IN A SIGNIFICANT RULING, a Supreme Court Bench comprising Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar held that the 24-hour timeline mandated under Article 22(2) of the Constitution would commence from the date and time of detention of the person detained, when his liberty stands curtailed, and not from the time of his formal arrest.
The Bench ruled that if such a detention continues beyond 24 hours before the person is produced before a magistrate, they should be forthwith released from custody.
The Bench underscored that while computing the 24-hour deadline, no other time period is permitted to be excluded therefrom except the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate.
The Bench said it is the duty of the magistrate to record the actual date and time of detention of the person produced before him when his liberty stood curtailed and examine whether the 24-hour deadline has been complied with or not from the time of such detention. If there is a breach of the 24-hour deadline, the concerned person shall be released forthwith from detention.
The Bench has ordered that a copy of their judgment be circulated to all Director Generals of Police of the States and Union Territories as well as to the Registrar Generals of the High Courts and Directors of State Judicial Academies.
The ruling becomes significant as it comes at a time when there have been allegations that police had been detaining protesters without formal arrests who have been protesting against Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar.
The Bench observed that the key expression appearing in Article 22(2) is ‘arrested and detained in custody’, which is conjunctive and not disjunctive.
“Had it been disjunctive, two separate meanings could have been assigned to the two words. But the expression being joint and conjunctive, the two words appearing therein would mean one and the same thing. This is because the Constitution does not recognize any detention dehors arrest,” the Bench highlighted.
It further added that the prescription of the 24-hour time period would commence the moment a person is detained by the arresting authority suspecting him to have committed an offence, when his liberty is effectively curtailed.
“To that extent, the words appearing in clause (2) of Article 22 i.e. ‘arrested’ and ‘detained’ are synonymous. Any attempt to draw an artificial distinction between ‘arrest’ and ‘detention’ would dilute or negate the fundamental protection guaranteed by the Constitution under clause (2) of Article 22. Such an endeavour should be avoided. We must adopt that interpretation which enhances and furthers the constitutional objective,” the Bench said.
The Bench also underscored the reasons for such an interpretation. It said the endeavour of the Court has always been to eliminate custodial violence which unfortunately takes place during the time when a person is under detention and not shown as formally arrested, in the process delaying production before the magistrate.
The Bench disapproved the decision of the Orissa High Court in Aryaman Pattnayak Vs. Union of India, the Kerala High Court in Arun K. Thomas Vs. Narcotics Control Bureau, and the Madras High Court in Kannan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, which took the view that detention of a person leading to temporary disruption of his liberty in the course of a search and seizure process cannot be treated as a detention alike arrest, runs contrary to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence.
The Bench noted that there is no such thing called temporary disruption of liberty.
“The further view of the Orissa High Court that a detention is not arrest if it is for brief questioning but if it goes beyond a short investigatory hold, then it becomes an arrest is constitutionally unsustainable, delving into a realm of uncertainty. We are afraid, a constitutional provision, that too, a fundamental right, cannot be interpreted in such a manner…,” the Bench ruled.
Importantly, the Bench also raised doubts on the correctness of a decision of a coordinate bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih in State of Punjab versus Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora. In that case, the Bench set aside the bail granted to the accused for an offence punishable under Sections 21(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act.
While doing so, the coordinate Bench found that the High Court did not record any satisfaction that the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act were satisfied and held that without recording such satisfaction, bail could not have been granted. It was also observed that in matters governed by special enactments such as the NDPS Act, particularly where the recovery is of commercial quantity, the said right under Article 21 must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service solely on the ground of delay to override Section 37.
Expressing reservations over the reasoning in Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, the Bench said: “First and foremost, the rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution of India are not only constitutional rights. These are fundamental rights. Right to life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 are at the core of our constitutional jurisprudence. These fundamental rights cannot be tinkered with so lightly, not even under the special statutes. Such observations run counter to numerous judgments of this Court which reiterate the proposition that when there is a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, the rigor of Section 37 of the NDPS Act or similar such provisions under the special statutes would have to give way.”
The Bench was ruling on a batch of petitions filed by three accused challenging the decision of the High Court of Tripura dismissing their regular bail. The accused are facing an FIR under Sections 21(C)/22(C)/23(C)/25/25A/28 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
The Bench found that the accused were intercepted at 2:00 p.m. on September 29, 2025. From this time onwards, the liberty of the accused was curtailed inasmuch as they were under the control of the search team constituted by the respondent.
“The recovered material were subjected to weighing and testing on the spot by using electronic weighing scale and the field narcotic test kit. On being satisfied that the recovered substance was methamphetamine (Yaba) tablets, the related NDPS case was registered then and there. Respondent has stated that the search procedure which started at the place of interception continued in the office premises of the Customs Division, Agartala and completed at 5:00 p.m. on September 29, 2025. Appellants were shown formally arrested on September 30, 2025 at 11:00 a.m. and 11:15 a.m. respectively whereafter they were produced before the Judicial Magistrate on September 30, 2025 at 4:45 p.m. who thereafter remanded them to judicial custody,” the Bench found.
On the facts of the case, the Bench ruled that the arrest of the accused would be construed to have taken place at 2:00 p.m. on September 29, 2025 when they were under the control and custody of the search team. Therefore, they were required to be produced before the Judicial Magistrate before 2:00 p.m. on September 30, 2025. But the appellants were produced before the Judicial Magistrate at 4:45 p.m. on September 30, 2025.
The Bench thus held there was a clear breach of Article 22(2) of the Constitution vitiating the arrest of the appellants and rendering their continued detention beyond 2:00 p.m. on September 30, 2025 illegal and unconstitutional.
