The Delhi High Court’s recent bail order under the MCOCA revives the spirit of K.A. Najeeb

ON JULY 7, the Delhi High Court granted regular bail to B. Mohanraj, a man who had spent nearly five years in custody without his trial even beginning. Mohanraj, described by the prosecution as the legal aide of an organised crime syndicate led by Sukesh Chandra Shekhar, had been arrested in September 2021 in connection with an extortion racket that allegedly impersonated senior government officials. He was booked under provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Information Technology Act, 2000, and the stringent Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (‘MCOCA’).Justice Jalan’s order granting bail furthers a live, unresolved dispute within the Supreme Court itself over whether Article 21’s guarantee of a speedy trial can override the statutory bail restrictions built into laws like MCOCA..The petitioner relied on K.A. Najeeb (2021), arguing that prolonged pre-trial detention with little prospect of a timely trial warranted bail despite MCOCA’s restrictions..BackgroundThe case arose from a First Information Report (‘FIR’) registered by the Delhi Police Special Cell in August 2021, following a complaint by Ms. Aditi Singh alleging extortion. Sukesh Chandrashekhar was identified as the lead figure of a syndicate that ran an extortion racket by impersonating senior government officials, among other illegal activities carried out with his associates. B. Mohanraj, the petitioner, was arrested on September 5, 2021. The chargesheet was filed under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the Information Technology Act, 2000, and the MCOCA. Mohanraj, a close aide of the syndicate who handled its legal affairs, allegedly assisted in concealing the proceeds of crime through illegal means. Over the course of his association with the syndicate, he is alleged to have helped channel funds through third parties to purchase real estate and vehicles, earning substantial commissions that themselves constituted proceeds of crime.Mohanraj’s earlier bail application had been rejected by both the Special Court and the Delhi High Court in 2023. The present regular bail petition was accordingly filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’) before the Delhi High Court.Arguments on behalf of the PetitionerSenior Advocate Anand Grover, who appeared for the petitioner, argued that the petitioner had been incarcerated for nearly four years and ten months and the charges had only recently been framed by the Special Court and the prosecution proposes to examine 403 witnesses with a chargesheet running into 10,000 pages. Moreover, a co-accused had also been recently arrested. All this indicated that the trial was unlikely to be concluded within a reasonable time period. He noted that the petitioner had no attributable role in the alleged extortion and there was no documentary evidence and money trail that could link the petitioner to the organized crime syndicate, and that the prosecution’s case relied primarily on the retracted confessional statement recorded under Section 18 of the MCOCA..He challenged the admissibility of the confession under Section 18 of the MCOCA citing procedural lapses committed by the authorities particularly the requirement of certificate regarding voluntariness. He relied on Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) to argue that the mandatory cooling-off period was not followed before recording the confession. He further relied on the three-judge bench order in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021), and contended that the prolonged pre-trial detention with a dim prospect of conclusion of the trial within a reasonable period warranted the grant of bail despite the statutory restrictions under MCOCA.Arguments advanced by the ProsecutionSenior Advocate Sanjay Jain, who appeared for the State, opposed the grant of bail and noted that the issues raised by the petitioner had already been considered and rejected by the High Court in its earlier 2023 judgement, especially surrounding the confessional statement. He argued that Mohanraj was an active member of the organized crime syndicate while being fully aware of the activities and related illegalities. He further submitted that Mohanraj knowingly assisted in managing the proceeds of crime by facilitating the successful transactions related to purchase of the immovable properties and luxury cars along with handling cash transfers on behalf of the syndicate. He contended that the benefits of Article 21 could not be invoked on the basis of the mere length of custody and that too where the delay is attributable to the accused himself. He argued that cases governed by special statutes like MCOCA have statutory restrictions on the grant of bail which cannot be overridden on the lone prolonged incarceration argument.The Court’s reasoningThe Court reviewed the competing authorities including K.A. Najeeb, Gulfisha Fatima v. State (GNCTD) (2026) and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, Jammu (2026). It relied on its earlier judgement in the Deepak Ramnani v. State of Delhi (2026) holding that the question of bail in cases involving special statutes should be decided through a practical, fact-specific approach while taking into account the period of incarceration, the likelihood of early conclusion of the trial, the nature of the offence, and the role of the accused.The Court noted that the petitioner had not been accused of participating in the alleged acts of extortion and his role limited to planning and management of funds. It noted that the period of pre-trial detention and the unlikeliness of the trial being completed within a reasonable time to hold that the continued detention as an undertrial was inappropriate. Consequently, Justice Jalan allowed the application, granting bail to the petitioner with certain conditions..Weighing the period of incarceration, the likelihood of early trial conclusion, the nature of the offence, and the petitioner’s role, the Court granted bail..The evolution of bail jurisprudence under special statutesIn Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979), the right to a speedy trial was read into Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Individual liberty depends greatly on the speed of trial, particularly in cases where life and liberty are at stake and where the State itself is a party to the prosecution.Four decades later, NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) narrowed that premise in cases involving special statutes. This judgment marks the point from which the modern jurisprudence around bail under special laws took a restrictive turn. The Court, adopting a State-favouring approach, held that a prima facie case could be established on the basis of allegations in the FIR, case diary, and chargesheet alone. It limited the safeguards available to the accused and, in effect, undermined the right to a fair trial. The reasoning in