ON JUNE 19, 2026, the Delhi High Court in a significant ruling in the case of Telegram FZ LLC & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. upheld the order passed by the Union government pertaining to the temporary blocking of Telegram, the cloud based social media and instant messaging platform, until June 22, 2026. The judgement was pronounced by Justice Tejas Karia.
On May 22, 2026 , the National Testing Agency (‘NTA’) had informed the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (‘MeitY’) about the ‘misuse of the Telegram Application by third-parties concerning the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (Undergraduate) 2026 (NEET UG)’. Subsequent to this, on June 3, 2026 , a meeting was held which was attended by representatives of Telegram along with MeitY and the NTA, which ultimately resulted in Telegram taking down the URLs notified by the MeitY which were allegedly involved in the fraud concerning the NEET UG 2026.
The Union government then issued an order directing Telegram and its associated URLs to be blocked across India till June 22, along with disablement of the message editing feature of the App till June 30. The committee which was constituted under Rule 7 of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public Rules),2009 for providing recommendations with respect to the order also concurred with the findings and directions encompassed in the order with the Union government placing its observation of an unresolvable issue with respect to re-emergence of ‘unlawful channels’ on the platform despite their take-downs.
‘Platform wide ban is an extreme measure’: Telegram
Telegram, in its submissions, highlighted its sustained cooperation with the Indian government when it was apprised of the ‘alleged circulation of fraudulent content relating to NEET UG 2026’ through meetings with the Union government’s representatives. Further, Telegram highlighted its reply to the Respondents in which it strictly maintained its stand on its policy of prohibition of extending any services for the purposes of ‘examination fraud, cheating impersonation or the sale and distribution of examination material’ along with having an extensive content-moderation framework in place comprising ‘AI, machine-learning tools and human moderators’ who actively review the nature of the content and remove the same if they are found to be unlawful.
It also employed crackdown measures like ‘content removal, account restrictions and permanent bans’ with respect to its users who were found to be involved in the violations in relation to NEET UG 2026 . Telegram also termed the order issued by the Respondents as a non-speaking order whilst placing reliance on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) as it termed the ‘platform-wide block’ as an ‘extreme measure’ which was disproportionate to the extent of the problem that the respondents were aiming to curb .
Additionally, it highlighted that such a measure directly impacted more than 150 million Telegram users in India with numerous students using it for lawful purposes such as accessing ‘study material and educational resources’. In its submission the petitioner also highlighted the absence of any mention in the order regarding its compliance with the directions entailed in the order as it disabled 900 URLs out of the 1300 URLs notified by the MeitY. It vehemently maintained its adherence to the statutory obligations under Rule 3 (1)(b) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 as it had employed all the ‘reasonable and technologically feasible safeguards’ in order to curb the unlawful content.
Telegram also submitted that the order passed by the Union government was in direct contravention with Section 69A of the IT Act as it laid down blocking access only with respect to a ‘specific information’ and not to a complete ‘intermediary platform’ and asked for the order to be set-aside.
‘Platform wide ban is in adherence of Section 69A of IT Act’: Respondents
The respondents which comprised the MeitY and the Ministry of Home Affairs (‘MHA’) in their submissions acknowledged receiving various complaints regarding the misuse of Telegram with NTA being one of the first complainants which voiced its concern disclosing certain bots and channels allegedly linked to the examination paper leaks thereby posing a significant threat to the integrity of NEET UG 2026.
It highlighted the distinct nature of Telegram when compared with other intermediary platforms on the ground of its ‘cloud-based infrastructure, large public broadcast channels, concealment of user identifiers’ coupled with an exclusive feature of ‘message editing’, wherein a user can alter the date on which such content was published thereby making it highly prone to misuse in the backdrop of examination fraud. Additionally, Telegram claimed that it was incapable of preventing its users from blocking measures through VPNs and in order to structurally change its message editing feature it would require a considerable amount of time.
In their submission, the Respondents specifically highlighted a Telegram Channel which had been identified as being actively involved in disseminating materials in relation to the NEET UG 2026 examination leaks whilst placing before the High Court the futility of removing such a Telegram channel as ‘mirror channels’ can be created instantly towards which the subscribers of the earlier channel can be easily directed to leading to an almost instant resurrection of the unlawful activities despite the removal of the Telegram channel.
The Respondents submitted that blocking power enshrined in Section 69A of the IT Act extended to not just ‘individual pieces of content’ but also the ‘software architecture, databases and the entirety of programmatic ecosystem which constitute an application’ with such an application falling within the terminology of ‘information’ as per Section 2(1)(v) of the IT Act. This ensured that Telegram’s blocking was in adherence to Section 69A. They also also highlighted inherent systemic abuse of the Telegram Platform through a report which contained documented unlawful activities like the carrying out of cyber-attacks and circulation of child sexual exploitative and abuse material.
They referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Akshay N. Patel v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr. (2022), in which the Court had held that ‘constitutional rights cannot be permitted to become instruments in the hands of private commercial entities to defeat lawful regulation enacted in public interest’. They termed the platform wide block as the only feasible recourse as Telegram was structurally incapable to re-model its design, particularly the ‘date-time editing capability and the mass-multiplication’ features within the fast-approaching exam window.
What did the High Court say?
The High Court zeroed down two issues which had arisen for determination: the first, the ascertainment of whether the order passed by the Union government suffered from a non-application of mind and the second, whether the temporary blocking of an entire platform is a proportionate measure in relation to the harm that is being sought to be curbed.
On the first issue, it recognised the Union’s cognizance of the issues pertaining to the circulation of ‘exam related misinformation, purported examination papers and other unlawful activities’ and the wide-scaled implications the same could pose on the ‘public order’ in the country and termed the same as a valid and well-founded reason to pass such an order. It affirmed the application of reasoning in the order whilst also providing Telegram an opportunity of being heard. The High Court recognised that the Respondent acted in the interest of nearly ‘2.2 million candidates appearing for the NEET UG 2026 examination’, with the intent to prevent any possible public disorder.
On the second issue, Telegram explicitly acknowledged that the term ‘information’ which is used in Section 69A of the IT Act and is defined under Section 2(1)(v) is lucidly indicative of being construed in an expansive manner and a narrow interpretation of the same confining it only to ‘channels, posts, messages, accounts’ etc of individuals would render the blocking-power enshrined in Section 69A as futile.
The High Court, while assessing the threshold of proportionality in the Respondent’s act of blocking public access to Telegram, noted that the very build of the Telegram platform facilitates the ‘mass dissemination of content’ to a considerably large number of its users in no time, which thereby alludes to swift and wide circulation of any unlawful content which significantly increases the risk of disruption in public order.
It also noted the inefficacy of removing ‘channels, groups, bots and accounts’ as the same instantly resurfaced through ‘mirror channels’. Additionally, the High Court recognised that the construction of Section 69A lucidly envisages the power to issue ‘interim blocking directions’ in case of an emergency to be exercised by the Union government whilst acknowledging the intermediary’s right to a ‘post-decisional hearing’ before passing a final order.
The High Court ultimately upheld the temporary blocking of Telegram until June 22 and the disablement of its message editing feature untilJune 30, as they proved to be germane to secure the objective stated by the Respondent and termed the measure adopted by the Union government as ‘least restrictive and proportionate’.
