THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU to establish a legal review committee under Justice Kurian Joseph, Former Judge, Supreme Court of India, is not just a policy manoeuvre but echoes the continuous call for reforms. Like its predecessor, the 1969 Rajamannar Committee, the present government’s act reflects a deeper anxiety shared across South India, i.e., that the foundational promises of Indian federalism are being steadily hollowed out. In the last year, the state finance ministers had also raised concerns at the recent South Indian Finance Ministers’ Conclave. So, as is visible, a growing sense of estrangement is taking root, not merely over the national level medical entrance exam (NEET), delay in fiscal transfers, or the threat of delimitation leading to possible dilution of seats from these states in the Parliament of India, but over a simple yet significant question: Do the Indian states have meaningful autonomy in the Indian federation?
A Centre that crowds out the States
India has walked a thin line between constitutional centralism and operational federalism for decades. While the Constitution’s Article 1 defines India as a “Union of States,” the Centre has steadily consolidated its grip on power. The last decade, particularly the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the increasing reliance on cesses, has exposed how this centralising tendency is a lived reality for many States. Notably, the centralisation of power is not just economic but political. The careful framing of balancing powers in the Indian Constitution has gradually been eroded due to government practices, such as formal, informal, or constitutional amendments. The important intergovernmental institutions like the Finance Commission and posts like the Governors and process of intergovernmental consultations in the Zonal Council and Interstate Councils are increasingly sidelined. From experience, there is no dearth of examples in the last five years where the Governors have sat on the bills and not allowed them to be passed by the state assembly, particularly when the bills did not align with the Central policies.
Although the judiciary in recent times has rebuked these practices, often, these decisions are delayed and there have been only piecemeal approaches to address the deeper systemic imbalances. Tamil Nadu’s recent
growing unilateralism, whether through delays in gubernatorial assent, bypassing state governments through central appointments, or weaponising agencies like the Enforcement Directorate, has created a situation where federal trust is at an all-time low.
History repeats, but are we listening?:
In their 1971 report, the Rajamannar Committee (constituted by the erstwhile Tamil Nadu government - like the current Kurien Committee) emphasised rebalancing the distribution of powers between the Centre and the States. It recommended shifting specific key subject matters to the State list and forming the Inter-States Council towards establishing cooperative federalism and respect for regional autonomy. However, these proposals were dismissed, mainly due to political fears of ‘regionalism’ and the spectre of ‘secession’. It must be noted that following up on the Committee’s recommendation, the Centre constituted the Inter-State Council in 1990, although with limited power. Thus, even though the recommendations of the Rajamannar Committee did not meet positive ends, their efforts played an instrumental role in shaping the discourse on State autonomy. It provoked the conversation over states’ autonomy in the country, as also visible in the efforts of other state governments in forming committees on similar lines. In the late 1970s, the West Bengal Memorandum (1977) and the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1978) emphasised greater fiscal, legislative, and administrative autonomy for states. While West Bengal sought constitutional changes like scrapping Articles 200, 201, and 356, the Government of Punjab pushed for limiting the Centre’s role to core functions and transferring residuary powers to states.
This kind of friction also resulted in the constitution of the Sarkaria Commission with similar mandates at the Centre's behest in 1983, against the backdrop of federal tensions owing to the Centre imposing presidential emergency in certain states. Unlike the previous Rajamannar Committee, the Sarkaria Committee avoided recommending radical changes to the constitutional scheme and emphasised developing consultative and cooperative mechanisms. Similarly, the Punchhi Commission, 2007, took the conversation further by calling for a more unambiguous reaffirmation of India as a ‘Union of States’, proposing devolution of powers, and questioning the growing role of the Governor as a tool of central interference. However, its suggestions, too, were largely ignored.
This systemic failure to heed the calls for reform reflects a larger pattern of political expediency. Regional voices are sidelined when it suits the Centre, and when regional parties push back, they are often dismissed as separatist rather than constructive.
The underlying issue with the Centre’s attitude towards these suggestions is that it equates the national interest with centralisation, which overshadows the federal principles enshrined in the Constitution.
The Kurian Committee - A fresh attempt
The Tamil Nadu government’s resolve to constitute the Kurian Committee is a notable development that gives more direction to the earlier repeated calls for reform and centralisation attempts. It also signals the situation’s urgency, which requires a thorough and more cohesive approach to India’s changed fiscal and political scenario.
The Kurian Committee has to suggest reforms against contemporary political and economic realities. The rise of regional parties and increasing influence, the growing discontent over economic policies like the Goods and Services Tax (GST), and concerns over the erosion of fiscal autonomy are symptoms of a deeper problem. The GST law implemented as a “harbinger of pooled sovereignty” in India, resulted in a significant loss of independent taxation powers to the states. Moreover, the Centre significantly influences the GST Council, which makes significant decisions regarding tax bases and rates.
Even though the 14th Finance Commission recommended a 42 percent share of tax revenues for the States, the reality is that this is undercut by the rise of cesses and surcharges, non-shareable components of revenue that further limit States’ financial autonomy. An added and pressing concern has been the rise in instances where central bodies like the Enforcement Directorate (ED) and other central agencies are indirectly being used by the Centre to target state governments officials, individually who are opposed to the Centre’s policies. This taints federal trust and reduces federal harmony.
Therefore, Tamil Nadu’s demand is not about a regional dispute or isolated grievances but a larger question: Do States still have a meaningful voice in the Union?
Is India’s federalism in crisis?
The Indian Constitution was designed to create a federal system that accommodated the diverse needs of its regions while ensuring national unity. It was a departure from the centralisation of power under colonial rule. In India’s Founding Moment, legal scholar Khosla argues that many perceive the Constitution as simply an extension of the Government of India Act, 1935, but this is a reductionist view. The Constitution was a deliberate attempt to establish a robust federal structure with clear demarcations between the Centre and States.
Thus, the feeling of regional alienation and the centralisation of power has led to a federal trust deficit. Federalism is increasingly seen as an obstacle to governance rather than a necessary component of India’s democratic legitimacy.
Unlike its predecessors, the Kurian Committee has the potential to be more than just another academic exercise. It must address the deep-seated fiscal federalism issues, political autonomy erosion, and the increasing centralisation of power in Delhi. Suppose the Centre continues to ignore the demands for a fair and equitable power distribution. In that case, it will exacerbate regional inequalities and risk the stability of India’s democratic structure.
The need for systemic reform: Federalism as the pillar of democracy
It is important that the Centre sees the system’s distortions and redresses the pressing concerns undermining the federal architecture. More than the constitutional amendments, the Centre’s attitude and perception of states not being administrative units but rather exercising ‘co-government” in the federal set-up has to be reaffirmed. Federalism is a constitutional promise to the local people by the regional and federal governments. Decentralisation is a vertical division of powers in an institutionalised system of authoritative bodies. However, decentralisation does not guarantee federalism, and federalism is not a necessary condition for it. Referencing federalism means that the subnational units have autonomy under the constitutional scheme.
The Kurian Committee’s recommendations may have an opportunity to chart a new course, but of course, like previous committees, the outcome depends on the political will of the Centre. If the recommendations align with Justice Kurien’s remark that, “it needs a glasnost to look into, and if necessary to do an exercise of perestroika,” and if implemented with sincerity and political will, they can provide the much-needed framework to restore the federal balance. Moreover, this will require the Centre to acknowledge that the strength of the Union lies not in centralisation but in a federal structure that respects regional diversity and equitable sharing.
