“The majestic equality of the laws prohibits the rich and the poor alike from sleeping under bridges, begging in the streets and stealing bread.
– Anatole France
WHEN THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA (‘CJI’) Surya Kant headed bench of the Supreme Court of India granted an interim stay on the University Grants Commission (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026 (‘Equity Regulations’), perhaps they were guided by this quote attributed to the French poet Anatole France. Little did they realize that the Indian Constitution not only has an equal protection clause under Article 14 but also forbids the State from discriminating against any citizen only on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth under Article 15. It only means that if there is any discrimination based only on grounds of caste, such a discrimination will be hit by the said Article.
While granting the stay of the Equity Regulations on January 29, 2026, CJI Surya Kant’s bench observed: “It appears to us that some of the provisions of the Impugned Regulations suffer from certain ambiguities, and the possibility of their misuse cannot be ruled out”. Among the questions of law framed by the bench is this: “(i) Whether the the Impugned Regulations, defining “Caste-based Discrimination”, bears a reasonable and rational nexus to subserve the object and the fact that no distinct or special procedural mechanism has been prescribed to address caste-based discrimination, as opposed to the exhaustive and inclusive definition of “Discrimination” provided”.
The long movement for a law against caste discrimination in universities
In essence, even before the Equity Regulations could be put to practice, the bench, on a theoretical basis, had developed a theory of so-called “reverse discrimination” of the high caste students studying in the same campus. This approach is not only regressive, but also derailing a process initiated after the suicidal deaths of Rohith Vemula, a Dalit research scholar of the Central University, Hyderabad and Dr. Payal Tadvi, a tribal woman. For years now, the mothers of both students have highlighted, organised around and litigated on the numerous caste-based discriminations prevalent across India’s higher education institutions that students from deprived sections of society have had to face.
In fact, the Karnataka government had already finalized a draft of the Rohith Vemula Act, a comprehensive law to address caste discrimination in higher education, to be introduced in legislative assembly. The Leader of the Opposition Rahul Gandhi has also voiced the demand for a nationwide legislation to curb caste based discrimination against the socially deprived groups of students in campuses.
When the two mothers moved the Supreme Court, they pointed out that the pre-existing UGC (Promotion of Equity in Higher Educational Institutions) Regulations, 2012 did not address certain issues. What was needed, they argued, was for a regulation that mandates universities to take strong disciplinary action against the victimization of students and for the constitution of anti-discrimination, internal complaint mechanisms in universities.
The case filed by Radhika Vemula and Abeda Tadvi was heard by several benches. On April 24, 2025, when the UGC produced a draft regulation, the Justice Surya Kant, as a puisne judge at that time, directed the Commission to “proceed with finalisation of the Draft Regulations, 2025 and [to] notify the same.”
It is this final notification which has now been put in abeyance even before it is put to use. Beyond the Court, right wing students groups owing allegiance to the ruling regime and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh have started an agitation, accusing the new Equity Regulations of targeting high caste students, who could, according to them, suffer from motivated complaints lodged by students from Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes.
The blatantly casteist comments by CJI Surya Kant
At the time of issuing notice, perhaps not satisfied with merely issuing notice, CJI Surya Kant made a startling observation: “We want a casteless society. Do you want to take the country back to the old days?’ These guidelines were framed only keeping a section in mind”.
He further questions whether Brahmins should be blamed for the “entire caste system”. “Did Brahmins create caste division in Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains?...if Brahmin caste is such a big issue, renounce your caste today? Who is stopping you?”. He also noted that “even after becoming an IAS, IPS, CJI, President or Prime Minister, if someone still wants to think of themselves as ‘oppressed’, that’s not the fault of Brahmins, it’s their own mindset”.
Supreme Court has recognised the obligation on the State and judiciary to dismantle caste-discrimination
Perhaps in the judicial annals of the Supreme Court, never has any judge made such blatantly casteist remarks in open court, that too when dealing with the sensitive issue of Dalit students facing discrimination in campuses of higher education. It was egregious more so because the Supreme Court, itself, in many of its earlier decisions, has spoken about the context of casteist discrimination against Dalits and the need for its total prohibition. In its decision in Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India (2024), the Supreme Court had noted:
“Discrimination arises due to a feeling of superiority/inferiority, bias, contempt, or hatred against a person or a group. In history, such feelings have led to the genocide of certain communities. Discrimination also lowers the self-esteem of the person being discriminated against. It can lead to unfair denial of opportunities and constant violence against a set of people. Discrimination can also be done by continuously ridiculing or humiliating someone, who is on the weaker side of the social spectrum. It can cause trauma to a person with which they may be affected their entire life. Discrimination also includes stigmatizing the identity or existence of a marginalized social group. Discrimination can also happen based on certain stereotypes against a marginalized group. As a society that divided people into a hierarchy, we must remain conscious of the forms and kinds of discrimination against marginalized groups.”