Watali has since come to be described as the ‘jurisprudence of suspicion’.This line of jurisprudence saw a fissure with the Supreme Court’s order in K.A. Najeeb in 2021, where the Court insisted on a harmonious reading of statutory restrictions alongside the constitutional guarantee under Article 21. The Court held that where fundamental rights are violated, statutory restrictions on bail would “melt down,” allowing the right to life and personal liberty to override them. Thus, where trial delay exceeds reasonable limits and the period of incarceration comes to constitute a substantial part of the likely sentence, bail ought to be granted. The Supreme Court in Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) affirmed the bindingness of the Najeeb ruling holding Article 21 as sacrosanct and that it would run counter to the constitutional jurisprudence if constitutional courts are restrained from granting bail under special laws. Again, in Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India (2021) it was relied upon and followed as precedent. Here, the Court observed that “mere support” is not enough to establish the intent of the accused. Thus, material presented failed to disclose the intent to commit offence and the unreasonable delay in trial which violated Article 21. In Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024), the Court relied on Najeeb to hold that the nature of the offence can’t lead to the denial of bail if the accused’s right to speedy trial under Article 21 cannot be protected.In January 2026, however, in Gulfisha Fatima, the Court departed from the rule laid out in Najeeb and held that delay in trial and prolonged incarceration alone cannot override the statutory restrictions and that the accused cannot be separated from the broader conspiracy. It emphasised that the other factors depending on a case-to-case basis need to be taken under consideration. These include the gravity of the offence, ascribed role of the accused, weightage of prima facie, with delay period as just another input.The ruling in Gulfisha created an aberration in the law of precedent as the two-judge bench decision ignored the three-judge bench order in Najeeb which should otherwise have been followed given the facts of the case: a five-year detention, no charges framed, and prosecution witness yet to be examined. In a way this opened the door for further constitutional questions on whether the judges can deviate from the set precedent laid down by benches of greater strength. The same year in May, in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, the Supreme Court held that in cases of prolonged pre-trial detention and no reasonable expectation of trial reaching conclusion within a reasonable time, bail should be granted irrespective of the nature of offence. Importantly, the Court disapproved the law in Gulfisha noting that it failed to adhere to the precedent in Najeeb. Interestingly, with this emerged a constitutional crisis where two benches of the same strength interpreted a judgement (Najeeb) leading to two different outcomes. To resolve the dispute and seek clarity on what is the established position on law both these cases: Gulfisha and Andrabi have been referred before a higher Bench in Tasleem Ahmad v. State Govt of NCT of Delhi..The ruling in Gulfisha created an aberration in the law of precedent with a two-judge bench decision ignoring a three-judge bench order it was bound to follow..Implications of the orderIndividual liberty and constitutional rights stand at the crossroads of judicial oversight and executive-legislative action, both of which have, in different ways, shown indifference to their protection. That the Supreme Court’s helplessness is visible in its unwillingness to critically assess the legislative policy when it comes to statutorily laid down restrictions under special laws and in a way this reflects the Supreme Court’s failure to act as an anti-majoritarian figure. And when it comes to adjudication of terror-related cases, the Court has shown a passive and minimalistic approach signifying deference to mere procedural compliance and limited scrutiny of the statutory provision in light of fundamental rights.The special laws have been stripped of their so-called extraordinary character through a series of amendments widening their scope, for instance, the UAPA (Amendment) Act, 2019, empowered the Union government to designate individuals as terrorists, whereas its original mandate was limited to organisations alone. The judiciary has facilitated much of this expansion, one notable instance being the oft-cited Watali case of 2019. A discernible trend has also emerged on the part of executive agencies filing cases built on concocted allegations or insufficient evidence under stringent special laws, resulting in a structural denial of speedy trial and a distortion of the presumption of innocence.In light of all this, the significance of the Delhi High Court’s judgment lies more in its method than in its outcome. Amid an unresolved conflict on the issue, Justice Jalan posed a simple question: whether the petitioner would be entitled to bail even on the prosecution’s best case. Answering in the affirmative, the Court revived the spirit of Najeeb, giving due weight to the prolonged detention, the unlikelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable time, and the petitioner’s rights under Article 21.While the order does not resolve the doctrinal conflict, it signals how individual constitutional courts intend to navigate the interim uncertainty by continuing to apply the logic of Najeeb wherever the facts warrant it. For undertrials languishing in custody under special statutes, this matters as much in practice as any eventual doctrinal resolution. Bail delayed by years of unresolved jurisprudence is, in real terms, liberty denied.Each such order also does quiet work of its own. It nudges the pendulum back toward individual liberty as the default constitutional value, rather than the exception statutory restrictions must occasionally accommodate. Whether this pattern of High Courts choosing Najeeb over Gulfisha, on facts that resemble the latter as much as the former, amounts to a considered judicial trend or scattered instances of judicial conscience will likely weigh on how the larger bench frames its answer in Tasleem Ahmad. A reference meant to resolve a conflict between two coordinate benches may, paradoxically, be shaped by the accumulated weight of orders passed while that conflict remained unresolved.Until the Supreme Court speaks with one voice, orders like this one will likely continue to test how far constitutional courts are willing to go in giving Article 21 primacy over statutory silence, and how much of that burden should fall on individual judges, rather than on Parliament or the Supreme Court itself, to resolve.

The Delhi High Court’s recent bail order under the MCOCA revives the spirit of K.A. Najeeb

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