OF the little-known works of Lord Thomas Babington McCaulay are his literary works. In Lays of Ancient Rome, Horatius asks an important question, “And how can man die better/ Than facing fearful odds, /For the ashes of his fathers, /And the temples of his gods?”
The Supreme Court was faced with a similar question, when a Christian pastor, Ramesh Baghel challenged the judgement of the High Court of Chhattisgarh which had ordered him to bury his father in a distant village after some Hindu residents of Chhindwada where he lived, opposed the burial in the communal graveyard which was not just in the same village but also in their own private property. The case was heard by two judges of the Supreme Court (BV Nagarathana and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ), and ended in a split verdict. Notably, the affidavit of the State which has been quoted extensively by Justice Nagarathana avers that, “Any person who has forsworn the tradition of the community or has converted into a Christian is not allowed to be buried at the village graveyard…According to the villagers, a Christian person cannot be buried in their village be it at the village graveyard or the instant Petitioner’s own private land”. The answer to this lis would not just be intuitive by allowing a man to be buried where other Christians have also been buried, a fact buttressed by affidavits of other Christian tribals whose families are buried there were also placed before the Court, including the Appellant’s own aunt and grandfather as the Court notes. Yet, that was not to be.
Justice Nagarathana correctly delivered a severe indictment of the village authorities, including the State and called it a betrayal of the principles of secularism. She also notes that this led to the ostracization of the Family in the village and set aside the High Court order. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, however, upheld the High Court order. The Judge, in my view, commits a grave constitutional error in his judgement by allowing the restriction of ‘public order’ in Article 25 to defeat the substantive right of freedom of religion and conscience itself.
