Six noteworthy judgements by Justice Joymalya Bagchi, the newest appointee to the Supreme Court of India

ON March 10, 2024, the Union government cleared the appointment of Calcutta High Court’s Justice Joymalya Bagchi as a judge of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Collegium led by Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna had recommended Justice Bagchi’s appointment on March 6, 2025. With his appointment, Justice Bagchi is set to take up the mantle of the Chief Justice of India in 2031.

Cognizant of this, in its resolution, the Collegium had noted that since the retirement of Chief Justice Altamas Kabir in 2013, there had been no Chief Justice from the Calcutta High Court. 

Justice Bagchi enrolled as an advocate on November 28, 1991. Twenty years later, he was appointed as a permanent judge of the Calcutta High Court, on June 27, 2011. In 2020, he was transferred to the Andhra Pradesh High Court. On November 8, 2021, he was repatriated to the Calcutta High Court. Notably, Justice Bagchi’s recommendation superseded the names of at least ten senior judges.

During his tenure as a judge in the High Courts, Justice Bagchi delivered important criminal and constitutional decisions, harping on progressing criminal justice protections such as the right to free legal aid, right to speedy trials in terror offences, and mitigating circumstances in death penalty adjudications. One decision, although later overturned, also emphasised on the right of minorities to administer religious institutions. 

We list a few of his noteworthy decisions. 

Malati Sardar v. State of West Bengal (2017)

In Malati Sardar v State of West Bengal, Justice Bagchi harped on access to justice and fairness in procedural law. In the case, a convict’s appeal had remained unaddressed for almost six years due to a failure to avail her of legal aid. 

Justice Bagchi emphasised that the right to legal aid to a convict to prefer appeal against conviction and/or sentence was not a mere statutory right but a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This also found reflection in Article 39A as a Directive Principle of State policy. It was further reinforced under Article 14(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

Justice Bagchi clarified that this right is available not just at the trial stage but continued through the appellate process. He created a blueprint for institutional accountability by issuing extensive guidelines mandating trial courts and correctional home authorities to inform convicts of their right to appeal with legal aid. Besides this, he also directed the legal service authorities to conduct follow-ups

State of West Bengal v. Sahadeb Barman (2023)

As part of a Division Bench in State of West Bengal v. Sahadeb Barman., Justice Bagchi, highlighted the necessary balance between retributive justice and humanistic sentencing. Three individuals had been murdered during a robbery attempt by a group of carpenters engaged in home renovations. The accused were sentenced to death by the trial court. However, Justice Bagchi commuted the sentence to life imprisonment without remission for thirty years.

He carefully examined the evidence, including circumstantial links such as presence at the scene and recovery of stolen property, illustrating the requirement for the court to consider not only aggravating but also mitigating circumstances of the accused before awarding the death penalty. Justice Bagchi emphasized that the death  penalty must be guided by the rarest of rare doctrine, wherein all possibilities of reformation are eliminated. He held that although the crime was grave and serious, it could not be said to fall within the category that shocks the “collective conscience” of society or displays such depravity or uncommon brutality as to warrant capital punishment. 

Sk. Md. Rafique v. Managing Committee, Contai Rahamania High Madrasah (2015)*

In Sk. Md. Rafique v. Managing Committee, Contai Rahamania High Madrasah the constitutionality of the West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008, which mandated a state-controlled selection process for appointing the teaching staff in minority-run Madrasahs, was under challenge. The judgement, delivered by then Chief Justice Manjula Chellur and Justice Bagchi, held that the 2008Act violated Article 30(1) of the Constitution, which conferred upon a minority institution the right to administer and appoint its own staff. He noted that any regulation that substantially impairs such a right must be held unconstitutional. The judgment made an important distinction between regulation and control, establishing that while the State may regulate for quality assurance, it cannot dictate personnel appointments. Even though the West Bengal government claimed that the commission's role was purely recommendatory, the judgement held that even a mechanism of appointment, which may appear ostensibly recommendatory, can, in effect, control and curtail the autonomy of minority institutions where such recommendations become determinative in practice.

This judgment was later overturned by the Supreme Court in 2020. The top Court upheld the validity of the 2008 Act, holding that it did not infringe Article 30(1) of the Constitution, as regulatory provisions relating to the appointment of teaching staff did not take away the minorities’ right to administer the institution. It was clarified that the right to administer does not exclude reasonable regulations to ensure excellence in education.

Dr. Subires Bhattacharyya v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2022)

A Division Bench decision in Dr. Subires Bhattacharyya v. CBI, provides insight into Justice Bagchi’s approach towards systemic corruption and public accountability. The former Chairman of the West Bengal Central School Service Commission, accused of executing a large-scale recruitment scam involving manipulation of OMR sheets, personality test scores, and issuance of fraudulent recommendation letters. This conspiracy led to the subversion of a public recruitment process. Justice Bagchi denied the bail application to the former chairman noting the gravity of the offence and its widespread societal consequences

Justice Bagchi asserted that corruption in public recruitment not only eroded institutional integrity but also destroyed the social fabric of equal opportunity. The gravity of such offences necessitates a higher threshold for bail, especially where it involves systematic abuse of power and breach of public trust. As per Justice Bagchi, the normalisation of institutional misconduct through routine approval of bail application could corrode the sanctity of due process. 

Sk. Rejaul @ Kiran @ Rutu v. State of West Bengal (2023)

The petitioner, alleged to be linked to the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), was under trial under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and had been in custody for almost three years.

In this bail judgment, Justice Bagchi relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb to emphasise the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Carefully analysing all the facts, Justice Bagchi found the petitioner to have no prior criminal record, with no explosive materials found in his possession. 

Justice Bagchi noted that the accused had already suffered incarceration for almost half of the sentence awarded to the co-accused in the same case. The trial proceedings were severely delayed, with only one out of 54 witnesses examined over the past three years, making the conclusion of the trial a distant prospect.

Justice Bagchi held that delay in trial proceedings, even under a stringent anti-terror law like the UAPA, could warrant bail. 

Ajoy Mudi v State of West Bengal (2023)

In Ajoy Mudi v. State of West Bengal, Justice Bagchi demonstrated certain meticulousness in analysing the chain of evidence. As part of the Division Bench, Justice Bagchi upheld the conviction of the appellant for the murder of his wife under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The case involved circumstantial evidence, with the deceased found dead in her matrimonial home and the postmortem revealing ante mortem injuries consistent with homicidal strangulation, including fractures of the hyoid bone and laryngeal cartilage.

Justice Bagchi observed that when an accused is shown to be present with the deceased at the time of death and fails to offer a plausible explanation for fatal injuries, the burden under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 shifts to the accused. The High Court rejected the defence’s theory that the injuries were caused by tuberculosis-related coughing or induced vomiting, citing a lack of medical evidence.