Can the constitutional promise survive a Hindu Rashtra?

Can the hunger of the Hindu Rashtra be contained within the limits of the Indian Constitution, Aditya Krishna and Saif Ali ask Prof. Faizan Mustafa.

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IN a recent article in the Indian Express, Professor Faizan Mustafa, vice chancellor of the Chanakya National Law University in Patna and one of India's most respected constitutional experts, reflected on the future of secular ideas in the country in the wake of the recently concluded elections.

His arguments can be summarised in three points. First, the fantasy of Hindu Rashtra needs to be thrown out for elections to happen on development issues.

Second, he suggests that Hinduism should be declared India's "dominant spiritual heritage". It would be good for secularism because it is also possible that it would ensure non-communal election campaigns in the future.

Third, he gives reassurance that even in the event of India becoming a Hindu Rashtra, the rights of Muslims will be protected by the country's Constitution. The protection of rights will be ensured by the judiciary and coalition politics; and, under liberal judges, the protections might be enhanced, particularly on subjects such as hate speech and the rights of Muslims to reservation.

We respectfully disagree, and seek to respond to the same seriatim.

As Prof. Mustafa acknowledges, the Hindutva fantasy tends to make elections a communal, 'us versus them' affair. If we look into the history of Hindutva, it constructs India as a Hindu nation. It seeks to unite the Hindu population into subscribing to this majoritarian dream of a homeland for Hindus.

The early proponents of Hindutva drew inspiration from the fascists in Italy and Germany, asserting in We or the Nationhood Defined (1939) that India belongs to Hindus and the minorities should be treated like the Nazis treated the Jews.

The manifestation of this fantasy in India has seen multiple chapters— the Independence and Partition, tensions with the new Constitution, the Ram Mandir phase, and finally the post-2014 phase.

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The one thing that has remained constant throughout is the idea of India being a nation of and for Hindus. Another likeness with the fascists is the fantasy of recreating a mythical 'Akhand Bharat', the core of which includes territories of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Tibet— and the periphery going further East up to Indonesia.

The irony is that a huge portion of this 'akhand' (unbreakable) land is today populated by Muslims— whose position in the present Hindutva-ruled and "khandit" (broken) India is also miserable.

While claiming to soon establish Akhand Bharat as a Hindu nation, the proponents of Hindutva take contradictory positions like "every person living on this land is a Hindu/has a Hindu DNA", which was in time polluted by the enslavement of Mother India by Muslim rulers and the British.

In many ways, the Hindutva narrative is thus an attempt towards constructing a national identity out of victimhood— which is half-truth and half-post-truth.

This victimhood nationalism is an attempt to correct the wrongs committed, and in that sense a unique mix of revivalist and reactionary politics. It seeks to revert to the glory of ancient, Hindu India by invisiblising religious minorities whose manifestation can be seen in calls for economic boycotts, name changes, prohibition of inter-faith marriages, etc.

A conspicuous entity at the receiving end of these fantasies is the Muslim woman. A woman's body becomes the site for violence. During communal riots, apart from the brutality towards life and property, sexual violence against women is a measure to assert dominance.

With the emergence of internet connectivity, the brutalisation of Muslim women has extended to the digital space through apps such as Bulli Bai and Sulli Deals, which were 'auctioning' young Muslim women's photographs, and fetishising and harassing them on the internet.

Recently, a Muslim widow working for the Gujarat government secured a flat in a Vadodara housing complex. When she tried to move in with her children, the residents protested her occupancy and took this matter to the administration.

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These instances point out the larger menace of housing discrimination against Muslims (while there is a simultaneous and growing clamour of complaints about ghettoisation of the Muslim populations— calling those ghettos 'mini-Pakistans').

This is a clear demonstration of how this victimhood nationalism pans out in its crudest forms; constructing the vulnerable as the threat, which leads to further victimisation.

On the second issue, there have been countless examples of how the unholy marriage of nationhood and religion has never led to more democratisation. In India's neighbourhood, this experiment of declaring a State religion while granting equal rights to other religious communities has turned out to be a great failure.

Pakistan was formed claiming to secure the rights of Muslims. The first constitution of the country declared Pakistan as an Islamic State and granted equal rights and protection to other religious communities. This vision can be traced to M.A. Jinnah's famous speech, "aap sab azaad hain" where he assured the minority communities the freedom to practise religion.

However, this assurance turned out to be a false promise. The Islamist fantasy did not cease at the declaration of a State religion but extended to Islamic dictatorships and oppression against Hindus, Christians and Ahmadis.

Similarly, in Bangladesh— a nation formed on the Bengali identity and by secularising its politics— religious extremists organised a violent coup, bringing back the Islamic identity of the country, and reinstating religion as the core of the national politics.

Therefore, Prof. Mustafa's suggestion of declaring Hinduism as the "dominant spiritual heritage" of India does no good for two reasons.

First, he says that to ensure that electoral politics becomes more development-oriented (i.e., secularised), a tokenistic declaration can be offered.

It is noteworthy that even after the BJP became considerably weakened in the Parliament, the instances of mob lynchings are not coming to an end. There have been at least half a dozen instances of mob violence against Muslims in the one month since the elections concluded.

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The Hindutva's fantasy will not be satiated by a mere tokenistic change of declaring Hinduism as the dominant spiritual heritage of India. An example from the past is the negotiated inclusion of cow protection under the Directive Principles.

This inclusion did not satiate the majoritarian urge for cow protection. Over the years, many state governments have passed anti-cow slaughter legislation. Even then, cow vigilantism and violence have become prevalent and the accused have garnered support from the State.

Second, giving any form of credence to such demands is tantamount to accepting the legitimacy of these fantasies, which, as stated above, are beyond all normative justifications in a liberal, constitutional democracy.

On the third issue, Prof. Mustafa suggests that the rights of the minority are adequately safeguarded in the Constitution and that the judiciary and coalition politics would protect the rights of Muslims.

Prof. Arun Thiruvengadam (in The Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism, 2021) points out that while the framing of the Constitution was a commendable liberal exercise, owing to the limitations, the framers were unequipped to contemplate the peculiar possibilities of the abuse of the same.

The BJP finds ways to weaken democracy (and secularism) through these fissures already present in the Constitution. In the last ten years, majoritarian decisions such as the abrogation of Article 370, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA/NRC), love-jihad laws, hijab ban, etc. were not interfered with by the courts.

Therefore, how much faith one can have in the courts to be the only safeguard of the secular character is not very clear. Further, when Prof. Mustafa acknowledges that liberal judges can expand the scope of rights for minorities, it logically follows that the not-so-liberal judges can have a similar impact in the opposite direction.

Lastly, while the point on coalition politics might have some substance to it, it is noteworthy that parties such as the Shiv Sena (UBT), currently in the Opposition, share Hindutva fantasies and may jump ship if an occasion comes.

Therefore, we humbly submit that the Hindutva fantasies of the BJP are not to be taken lightly, nor should the possibility of a polarised communal flare be ignored. The academia, the civil society and the student community should hold their ground and keep the principles of dissent, freedom of expression and peaceful coexistence alive in the public discourse— classroom or beyond.