

On JANUARY 13, 2026, the University Grants Commission (UGC), a statutory central governmental organisation to coordinate, determine and maintain standards of university education, released the University Grants Commission (Promotion of Equity in Higher Educational Institutions) Regulations, 2026 (‘2026 Regulations’). Since then, the 2026 Regulations have gripped the dominant caste imagination, with fears of potential misuse and victimisation of the powerful castes in the field of higher education. The backlash, and misinformation traced three trajectories – first, that the provision of such regulations may harass general category students and deepen caste divisions; second, that there were no provisions to penalise false complaints of discrimination; and third, that these regulations were unconstitutional.
A petition was filed in the Supreme Court challenging these Regulations. In the order dated January 29, 2026, merely 16 days after they were introduced, the Supreme Court directed the Regulations “to be kept in abeyance”. It further observed that the 2012 UGC Regulations “will continue to operate and remain in force till further orders.”
Much has been written to both demystify and clarify the scope and objectives of the 2026 Regulations. Disha Wadekar, an advocate spearheading reforms within the Regulations, makes an excellent case to show why institutional safeguards cannot be caste-neutral. In a recent piece for The Leaflet, Justice K. Chandru, a former judge of the Madras High Court, pointed out how the stay order ignores decades of jurisprudential progress on equality and justice in India. Writing in the Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, Gautam Bhatia analysed the four questions that have been put forward in the order and showed how they do not apply to the 2026 Regulations that have been released.
As the petition against the UGC regulations contains a challenge to its constitutional validity, it is necessary to buttress the legislation with constitutional logic. Specifically, a close reading of Articles 14, 15 and 16 substantiates the need for the 2026 Regulations under the scheme of substantive equality, both normatively and doctrinally, through the interpretation of previous Supreme Court judgments.
The Constitution mandates special provisions
The 2026 UGC Regulations are in line with the constitutional provisions. Articles 15 and 16 both mention the phrase “special provisions”. There is no constitutional restriction on whether these provisions only refer to reservations. Reservations are only one form of the affirmative action framework which operates at the entry point. However, there is need for scaffolding and structure at every point to ensure support for students from marginalized communities.
Article 15(4) clearly states: “Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.” Similarly, Article 15(6)(a) allows the State to make any “special provision for the advancement of any economically weaker sections of citizens”. Similar is the case with the wording of Article 16 which relates to employment opportunities. Moreover, Article 46 states that the “State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.”
The 2026 UGC Regulations are in line with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution as well as the more ideal Part IV of the Constitution. It creates special provisions to “eradicate discrimination only on the basis of religion, race, gender, place of birth, caste, or disability, particularly against the members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, socially and educationally backward classes, economically weaker sections, persons with disabilities, or any of them”.
2026 UGC Regulations further the Supreme Court’s substantive equality jurisprudence
Any provision which aims for rectifying inherent social power imbalance in Indian society is in line with the substantive equality approach of the Indian Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court eschews mere formal equality and has evolved it to a substantive equality interpretation. Formal equality, following the Aristotelian logic, states that likes should be treated alike irrespective of social conditions and reality which gives rise to inequalities. Contrastingly, substantive equality acknowledges that mere equal treatment will not lead to creating an equal society. The treatment meted out should be considerate of the relevant context of historical and continuing social inequalities that are present. The Indian Supreme Court, mainly in the cases relating to reservations, has evolved the equality jurisprudence from formal equality to substantive equality.
The earliest articulation of formal equality was in the case of State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan (1951) where the Court held that reservation of seats in educational institutions – among non-Brahmins (Hindus), Backward Hindus, Brahmins, Harijans, Anglo-Indians, Christians, and Muslims – is unconstitutional. The decision of the Supreme Court led to the first constitutional amendment inserting the clause on special provisions in Article 15. Similarly, the constitution bench of the Court in Venkataramana v. State of Madras (1951) held that only Harijans and the backward Hindus can be considered as “backward classes”. In General Manager, Southern Railways v. Rangachari (1961), the Court held that Art 16(4) is an exception to Art 16(1) and while it cannot be interpreted “in any narrow or pedantic sense,” it also “should not be interpreted so liberally as to destroy the fundamental right itself to which it is a proviso or exception”. These cases, as noted in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2024), showed the “formalistic and reservation-limiting approach in the reading of the constitutional provisions”.
This changed for the first time in a dissenting judgment in T. Devadasan v. Union of India (1963). Here, the Court prohibited the State from “carrying forward” unfulfilled vacancies into succeeding recruitment years. However, the dissent showed a holistic approach towards understanding the place of Article 16(4). Justice Subba Rao held that the reservation provision was not an exception but “preserved a power untrammelled by the other provisions of the Article.” He further observed that, “if [Art 16(1)] stood alone, all the backward communities would go to the wall in a society of uneven basic social structure; the said rule of equality would remain only an utopian conception unless a practical content was given to it.” This was adopted within the majority decision in State of Kerala v. N.M Thomas (1975) case, which held that Article 16(4) was not an exception to Article 16(1), but instead an emphatic restatement of the principle of equality.
