EARLIER this month, on March 3, 2025, the Supreme Court, in In re: Recruitment of visually impaired in judicial services v. The Registrar General, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, delivered its decision in a case concerning the exclusion and discrimination faced by visually impaired and disabled candidates in judicial service examinations across states, including Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. The Court held that Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Services Examination (Recruitment and Conditions of Services) Rules, 1994 (‘MPSE Rules’), which excludes visually impaired and no-vision candidates from seeking appointment to State judicial services, is unconstitutional and constitutes indirect discrimination under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.
By moving decisively away from the outdated medical model of disability that relied solely on clinical assessments, the Court has continued to adopt a rights-based approach anchored in disability law. The ruling not only opens judicial service opportunities to qualified visually impaired candidates but also establishes novel precedents in disability jurisprudence by applying the principle of indirect discrimination, rejecting arbitrary classifications between ‘Persons with Disabilities’ and ‘Persons with Benchmark Disabilities’, and elevating reasonable accommodation to a constitutional imperative.
The case of a ‘Suitable’ judge
The case arose after the mother of a visually impaired student wrote a letter to the then Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, who took suo moto cognizance of letters challenging the constitutionality of Rule 6A of the MPSE Rule. Similarly, other cases were tagged along which inter alia include the case of a visually impaired law student seeking equal opportunity for disabled candidates in Rajasthan’s judicial service examinations and a challenge to an order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which upheld an amendment to Rule 7 of the Judicial Service Rules.
The amendment did not provide specific exemptions or relaxations for persons with disabilities, and the petitioner, a visually impaired candidate who challenged their non-selection for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) position under the ‘physically handicapped’ quota in the unreserved category, sought a directive to allow such accommodations. The candidate had filed a writ of mandamus directing the Rajasthan High Court to publish separate results and cutoff marks for persons with benchmark disabilities at all stages of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Examination, including Preliminary, Mains, Interviews, and Final Results.
The Court on ‘Suitable Judge’
Some of the key issues framed by the Court included:
1. Whether the visually impaired candidates can be categorically deemed ‘not suitable’?
2. The constitutionality of Rule 6A of the MPSE Rules,
3. Whether the proviso to Rule 7 of the MPSE Rules violates equality principles and reasonable accommodation requirements?
4. Whether relaxation in suitability assessment is permissible when sufficient PwD candidates are not available?
5. Whether separate cut-off standards should be maintained for visually impaired candidates during selection processes?
The Court began its analysis with an observation that it had consciously used the word ‘suitability’ instead of ‘eligibility’ as it is a matter of fact that once a person completes a law degree and acquires the other required educational qualifications as stipulated for appointment as a judicial officer, he/she is eligible for appointment to the said post.
It noted that while Article 15 does not recognize ‘disability’ as a ground for non-discrimination, the collective framework of Articles 14 and 15 read with the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (‘Disability Rights Act’) creates the principle of reasonable accommodation and stipulates a positive obligation on the State to recognise and protect persons with disabilities. The Court also noted that the Disability Rights Act functions as a ‘super-statute’, borrowing from the language of scholars William N. Eskridge and John A. Ferejohn, which has quasi-constitutional significance.
Reasonable accommodation as constitutional imperative
The Court held that it has, in a catena of cases, recognised that reasonable accommodation is not a discretionary measure, but a fundamental right integral to achieving substantive equality, and forming part of the right to dignity as guaranteed under Article 21. Reasonable accommodation, it noted, not only afforded equal opportunity to the PwD but also ensured the dignity of the individual by driving home the message that the assessment of a person’s suitability, capacity and capability is not to be tested and measured by medical or clinical assessment of the same. Instead, it must be assessed after providing reasonable accommodation and an enabling atmosphere.
The ‘suspicion-ridden medical expertise-driven model’, is directly opposed to the principle as laid down by this Court and also the spirit of the Disability Rights Act.
From medical model to rights-based approach
The Court emphatically rejected the medical model of disability that relied solely on clinical assessments, instead embracing a rights-based approach grounded in the Disability Rights Act and international obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The Court emphasised that once a person has been permitted to pursue a law degree, they should automatically be eligible for all related opportunities, including judicial appointments, invoking the principle of legitimate expectation as part of non-arbitrariness, while furthering the equality doctrine.
The Court elaborated on the principle of indirect discrimination, facially equal application of laws to unequal parties is a farce, and applied this principle to demonstrate how requirements like three years of practice or securing 70 percent marks in the first attempt disproportionately disadvantaged disabled candidates. "This is also a perfect example of how unequal are sought to be treated equally," it noted, “and that itself would be a negation of the principle of substantive equality”. Consequently, it struck down the proviso to Rule 7 that imposed additional requirements on candidates with disabilities.
