ON FEBRUARY 10, the Allahabad High Court stayed the operation of an order passed by the then Sambhal Chief Judicial Magistrate (‘CJM’) directing the registration of an FIR against Additional Superintendent of Police Anuj Chaudhary and other police officials in connection with the Sambhal violence of November 2024.
A single-judge bench of Justice Samit Gopal passed the interim order while hearing a petition filed by Chaudhary, the former Sambhal Circle Officer and former Sambhal Kotwali in-charge Anuj Tomar. The High Court noted that the complainant, Yameen, father of one of five persons killed in the Sambhal violence, had failed to produce any relevant document or even make a specific pleading to show that he had approached the officer in charge of the concerned police station with information about the commission of a cognisable offence, or that such officer had refused or neglected to register an FIR.
The High Court granted the original complainant fourteen days to file a counter-affidavit. The stay on the impugned order will remain in force until then.
Memories of the Sambhal violence
In November 2024, amidst a growing number of legal disputes over religious sites, violence erupted in Sambhal, Uttar Pradesh, on the day of a court-ordered survey of the five-hundred years old Shahi Jama Masjid. In May 2022, then Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud observed during hearings related to the Gyanvapi mosque in Varanasi that the Places of Worship Act, 1991 does not bar inquiries into the religious character of a site as it stood on August 15, 1947. Subsequently, these remarks were cited in several petitions seeking surveys of mosques across the country.
On the morning of November 24, 2024, in Sambhal, the survey team returned to the Shahi Jama Masjid to resume its work. By 7.30 AM, a large crowd had gathered, leading to clashes with the police. The police fired tear gas and, according to residents, live bullets. The incident resulted in the deaths of five Muslims. While the police denied using lethal force and claimed they only used pellet guns, local MP Zia-ur-Rahman Barq alleged that some officers fired from their personal weapons and even set their own vehicles on fire.
Seven FIRs were registered by the police, naming Barq and around 2,500 unidentified persons, accusing them of rioting, attempt to murder, and obstructing public servants in the discharge of their duties. The BJP attributed the violence to alleged rivalry between Turkic and Pathan Muslim communities, a claim that has been contested. One FIR alleged that unknown persons belonging to the Turkic community opened fire with intent to kill.
It was within this context that the present case arose. According to the applicant, his son, Alam, was a street vendor and had left his home with his three-wheeled cart to sell biscuits at around 8:00 am. By approximately 8:45 AM, when he reached the area near the mosque, a large crowd had already gathered. According to the applicant, Anuj Chaudhary and Anuj Kumar Tomar, along with 15 to 20 other police personnel, had suddenly opened fire on the crowd with lethal intent. Alam was struck by two bullets in the back and one in the hand, causing him to collapse. He later underwent surgery in Meerut, during which bullets were removed from his body, and his life was saved.
Understanding the CJM’s order for FIRs against UP police
The applicant stated that due to fear and the urgent medical condition of his son, he was initially unable to approach authorities. However, after gathering courage, he submitted written complaints on 1 January 2025 to the Superintendent of Police, Sambhal, the District Magistrate, Sambhal, the Deputy Inspector General, Moradabad, and the Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. He had also submitted a complaint to the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh on 31 December 2024. Despite these representations, no FIR was registered, which compelled him to approach the Court seeking directions for registration of an FIR and investigation. In support of his application, the applicant filed an affidavit, copies of his complaints, and medical records.
On January 9, 2026, the CJM, Sambhal, ordered the registration of an FIR against Officer Anuj Chaudhary, former Kotwali in-charge Anuj Kumar Tomar, and fifteen to twenty unidentified police personnel in connection with the November 2024 Sambhal violence. The order was passed on an application filed under Section 173(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (‘BNSS’).
In its status report, the police contended that the recovered bullet was of a calibre not used by the force. However, the trial court noted that while the victim had suffered gunshot injuries, the identity of the shooter remained a matter of investigation. The Court reasoned that when a serious offence such as attempt to murder was alleged, it could not be presumed that the victim would falsely implicate someone else, especially when he himself had suffered life-threatening injuries. The CJM rejected the preliminary defence raised by the police, observing that the medical records explicitly recorded “gunshot wound” and “police firing in riot,” rendering the police version suspicious and inconsistent with the medical evidence.