In People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) (‘PUDR’), the same Court recognised an obligation upon the State: “It is the constitutional obligation of the State to take necessary steps for the purpose of interdicting such violation and ensuring observance of the fundamental right by the private individual who is transgressing the same”.
The Supreme Court, in PUDR, did not just stop with recognising state obligations. It also recognised the duty upon the judiciary to dismantle caste-based discrimination by taking an active stand: “The fight against caste-based discrimination is not a battle that can be won overnight; it requires sustained effort, dedication, and the willingness to confront and challenge societal norms that perpetuate inequality. When faced with practices of caste-based discrimination, this Court must take an active stand. In entertaining the current petition, this Court is making its contribution to the ongoing struggle to dismantle caste-based discrimination”.
Seen in this context, the CJI’s remarks, that too at the stage of admission, is particularly perplexing. In this way, the Supreme Court has laid bare its prejudicial pre-determined approach on the vexed problem of seeking a solution to the issue of Dalit students facing immense discrimination – discrimination they are facing despite deservingly availing a seat through affirmative action after centuries of being denied the opportunity to be educated.
It was this prevailing logic that induced the framers of the Constitution to ensure that Article 15 specifically prohibited any discrimination on the basis of caste, among other grounds. The Supreme Court in Sukanya Shantha had also explained that the uniqueness of Article 15 lay in the fact that “not only does Article 15(2) prohibit the State from discriminating, it also restricts the citizens or private entities from discriminating against other citizens on the grounds mentioned therein.” Authoritative pronouncements such as these construe the law of the land under Article 141 of the Constitution.
The fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter III of the Constitution, from Articles 14 to 17, are intended to be a charter for social justice. While it proclaims equality before all laws, it also further strengthens the same equality clause by the addition of Article 15, which prohibits any form of discrimination by the State. Further, under Chapter III, while Articles 15(4) and 16(4) provide for equal opportunity in public services, Article 17 makes the historical declaration that all forms of untouchability are abolished, even making it a punishable offence.
Therefore, the concept of the ‘majestic equality of the laws’, to borrow from Anatole France, quoted in the beginning had no bearing on the equality clause. This is clear even in the Preamble where equality is one of status and opportunity. Justice, in the Constitution, is also not an abstract term, but is intended to provide social, economic, and political justice.
Unfortunately, from the day the Constitution came into force (January 1950), the forces which initially attempted to undermine any such social justice understanding have used the constitutional basis either to wreck or to torpedo any attempt by the State to provide equal opportunity to historically marginalised communities.
Is affirmative action for caste-marginalised citizens opposed to the Constitution’s equality clause?
In State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951), the Supreme Court did not hesitate to quash the Communal G.O. of Madras Presidency, which had divided public service appointments equally for all communities and religions, thereby eliminating the monopoly position of the Brahmins in the State services. Despite the State extending similar benefits in respect of educational institutions after the advent of the Constitution, the Supreme Court did not hesitate to reject such a system stating that there can be no caste based reservations. Notably, Article 46 enables the State to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. This same reasoning was reiterated by the Court in B. Venkataramana v. State of Madras (1951), wherein it quashed the Madras government’s policy granting reservations for SC, ST and other non-Brahmin communities in public services.
It wouldn’t be until seventeen years later that the Court, in a property related case, would finally recognise the fault in its rulings. In I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967), the Court would note:
“To remove the effect of centuries of discriminatory treatment and to raise the down-trodden to an equal status cannot be regarded, as discriminatory against any one. It is no doubt true that in State of Madras v. Champakam, the reservation of seats for Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Tribes in public educational institutions was considered invalid. Articles 16(4) and 340 had already provided for special treatment for these backward, classes and Art. 46 had provided that the State shall promote, with special care their educational and economic interests. With all due respects the question of discrimination hardly arose because in view of these provisions any reasonable attempt to raise the status of the backward classes could have been upheld on the principle of classification. In any event, the inclusion of this clause to Art. 16 does not abridge or take away any one's Fundamental Rights unless the view be taken that the backward classes for ever must remain backward.”
By mechanically applying Article 15, the Supreme Court set back progressive jurisprudence on social justice by one and a half decades.