The Court also mandated the implementation of separate cut-off marks for persons with disabilities. The judgment criticised the non-disclosure of cut-off marks as compelling disabled candidates to compete on unequal terms with others, stating that "non-declaration of cut-off marks affects transparency and creates ambiguity" and "in effect, it compels PwD candidates to compete with other category candidates on unequal terms”.
The Court directed authorities to declare separate cut-off marks and publish separate merit lists for disabled candidates at every stage of the examination process. “For the purpose of rights and entitlements of persons with disabilities,” it stated “there can be no distinction between Persons with Disabilities and Persons with Benchmark Disabilities".
From suitability to accessibility
By declaring that "a rights-based approach necessitates that PwDs must not face any discrimination in their pursuit of judicial service opportunities", the Court has reinforced that inclusion is not merely a statutory obligation but a constitutional imperative. The judgment significantly strengthens the legal position of persons with disabilities by providing constitutional remedies against discrimination.
The Court's emphasis on reasonable accommodation as a principle that must be applied when assessing capability represents a groundbreaking development in Indian disability jurisprudence. The Court explicitly stated that conclusions "based merely on a clinical assessment of disability, innocent of the principle of reasonable accommodation, cannot be said to be a fair and proper assessment of the capability of judicial officers with disabilities".
This perspective aligns with the evolving international understanding of disability rights as articulated in the CRPD's General Comment No. 6 on Article 5, which develops the concept of “inclusive/transformative equality.” By incorporating this principle, the Court has established that reasonable accommodation is an essential component of equality, not an exception to it.
Perhaps most significantly, by dismissing the "technical distinction" between persons with disabilities and those with benchmark disabilities, as unsustainable in law, the Court has taken a bold step toward dismantling arbitrary classifications that limit the scope of disability justice.
Dismantling indirect discrimination
Significantly, this is the first judgment where the Court has directly applied the principle of indirect discrimination in a disability rights case. While previous disability rights precedents had mentioned this principle in passing or by reference to other cases, this judgment actually employs indirect discrimination as a central analytical framework. The Court explicitly states that "the rule relating to practice or in the alternative, to secure 70 percent in the first attempt, is a case of indirect discrimination as the provisions are facially neutral but discriminatory in operation.” By methodically analysing how seemingly neutral requirements create disproportionate barriers for candidates with disabilities, the Court has established a concrete application of indirect discrimination theory within disability jurisprudence. This represents a crucial advancement, as it provides a template for future courts to identify and remedy subtle forms of exclusion that might otherwise escape scrutiny under a formal equality approach. By drawing parallels with gender-based discrimination in Col. Nitisha v. Union of India (2021) and applying those principles to the disability context, the Court has developed a more nuanced understanding of how discrimination operates through seemingly neutral criteria.
The Court's observation that "the atmosphere in which they operate cannot be said to be the same” for disabled and able-bodied lawyers reflects a deeper understanding of the structural barriers that create unequal conditions.
Unfinished: The road to intersectional disability justice
While the Court's decision represents significant progress, it could have further developed an intersectional approach to disability discrimination. The Court primarily treats disability as a ‘singular’ category without adequately addressing how disability intersects with other identities such as gender, caste, and socioeconomic status. Although the Court references gender-based discrimination when discussing Col. Nitisha, it does not extend this analysis to explore how multiple forms of marginalisation might compound for disabled individuals. For instance, a visually impaired woman from a marginalized caste faces barriers that multiply rather than merely add to each other. An explicitly intersectional framework could have opened the path for more nuanced remedies that address the specific challenges faced by individuals at these intersections.
The Court could have also advanced a more transformative interpretation of reasonable accommodation that challenges the underlying structures that create barriers in the first place. While the judgment recognises the need for accommodation and refers to the "ever-evolving" disability jurisprudence, it still operates within the existing institutional framework rather than questioning whether that framework itself needs fundamental restructuring. A more radical approach would have examined how judicial institutions and practices are inherently designed around able-bodied norms and would have called for reimagining these institutions to be inherently inclusive rather than merely accommodating differences.
Numerous courtroom practices continue to hinder lawyers and judges with disabilities. For visually impaired legal professionals, the reliance on physical case files, and visual cues during proceedings creates significant barriers. The common practice of judges referring to specific paragraphs in judgments without adequate time for screen readers to process the information disadvantages visually impaired practitioners. For those with mobility impairments, the physical layout of many courtrooms—with steps to the witness box, elevated judge's bench, and narrow passages between counsels' tables—restricts movement and participation. These structural barriers represent the kind of systemic issues that require comprehensive reform rather than case-by-case accommodation.
A truly transformative approach would redesign court architecture, digitise case management systems with accessibility features, reform procedural rules to allow flexible time management, and establish inclusive professional development opportunities—all addressing the root causes of exclusion rather than merely their symptoms.
Note: The author was not involved in the case in any capacity, and all views expressed are his own, not those of the Court.