JUSTICE YASHWANT VARMA, facing the threat of impeachment, has approached the Supreme Court to challenge the report of an in-house inquiry that indicted him in connection with the alleged recovery of burnt Indian currency notes from an outhouse at his official residence in Delhi on the night of March 14 and 15, 2025. The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear his petition next week.
Justice Varma’s petition raises several objections to the in-house inquiry procedure and its findings:
Firstly, Justice Varma contends that the in-house procedure, established by the Supreme Court in 1999, exceeds its intended scope of self-regulation and fact-finding by recommending the removal of judges. He argues that it creates a parallel, extra-constitutional mechanism that undermines Articles 124 and 218 of the Constitution, which vest the power to remove High Court judges exclusively in Parliament through a special majority under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.
Secondly, he submits that the in-house procedure lacks the procedural safeguards provided by the 1968 Act, such as formal charges, cross-examination, and proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Thirdly, Justice Varma argues that the Chief Justice of India (‘CJI’) lacks constitutional authority to exercise superintendence or disciplinary control over High Court judges, and the in-house procedure cannot override their constitutionally protected tenure.
Fourthly, he contends that the in-house procedure was improperly invoked without a formal complaint, based solely on presumptive queries about burnt currency found in the outhouse. He argues that the procedure is not designed for such circumstances.
Fifthly, Justice Varma alleges that the Supreme Court’s press release on March 22, disclosed unverified allegations and triggered a media trial that caused irreparable harm to his reputation.
Sixthly, he claims the three-member committee failed to notify him of its procedures, denied him opportunities to respond to evidence, examined witnesses in his absence, and provided paraphrased statements instead of video recordings. He further alleges that the committee selectively disclosed incriminating material, ignored exculpatory evidence (e.g., CCTV footage), reversed the burden of proof without notice, and denied him a personal hearing, violating Article 14’s principles of reasonableness and fairness.
Seventhly, Justice Varma argues that the committee’s mandate was confined to non-contentious issues, such as the presence of cash and the location of the outhouse. It failed to address critical questions: When, how, and by whom was the cash placed in the outhouse? How much cash was involved, and was it genuine? What caused the fire? Was he responsible for the alleged removal of currency remnants on March 15, 2025?
Eighthly, he contends that the committee’s final report, which was finalised on May 3 relied on inferences rather than evidence, concluding that the allegations were “proved” and warranted removal proceedings. The report failed to clarify the cash’s ownership, quantity, authenticity, or the fire’s cause.
Ninthly, Justice Varma alleges that the CJI endorsed the committee’s findings on May 4 hours after he received the report, and advised him to resign or opt for voluntary retirement by May 6 under threat of removal proceedings. He claims he was denied a personal hearing, contrary to precedent, and received no response to his request for adequate time to review the report.
What is the legal position in relation to In House Procedure
Justice Varma’s argument that the in-house procedure lacks constitutional or statutory sanction is misplaced. The procedure originates from the Supreme Court’s decision in C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee (1995), which recognised the need for an in-house mechanism to address complaints against High Court judges. The Court held that the Chief Justice of a High Court, after verification and confidential inquiry, should consult the CJI to address allegations of misconduct. This mechanism fills the gap between “proved misbehaviour” under the Constitution and conduct inconsistent with judicial office, enabling self-regulation within the judiciary.
In Addl. District & Sessions Judge ‘X’ v. High Court of M.P. (2015), the question arose, how should a complaint of a judge who is accused of sexual harassment be dealt with. It was in that context that the Supreme Court affirmed the pre-existing in-house procedure. The Court observed that the in-house procedure is an established mechanism for inquiring into allegations against judges through their peers.
The inquiry against the judge involved in Addl. District & Sessions Judge ‘X’ was conducted by a three-member committee, and its report was shared with the woman who filed the complaint.
When former Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi was accused of sexual harassment by a staff member, a similar in-house mechanism, consisting of three judges, was established, and a report was submitted.
Thus, the procedure has not only been reportedly used but also carries judicial sanction.