Nor were CJI Surya Kant’s remarks the first such instance of a judge (and overwhelmingly, our judiciary has been dominated historically by upper-caste judges), expressing their own notions of affirmative action. It is interesting to note that in these early years, even as, broadly, the judiciary denied the existence of caste discrimination, it routinely scrutinised affirmative action by framing it as a potential contributor to caste-based discrimination, missing to understand that reservations in fact were in furtherance of equality. Even the mention of ‘caste’ was akin to anathema when it came to judicial discussions, The understanding that caste was a crucial factor to identify backwardness remained amiss until Justice Chinnappa Reddy, in K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. State of Karnataka (1985), noted:
“Social status and economic power are so woven and fused into the caste system in Indian rural society that one may without hesitation, say that if poverty be the cause, caste is the primary index of social backwardness, so that social backwardness is often readily identifiable with reference to a person’s caste. Poverty, Caste, occupation and habitation are the principal factors which contribute to brand a class as socially backward…But mere poverty it seems is not enough to invite the constitutional branding because of the vast majority of the people of our country are poverty-struck but some among them are socially and educationally forward and others backward”.
After a long battle for representation, students from marginalised communities now confront discrimination
In the early 1990s, when the V.P. Singh led government implemented the Mandal Commission Report by providing reservation for Other Backward Classes (‘OBC’), the narrative re-emerged that reservations violated the equality clause since they overlooked merit to give way to caste-based reservations, solely to appease a larger vote-bank.
At the forefront of the agitations, which eventually led to several violent attacks and an instance of self-immolation by a protestor, was the Sangh. Finally, in 1992, a nine-judge bench in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India upheld the reservation for OBCs and the need for the upliftment of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (‘SEBC’). In that same decision, the Court capped the ceiling for reservations at fifty percent, and laid down an aspiration to eliminate the so-called “creamy layer” from the fold of reservations.
Meanwhile, as opportunities in government educational institutions continued to thin down, the proliferation of private education institutes continued diminishing opportunities for students of reserved categories. This led to the 93rd constitution amendment (2006) which inserted Article 16(5), which provided for reservation in higher educational institutions for the first time.
The entry of SC/STs and SEBCs into higher education also brought within itself several problems hitherto unknown. Following the receipt of numerous complaints from different quarters of students facing casteist treatment, the UGC finally brought in
The 2012 Regulations, which provided for a Grievance Redressal Committee headed by an ombudsman. It also sought to promote equity in higher educational institutions under which an equal opportunity cell to be led by an anti-discrimination officer was to be constituted. This required a “Students Counselling System” and also priority appointment of anti-discriminatory faculty advisors for SC/ST students.
The Hindu right’s challenge to the new UGC Regulations must be resisted
Notwithstanding all these cosmetic efforts by the UGC, the caste-based discrimination faced by the SC/ST students did not cease. Following Rohith Vemula’s death, his mother Radhika Vemula campaigned across the country to sensitize academic campuses and decision-making bodies. After the death of Dr. Payal Tadvi in 2019, her mother also similarly campaigned for justice for the Scheduled Tribe students and employees facing innumerable hardship. Both mothers also finally brought the case to the Supreme Court.
Because of the continuous monitoring by the UGC, the petitioners demanded a special regulation to specifically address atrocities faced by SC and ST students. Soon after, the new Equity Regulations, 2026 were issued. No sooner had this exercise been done that the Hindu right-wing created a situation of hostility, even as the central government has kept a neutral position on this.
In the hate campaign that has ensued, largely on social media, trolls, anonymous profiles and Hindu right-wing commentators have mounted an attack upon Indira Jaising, abusing her for the sole task of representing two brave mothers who lost their promising children due to caste hatred.
Earlier the courts had attempted to put spokes in the name of reverse discrimination and introduced ideas based on wrongful notions, giving the concept of ceiling on reservation, creamy layer, and finally the sub-classification of scheduled castes. While upholding reservation in private higher educational institutions, and in a way justifying their balancing trick, Chief Justice S.H. Kapadia summarised in M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006):
“Backward classes seek justice. General class in public employment seeks equity. The difficulty comes in when the third variable comes in, namely, efficiency in service. In the issue of reservation, we are being asked to find a stable equilibrium between justice to the backwards, equity for the forwards and efficiency for the entire system. Equity and justice in the above context are hard-concepts. However, if you add efficiency to equity and justice, the problem arises in the context of the reservation.”
Ninety eight years ago, on December 25, 1927, Dr B.R. Ambedkar famously burned a copy of the Manusmriti, even reasoning that“the bonfire of Manusmriti was quite intentional. “ It was a very cautious and drastic step, Ambedkar had said, “but was taken with a view to forcing the attention of Caste Hindus. At intervals such drastic remedies are a necessity. If you do not knock the door, none opens it.”.