The trial court further held that the defence of official duty could not extend to acts of criminal violence, observing that firing upon civilians cannot be construed as part of lawful discharge of official functions. Emphasising the gravity of the offence, the Court concluded that a prima facie cognizable offence was disclosed and that a proper investigation was necessary to ascertain the truth.
In this context, the trial court relied upon multiple judicial precedents. It referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Om Prakash Yadav v. Niranjan Kumar Upadhyay (2025), wherein it was held that public servants are not entitled to protection under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for criminal acts committed outside the scope of official duty. The trial court further relied on the principles laid down in People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. State of Maharashtra (2014), which mandated strict procedural safeguards and independent investigation in cases involving police firing and encounter deaths or injuries.
The trial court also relied upon Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2013), wherein the Supreme Court had categorically held that registration of an FIR is mandatory when information regarding commission of a cognizable offence is received. It further cited Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015), emphasizing that Magistrates must apply judicial mind while exercising powers to direct registration of FIRs. It also referred to decisions of the Allahabad High Court such as Sukhbasi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2017) and Anjum v. State (2008), which recognized the Magistrate’s authority to direct registration of FIRs in serious cases.Referring to the Supreme Court’s decisions, such as Ranjit v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023), Devendra Singh v. State of Punjab (2024) and Ram Naresh Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024) to reiterate that illegal acts committed by police officials, even while in uniform, could not be protected as official duties and did not require prior sanction for prosecution.
After considering the entire material on record, the CJM concluded that a prima facie cognizable offence of a serious nature appeared to have been committed, and that an investigation into the matter was both necessary and justified in the interest of justice.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the application under Section 173(4) of the BNSS and directed the Station House Officer, Sambhal, to register an FIR in respect of the incident described and to ensure that investigation was conducted strictly in accordance with law. The CJM further directed that information regarding registration of the FIR be submitted before the Court within seven days.
A questionable transfer follows
On January 20, 2026, days after he ordered the registration of the FIR, CJM Vibhanshu Sudheer was transferred by the Allahabad High Court, alongside 14 other judicial officers. He was shifted to Sultanpur as a civil judge (senior division). The timing of the transfer drew sharp political criticism.
Several lawyers, on January 21 protested against this transfer near the Chandausi police station and the district collectorate, where advocates raised slogans against the state government and described the transfer as “the killing of justice.” They alleged that a “good judge” was being “demoted” for passing orders against police officials.
Reportedly, on February 10, several advocates were issued notices by the district judiciary following these protests. According to the notice, such conduct disrupted judicial functioning and constituted interference in court proceedings. The advocates were directed to submit written replies explaining why the matter should not be referred for contempt proceedings against them.
Sudheer was replaced by Aditya Singh, the civil judge who had earlier ordered the survey of the Shahi Jama Masjid in Sambhal’s Chandausi.
Why did the Allahabad High Court stay the CJM’s order?
In February 2026, appearing for the Uttar Pradesh government in the Allahabad High Court, Additional Advocate General Manish Goel argued that Yameen had failed to first approach the officer in charge of the concerned police station for the registration of an FIR. Without having exhausted this remedy, he could not have directly approached higher authorities and thereafter the court.
This, Goel argued, amounted to a clear violation of the procedure prescribed under Section 173(4) of the BNSS. He also argued that Section 175(4) of BNSS, which allows magistrates to order investigations against public servants for acts committed in the course of official duties, subject to certain procedural safeguards, including obtaining a report from a superior officer and considering the public servant’s version of events, had not been complied with by the Magistrate before directing the registration of an FIR.
Goel argued that multiple FIRs in relation to the same incident had already been registered at Police Station Kotwali Sambhal, a fact reflected in a report submitted by the Additional Superintendent of Police, North, Sambhal on May 6, 2025. However, this material aspect had not been considered by the CJM. The state government contended that Section 174 of BNSS had not been complied with, and that a detailed police report placed before the court, which narrated the version of the incident, was completely ignored. Goel referred to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra (2025) and XXX v. State of Kerala (2026) to contend that the impugned proceedings amounted to abuse of process and were nothing but harassment of the accused.