After accepting the special provisions to be a part of equality, and not an exception, the doctrine has evolved to clearly name it as “substantive equality”. The Supreme Court specifically held that a substantive equality concept provides “that the attainment of factual equality is possible only if we account for these ground realities”. It further held that a substantive equality formulation “eschews the uncritical adoption of laws and practices that appear neutral but in fact help to validate and perpetuate an unjust status quo”. It recognised that the objective of both Articles 15(4) and 16(4) “is to ensure substantive equality by uplifting the socially backward class”.
The Supreme Court has made strides to evolve from formalistic equality to substantive equality grounded in social realities. The 2026 UGC Regulations are but an extension of over half a decade of jurisprudential development. If the regulations are overturned on the basis that they will be unequal to the general categories, it will go against manifest interpretation of the Court “to bring about real and not formal, actual and not merely legal, equality”.
The four-dimensions of substantive equality
Not only has the Indian Supreme Court recognised substantive equality but has also adopted Sandra Fredman’s four-dimensional framework. In Davinder Singh, the Court relied on Fredman’s framework, to hold that “the focus is on the equality of results or opportunities over equality of treatment”. As per Fredman’s framework, substantive equality is achieved when an action can simultaneously redress disadvantage; address stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and violence; enhance voice and participation; and accommodate difference and achieve structural change.
Redress disadvantage: The disadvantage in Higher Education Institutes (HEIs)s is that the students from SC/ST/OBC/EWS and other marginalised categories are already in an unequal position when they enter university spaces. Data by the Ministry of Education shows that over 13,500 students from Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes have dropped out of courses they were taking at Central Universities, Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), and Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs).
Data by the UGC also suggests that there is a 118 percent increase in the complaints received of caste-based discrimination in universities and colleges. The 2026 UGC Regulations recognise the sheer disadvantage faced by students from marginalised communities. The Regulations ensure that there is redressal of institutional bias and discrimination; and that students from SC/ST/OBC and other marginalised classes complete their higher education journey with the necessary support.
Address stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and violence: The 2026 Regulations were a result of the institutional neglect and systemic caste-bias that led to the deaths of Rohith Vemula and Payal Tadvi. Statistics show that deaths of students by suicide in top universities and central institutions particularly affects Dalit, Bahujan and Adivasi communities. Of the 122 student suicides reported between 2014 and 2021, 55 percent involved students from backward communities. Of these, 24 belonged to Scheduled Castes, three to Scheduled Tribes, and 41 to Other Backward Classes, according to a written response in the Lok Sabha in 2021. These deaths are not individual isolated incidents but indicate the pervasive stigma, stereotyping and prejudice that ultimately leads to violence in university spaces.
The 2026 Regulations address the stigma, stereotyping and prejudice by providing regulatory mechanisms which allow the effective implementation of policies and programmes for disadvantaged groups, and promote equality and equity within HEIs. Regulation 4 creates a duty upon the HEIs to safeguard the interests of the stakeholders without any prejudice to their caste, creed, religion, language, ethnicity, gender, or disability.
Enhance voice and participation: The 2026 Regulations ensure that all stakeholders irrespective of their status or background have a voice and are heard within the HEI spaces. The stakeholders here include students, faculty members, staff and members of the managing committee.
Regulation 5 provides for the establishment of the Equal Opportunity Centre to oversee the programmes for disadvantaged groups. It also ensures the creation of an Equity Committee to manage the Centre. Regulation 5(7) necessitates the representation of OBC, PwD, SC/ST and women within the Equity Committee. The Centre is responsible to receive the report of any incident of discrimination (Regulation 8 (a)-(b)) and to ensure that appropriate action is taken (Regulation 8(c)). The Regulations establish an institutional mechanism for disadvantaged students to raise concerns and ensure serious consideration of discrimination complaints within HEIs.
Accommodate difference and achieve structural change: The 2026 UGC Regulations seek to transform HEIs into spaces of equal access and participation for all members of society. Available data reveal persistent structural inequalities affecting students and faculty who have historically been excluded from such spaces. While reservations facilitate entry into HEIs, the UGC Regulations provide an additional institutional framework to safeguard the interests of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups once they are within these institutions. Importantly, the Regulations also normalise the presence and visibility of marginalised groups who face discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, gender, place of birth, or disability.
In essence, the 2026 UGC Regulations come under the special provisions that form part of India’s constitutional equality provisions. They further the goal of substantive equality as interpreted by the Indian Supreme Court in the last 50 years and they satisfy the four-dimensional framework to achieve substantive equality.
The UN Special Rapporteur, Ashwini KP, highlighted the need “to have national legislation that explicitly addresses caste-based discrimination in higher education”. The 2026 Regulations address this need on a pan-India basis, making HEIs more equal and accessible to all, irrespective of background, status, or wealth. To remove this legislation on a false formal equality basis would be tantamount to looking at the tree and missing the forest of achieving substantive equality. Albeit, here, the tree does not even belong in the forest!