There is a need to back the court vacation system with a more constitutionally sound reasoning, right from its nomenclature to metrics and reasoning as to why Supreme Court and high court judges ought to uniquely continue enjoying this privilege.
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THERE have been extensive discussions, recommendations, criticisms, and opinions on the subject of whether there should be vacation terms for the Supreme Court and high courts in India. This is because of the currency of the idea and notion that our highest courts are deliberately protecting and gatekeeping colonial traditions in continuing to have vacation terms at the expense of the public exchequer.
In popular parlance, the epistemological foundation of the term ‘vacation’ places reliance on ideas such as recreation, relaxation, break and travel, among other things, which often don’t find place in the discourse of the reformation of judicial systems. For context, there exists a summer break for 45 days, a winter break for 15 days, a Holi break for seven days, and five days off each for Diwali and Dussehra in the Supreme Court and high court calendars; these courts work, in a year, for approximately 200 days.
One of the key ideas of cushioning and justifying these numbers has been to engage in comparative studies of how the highest constitutional courts across the world function. This is a largely redundant exercise in both principle and practice given the lack of scrutiny of important variables including but not limited to pendency, legal procedures, judge–case ratio, percentage of appeals, accessibility, infrastructure, technology injection, and so on. This privilege of vacation cannot and should not be compared cross-culturally with the implicit assumption that other countries and their courts will continue to impose the same number of vacation days, when confronted with the scale and nature of problems that presently face India’s higher judicial system.
This piece focuses on why the argument for reduction in the Supreme Court and high courts’ vacation term should not be primarily hinged on the pendency of cases, for broadly two reasons: i) There are other pressing structural problems, including but not limited to lack of enough judges, funding inadequacies, and appointment delays that require immediate attention, and ii) While there is definitely an exacerbation in the problem of pendency, the foundational question of why it is present should be better grounded constitutionally and through a framework of public policy, rather than to rush to map its impact, especially when structural parameters such as the vacation term greatly or comparably stunt the judicial system.
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The focus should be on why the Supreme Court and high courts are the only constitutional bodies that are able to enjoy such a privilege?
Intellectual nature of judicial work not unique
The pedestalisation of the Supreme Court and high courts’ work as extensively intellectually stimulating vis-a-vis the need for rejuvenation is seemingly a farfetched justification that is supposedly unique to them, especially when various actors both within the government and the State undertake comparable intellectual work within their own respective domains.
There exists a summer break for 45 days, a winter break for 15 days, a Holi break for seven days, and five days off each for Diwali and Dussehra in the Supreme Court and high court calendars; these courts work, in a year, for approximately 200 days.
For instance, scientists at the Defence Research and Development Organisation and the Indian Space Research Organisation generate scientific and technical research critical in the advancement and realisation of India’s vision as a global leader. One may be inclined to argue that their work is on the same, if not higher, level of intellectual rigour as judges of the higher judiciary who analyse, understand and resolve disputes within the law of this country. Similarly, you have civil servants who generate public policy, monitor field work, review and carry out administrative functions, all with a certain degree of continuous intellectual activity.
The romanticisation of the work of the Supreme Court and the high courts, especially on the metric of its extended and superior ‘intellectual’ hold, is inconsistent with the reality of the nature of work carried by other State and constitutional stakeholders, who by this standard automatically qualify the threshold of being given a legally valid and equal vacation. Besides, intellectual burnout or the need for rejuvenation cannot and should not be uniquely justified only for the judges of the Supreme Court and high courts.
If vacations being used for judicial work, make that transparent
The second argument that is often extended in support of the vacation arrangement is that judges do not have adequate time to author judgements, conduct legal research, understand case laws, and undertake administrative work, among other things, and utilise vacation time to carry out and complete all these tasks.
The problem with this argument is, apart from believing in this premise from a framework of trust, there seems to be no statistical proof or accountability measures in places to actually gauge whether this is true (in fact, contrary evidence can be found here), especially with the spirit and rigour with which it is justified by both the Bar and the Bench. One would argue, if this is actually true, to make it mandatory for judges to be present in their chambers during the vacation period, without sitting on benches to carry out the above mentioned tasks, in order to prevent a duality of convenient reasoning as to the i) luxury of having a ‘mental health break’ or time off for rejuvenation, and the ii) utilisation of this time to complete pending judicial and administrative work.
The nomenclature of a ‘vacation’, especially given its colonial context, was in fact meant to be a vacation for all practical purposes for English judges, who could not bear the weather of British colonies during the summers, and had to visit their families during Christmas in winter. To somehow not make any correction to this culture, assuming that the role and usage of the term ‘vacation’ is suddenly different post national independence, and then claim moral superiority in its sustained existence without any accountability, is not fitting for the country’s highest constitutional authority.
While a ‘mental health break’ is warranted for the Supreme Court and high court judges, so it is for most workers in the country, for that matter. The exceptionally long vacation of these judges serves to actively invisibilise the nature, extent and rigour of the work of others.
While I have no doubt that Supreme Court and high court judges actively do make substantive and productive use of their vacation, there is a need to demarcate what days and time constitutes additional judicial workdays (devoted towards authoring judgements and research, among other things) and what days constitute actual vacation days/ ‘rejuvenation days’/ ‘mental health break’ in order to generate greater accountability and clear any confusion, given the absence of any judicial context.
Why vacation system must be reformed
In conclusion, there is a need to back the vacation system with a more constitutionally sound reasoning, right from its nomenclature to metrics and reasoning as to why Supreme Court and high court judges ought to uniquely continue enjoying this privilege.
Also read: Nine much-needed Supreme Court reforms: A short but hardly exhaustive catalogue
Former Chief Justice of India N.V. Ramana had observed that “[t]here exists a misconception in the minds of the people that judges stay in ultimate comfort, work only from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. and enjoy their holidays. Such a narrative is untrue… When false narratives are created about the supposed easy life led by judges, it is difficult to swallow.” One wonders, given the absence of accountability and transparency about the extent and nature of work done during the vacation term, whether classifying such narratives to be outright false without offering any good enough reason is convincing.
The context of power, privilege and access to media that judges of the higher judiciary have allows them to claim the benefit of rejuvenation on the basis of their ostensibly superior intellectual and burdensome work in a vacuum. This, combined with their reluctance and inertia to recognise and advocate the need for similar mental health benefits for other institutional and constitutional stakeholders is deeply harmful and actively glosses over the work of such actors.
The nomenclature of a ‘vacation’, especially given its colonial context, was in fact meant to be a vacation for all practical purposes for English judges, who could not bear the weather of British colonies during the summers, and had to visit their families during Christmas in winter.
Simultaneously, such judges have the responsibility to preserve the sanctity of their own institution, that is, the judiciary. If the vacation time is being used for judicial and administrative purposes, then it should be made clear, both in terms of policy and principle, to avoid any scathing and uninformed remarks by citizens. Either way, the ball is in the judges’ court.