Opposing the plea, Senior Advocate S.F.A. Naqvi, appearing for Yameen, argued that the State was improperly intervening to protect its own officers. Invoking the doctrine of parens patriae, he contended that the state, as the protector of citizens, could not shield itself or its officials from scrutiny. It was emphasised that the Principal Secretary (Home), Government of Uttar Pradesh, whose role is to protect citizens’ rights, was paradoxically challenging a judicial order directing investigation, which undermined the purpose of criminal law enforcement.
The complainant also raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution, arguing that supervisory jurisdiction ought not to be exercised to interfere with a simple order directing registration and investigation of an FIR. Relying on the Supreme Court’s judgments in P. Suresh v. D. Kalaivani (2026) and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamsunder Trivedi (1995), as well as coordinate bench decisions of the Allahabad High Court, Naqvi argued that such interference was unwarranted. On merits, the complainant sought two weeks’ time to file a counter-affidavit addressing the substantive issues raised by the petitioners.
The High Court observed that the petition invoked its supervisory jurisdiction and that the law governing the maintainability of petitions under Article 227 is well settled, declining to summarily exclude its jurisdiction at this stage.
At a prima facie level, the Court found that the complainant had failed to place on record any relevant document or make any specific pleading to demonstrate that he had approached the officer in charge of the concerned police station with information regarding the commission of a cognisable offence, or that such officer had refused or neglected to register an FIR.
The Court granted two weeks’ time to the private respondent to file a counter-affidavit, with a further two weeks granted for filing a rejoinder, if any. The matter was directed to be listed for further hearing on 24 March 2026.
Pending further consideration, the Court stayed the operation and effect of the Magistrate’s order dated 9 January 2026 directing the registration of the FIR and investigation, until the next date of listing.
A move away from registration of FIRs?
A persistent critique of criminal procedure in India is that its hyper-technical adherence to procedural steps often obstructs substantive justice, particularly in the registration of FIRs. In Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar (1975), Justice Krishna Iyer famously observed that procedure should be the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. Leaving aside the problems with that metaphor, Indian courts have consistently held that procedural law must facilitate, not obstruct, substantive justice. In Bijoy Shankar Mishra vs The State Of Jharkhand (2023), the Court reaffirmed that the Code of Criminal Procedure is procedural in nature and technical defects can't come in the way of substantial justice.
In the context of FIR registration, strict insistence on exhausting procedural stages, first approaching the Superintendent of Police and only thereafter the Magistrate, arguably contributes to avoidable delay and facilitates police inaction. The concern is not that unrestricted direct access to the Magistrate should be permitted. Rather, it is that once a complainant has approached the Magistrate, excessive pre-trial litigation over procedural compliance becomes counterproductive. Such litigation may shift focus away from the alleged offence and towards technical objections, resulting in delays in FIR registration and the commencement of investigation, thereby weakening the effectiveness of criminal law remedies.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Priyanka Srivastava v. State Of U.P. (2015), there was no express statutory requirement of exhausting remedies under Section 154(1) and 154(3), or filing an affidavit with the application. So in practice, complainants bypassed the police and directly approached Magistrates under Section 156(3) CrPC. Magistrates also frequently passed orders requiring the registration of FIR and investigation.
However, post the judgment direct approach without exhausting Section 154 remedies became legally impermissible. This change was later given statutory force through Section 173(4) of the BNSS. While the stated rationale was to curb misuse and ensure that statutory police remedies are exhausted, the resulting procedural layering of FIR registration has arguably transformed a victim-centric safeguard into a procedure-centric filtering mechanism.
Justice Samit Gopal, who was hearing a petition filed by Chaudhary, the circle officer of Sambhal at the time of the violence this week, has listed the matter for further hearing on February 24, 2026, when the court is expected to take up the question of the FIR’s legality and the procedural safeguards under the BNSS.