In the case of the woman judge in Addl. District & Sessions Judge ‘X’ who alleged sexual harassment, the three-member committee found insufficient evidence to support the claim. Despite this finding, the process under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, was followed.
Therefore, the objection raised by Justice Varma regarding the in-house procedure and the Judges (Inquiry) Act lacks substance. As a matter of fact Justice Varma submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the in-house committee. He participated in the proceedings and made submissions before the committee. It hardly lies in his mouth now to question the very existence of the procedure or its legality.
It needs to be underscored that the in-house procedure does not supplant the Judges (Inquiry) Act but provides the CJI, as the head of the judiciary, an opportunity to assess allegations while preserving judicial independence. By conducting inquiries internally, it shields judges from frivolous impeachment threats and external interference.
Justice Varma’s contention that the procedure was improperly invoked without a formal complaint lacks merit. Correspondence between the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and the then Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna indicates that the inquiry was initiated after ascertaining facts about the existence of currency notes in the outhouse.
Justice Varma did not deny the presence of the notes or dispute the surfaced video evidence. The in-house procedure does not mandate a specific form of complaint, and the facts were sufficient to warrant an inquiry.
The Addl. District & Sessions Judge ‘X’ case further clarifies that the CJI has the authority to adapt the procedure to ensure fairness, and Justice Varma has not alleged bias by the committee members.
Regarding the public disclosure of documents, Justice Varma’s claim of a media trial is overstated. The story first appeared in the Times of India, fueling speculation that the judiciary was shielding him through a mere transfer to Allahabad. To ensure transparency and protect institutional integrity, CJI Khanna disclosed relevant documents, including Justice Varma’s defense, ensuring a balanced release. The overwhelming public interest in transparency outweighs claims of privacy or confidentiality.
Justice Varma’s allegations of procedural unfairness by the committee are also misconceived.
The in-house inquiry is a fact-finding exercise for the CJI’s satisfaction, not a full-fledged trial. The committee adhered to principles of natural justice by allowing Justice Varma to depose and respond to incriminating material. His claim that the committee failed to address critical questions (e.g., the cash’s origin or the fire’s cause) misinterprets its mandate, which was to assess whether the facts disclosed conduct unbecoming of a judge, not to conduct a criminal investigation. It is these very questions which will be determined by the enquiry under the Judges Enquiry Act 1968.
Justice Varma has also challenged the findings of the in-house inquiry itself. Whether the Supreme Court will choose to review the wisdom of a committee comprising three High Court judges, including two Chief Justices, remains to be seen.
Legally, Justice Varma is entitled to contest the in-house inquiry on grounds of perceived irregularities.
In Addl. District & Sessions Judge ‘X’, the Supreme Court held that irregularities in an in-house inquiry may arise from violations of established procedures, bias, prejudice, or impropriety, and such issues are subject to judicial review. In this case, however, no such procedural violation appears to exist nor are alleged. The in-house committee operated strictly within the framework of the in-house procedure, adopting a process consistent with the principles of natural justice. Its composition adhered to the established guidelines, and at no point did Justice Varma allege bias or prejudice against any committee member.
His contention that the committee relied on inferences rather than evidence to conclude that the allegations were “proved” and warranted removal proceedings may not be amenable to judicial review, as reviewing it would be akin to sitting in judgment over the committee’s decision. Inferences are permissible based on the available evidence of cash found in the outhouse, regardless of the amount or its ownership. The findings are sufficient only to commence an inquiry, not to deem him guilty. Of necessity, all final findings can be made only after a full-fledged inquiry where evidence is recorded under oath and subjected to cross-examination by the judge or his representative, who may be a lawyer. Incidentally, at such an inquiry in Parliament, the judge is entitled to be represented by a lawyer of his own choice.
Finally, Justice Varma’s objection to the CJI’s recommendation for his removal, citing a lack of personal hearing, is unfounded. He was heard at length by the committee, and the CJI, not being a disciplinary authority, had no obligation to provide an additional hearing. After reviewing the report, the CJI offered Justice Varma the option to resign, which he declined. The CJI’s advice to the President to initiate removal proceedings was consistent with the in-house procedure. Justice Varma retains the right to be heard before he is finally impeached, if that happens.
