WHILE DESCRIBING ARTICLE 142 of the Constitution of India as a “nuclear missile against democratic forces, available to the judiciary 24x7,” Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar voiced strong concerns over the judiciary’s drift into executive and legislative functions.
The trigger for his remarks was the judgement that the Supreme Court delivered on April in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu. The dispute arose after the Tamil Nadu Governor, R.N. Ravi, withheld assent to ten bills passed by the state legislature without offering any reasons or returning them for reconsideration. When the legislature re-enacted the bills and sent them back, the Governor instead reserved them for the President’s consideration.
The Court held that such a conduct violated Article 200 of the Constitution, which permits the Governor to either assent, withhold (and return), or reserve a bill—but not indefinitely delay. Invoking its extraordinary powers under Article 142, the Court deemed the ten bills as having received assent.
Vice President Dhankar questioned the constitutional basis of this judgment, and warned that the judiciary was turning into a “super parliament” that believed that it could dictate terms to the constitutional functionaries. This amounted to a breach of the doctrine of separation of powers, and emphasised that it was especially unsettling as the judiciary consistently resists attempts when other branches try to check its powers and processes.
