academics Dipika Jain and Payal Shah have highlighted that while there has been considerable progress in recognizing the reproductive rights of women and girls in India by several Supreme Court and High Court decisions, courts continue to understand abortion as a conditional right and have yet to recognize it as an essential element of pregnant persons’ equality.
A study examining 1,114 MTP cases decided by Indian courts between 2019 and 2024 found that in 949 cases, the decision of the court was in conformity with the Medical Board’s opinion, or treated its opinion as final. Even where the Medical Board commented on things beyond the scope of the MTP Act such as the implications for a woman’s ‘future pregnancies’, courts unquestioningly followed such opinions.
The Court's call to the Centre to amend the law removing time limits for minor rape survivors in the present case is crucial. But the deeper reform that experts argue for is a more fundamental rights-based abortion law, so that children are no longer sent to courts to argue for rights the Constitution already promised them.
"There are two things to be done. Decriminalise abortion and allow complete autonomy to women and not their doctors in this matter," Jain told Times of India.
On May 2, the minor delivered a baby boy at AIIMS after the institution complied with the Supreme Court’s directions permitting medical termination of her then 30-week pregnancy. Officials stated that the mother and her parents relinquished their rights over the child, following which the formal adoption process was initiated through the central adoption agency. The ASG reported that the infant, born with certain disabilities, has an 80 per cent survival rate and is currently in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU)
On May 4, the Court thereafter dropped the contempt proceedings which had been initiated on a petition by the minor’s mother alleging non-compliance with the April 24 order directing termination of her pregnancy. Justice Nagarathna observed that such cases place courts in difficult situations where decisions must be taken dispassionately, despite the emotional weight involved. Acknowledging the social realities, she added “the tendency nowadays in society is that these unwanted pregnancies are on the rise. By the time a decision is taken in the family, it would be seven months.”
On that day, ASG Bhati had submitted that the statutory limit for termination of pregnancy had already been expanded through the 2021 amendment to the MTP Act, which extended the permissible limit to 24 weeks and in cases involving advanced pregnancies, the Court would also need to consider the rights and future of the child likely to be born.
“Someday your lordships will also have to consider what happens to such babies. This baby is here, he has an 80% chance of survival but with lifelong disabilities” she said.
“There is a need for sex education in the society. We as family and parents need to educate. That matter is pending before us,” Bhati stated.
Case: S v. Union of India SLP(C) NO. 14454/2026.
Note: * The year 2014, as referred to by CJI Surya Kant is likely an approximation. It was in 2009 that Justice Surya Kant, as a judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, delivered the verdict in the Nari Niketan case, allowing the termination of pregnancy. However, the Supreme Court stayed the decision in Suchitra Srivastava later that year. This derivation is based on The Leaflet’s research and approximation. We welcome our readers to guide us on further information on this.