We must also note that what happens in Parliament at an enquiry is not a criminal prosecution but a proceeding for removal from office as a judge of the High Court. Standards of evidence required for a removal are substantially different from those of a conviction.
At the end of the day, here is what we press upon: this story is not merely one that concerns a singular judge. Rather, since day one we have been clear that what matters most is the credibility of the judicial system in the eyes of the general public. In the world we live in, all disputes eventually end up in a court of law, and there are many litigants or potential litigants who need assurance that they are before an unbiased judge, free from any baggage of corruption, and that justice is being administered without fear or favor.
The issue is not solely about the rights of the judge, whatever they may be, but the credibility of the institution as a whole. It is worth recalling what the late Chief Justice of India, Sabyasachi Mukerji, said when confronted with a similar issue.
In open court, in the presence of the then Attorney General and the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association of India, Justice Mukerji stated and quoted in Addl. District & Sessions Judge ‘X’:
“Re : Ramaswami, J.
Chief Justice's Statement to the Bar
“In the beginning of May 1990, some learned advocates of this Court drew my attention to certain newspapers about the audit report investigating the expenses incurred in furnishing the residence of a former Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, namely, Shri V. Ramaswami, who is now a sitting Judge of this Court. I was requested by the learned lawyers to take action suo motu. The matter was mentioned more than once. On 1-5-1990, I had received a communication from the editor of a magazine enclosing therewith a copy of April 1990 issue of the magazine The Lawyers, stating that it contained the full text of the audit report of the Chandigarh Administration. Thereafter, after the learned Attorney General, Sir Soli Sorabjee, the former Attorney General, Shri Parasaran, Mr Venugopal, the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, and Dr Y.S. Chitale, former President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, also met me and drew my attention to these reports and expressed concern on the contents of the publications. The Union Minister of Law and Justice called on me and expressed the concern of the Members of Parliament about the alleged extravagance by Justice Ramaswami and the contents of the report, while working as the Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Sharing their concern, I had told the Law Minister and have since assured the learned Attorney General and other members of the Bar that I would look into the matter.
Legally and constitutionally the Chief Justice of India, as such, has no right or authority to inquire into the conduct of a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court. However, the Chief Justice of India, as the head of the Judicial Family has, I believe, the duty and the responsibility to maintain the judicial propriety and attempts to secure the confidence of the public in the working of the judicial process.
This was an unprecedented and an embarrassing situation. It called for caution and establishment of a salutary convention. I have obtained from the Chief Justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court the necessary papers.
There are three kinds of reports (i) reports submitted by the Internal Audit Cell of the High Court, (ii) fact-finding reports submitted by District and Sessions Judges (Vigilance) both of Punjab and Haryana; and (iii) reports and audit paras submitted by the official of the Accountant General's office to the High Court for reply. The reports and audit paras last mentioned seek clarifications and justifications in respect of the transactions which prima facie appeared to be irregular.
I have looked into it and then arrived at a certain tentative impression it is not necessary to recapitulate in detail, the alleged irregularities I understand from the authorities of the High Court that the officials involved in the alleged irregularities have been suspended and departmental inquiries have been instituted against them. The final result of these departmental inquiries is awaited. In the meantime, I took Brother Ramaswami into confidence and made known to him the contents of the audit reports with a view to ascertaining his position in relation to the disclosures made in the reports. He has given his version. I have also requested Brother Ramaswami to communicate his views to the Registrar, High Court of Punjab and Haryana so that the High Court may reply to the audit objections raised by the Government.
I understand that the High Court had directly sought Brother Ramaswami's clarifications with regard to certain audit objection and he has written to the officers of the High Court in this behalf. The proceedings, as mentioned before, against some of the officers of the High Court on alleged irregularities are still pending. In respect of some of the irregularities which I have considered and the tendency of the departmental inquiries against the suspended officers, I am of the opinion that it would be appropriate to wait for a closer examination of the replies to the audit objections and the various queries submitted by the High Court to Brother Ramaswami before one can come to a final conclusion.
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The Supreme Court must uphold the rule of law. It is, therefore, necessary that those who uphold the rule of law must live by law and Judges must, therefore, be obliged to live according to law. The law, procedure and the norms applicable in this case, enjoin that the expenses incurred by the Court for the Judges must be according to the rules, norms and the practice. No man is above law or the rules. The Judges either of the Supreme Court or of the High Courts and the Chief Justices are all subject to the rule of law and procedure like any other citizen of this country and must abide by the norms and regulation prescribed inasmuch as these and to the extent are applicable to them I always thought this was clear and needed no reiteration. We must, therefore, ensure that there is no conduct of the Judges, which affects the faith of the people that Judges do not live according to law. Judges cannot afford to be involved in disputes, which have to determine the question whether the Judges while functioning as Judges or Chief Justices have attempted to subvert the law either designedly or in utter negligence or recklessness.
In this matter, the questions involved are, namely, (i) whether the Chief Justice was entitled to the expenses of his telephone at Madras because Chandigarh was declared a disturbed area; (ii) Whether the Chief Justice was obliged to obtain leave to avail the facility of LTC; (iii) Whether the Chief Justice was entitled to direct the cars to be taken to Madras when he was on vacation from Chandigarh for the reasons mentioned by him; (iv) Whether the silver maces ordered by the High Court have been done at the rate similar to the rate applied in respect of those supplied to the Madras High Court, and (v) Whether even though the Judges of the Punjab and Haryana High Court did not approve the idea of having maces for each individual Judge, the Chief Justice was entitled to direct the purchase of these maces. These are the matters on which interpretation of the rules or on the permission or relaxation of rules, certain consequences will follow, and if the Chief Justice was not so entitled or these could not be sanctioned as has been done under the circumstances mentioned in the aforesaid objections and communications, reimbursement or recovery would be directed. These matters, therefore, will have to await adjudication by the appropriate authorities, namely, the Government and the sanctioning authorities dealing with audit objections, in respect of the permissions sought. Though one would like to think that there has been extravagance and ostentatiousness but these by themselves do not involve determining questions of moral or legal impropriety of a Judge functioning as a Judge in the Court.
But there are some other aspects involved in this matter, namely, the questions of not accounting for all the furniture or items that were in the residence and Office of the Chief Justice, the alleged replacement of superior quality items by inferior quality items, the missing items and the splitting up of the bills in order to have the sanction of the authorities or to conform to the rules, are the matters which are also pending determination and adjudication.
Involvement in any investigation on the conduct of a sitting Supreme Court Judge on such matters as aforesaid is embarrassing in the circumstances and the background in which these questions have arisen in the instant case. For one who should attempt to uphold the rule of law, it is embarrassing to be involved in such a dispute. But no final decision on this aspect can be arrived at until the investigations and inquiries are completed. I have, on these aspects after looking into the matter and the points involved, no doubt that those who aspire to uphold the rule of law must strive to live according to law and they necessarily expose themselves to the danger of perishing by law. I am aware and deeply conscious that in certain circumstances somebody may be a victim of certain situation. I was constrained, in those circumstances, to advise Brother Ramaswami to desist from discharging judicial functions so long as the investigations continued and his name was cleared on this aspect.
I wrote to Brother Ramaswami on 18-7-1990 rendering my aforesaid advice. I have also conveyed to him my anguish in tendering this advice and I have requested him to please be on leave until the investigations on the aforesaid conduct are completed.
On 18-7-1990 after receipt of my letter, Brother Ramaswami has applied for leave for six weeks in the first instance with effect from 23-7-1990. I have directed the office to process his application for leave.
Since I had assured the learned Attorney General, the Law Minister, the President of the Bar Association and other that I will look into it, I thought I must convey to you result of my looking into it.”