Bangladesh and Britain: Blood in the street—a case of livelihood?

At a cursory glance, the violent protests in Bangladesh against the quota system may seem to have nothing in common with the race riots in Britain, but beyond being mere law and order problems, a thread of economics joins the two. 

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CAN we find similarities in the antecedents to the disturbing scenes of violence frequently surfacing in different parts of the world?

As has been widely reported, the recent incidents of mob violence in Bangladesh began with protests by young people, mostly students, opposing certain quotas in government jobs

The protests then escalated into a nationwide scene of rioting, which ultimately led to the overthrow of the regime of the Awami League chief Sheikh Hasina.

Almost in the same week, we also witnessed a similar outbreak of violence and arson by 'anti-migrant and anti-immigration' groups in Britain. It started in Rotherham, where a hotel was attacked due to its supposed ownership by, or provision of refuge to, immigrants.

The protesters were reacting to fake news on social media about the death of three young girls by a young man rumoured to be a Muslim immigrant.

The violence in Britain, supported by the far-right anti-immigrant lobby, had its appeal and spread to various cities and towns, including London, Hartlepool, Middlesbrough, Liverpool, Belfast and Leeds. The situation turned rather grave and difficult for the ruling government to control.

Although these two events seem to have nothing in common except violence, can we find other similarities between them?

Bangladesh imbroglio

In Bangladesh, the initial student protests, mostly peaceful, were against the 30 percent reserved quota for descendants of freedom fighters in the 1971 Liberation War (who are usually linked to the Awami League).

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The nature of the protests quickly changed, with massive gatherings of protestors, mostly young, targeting individuals and properties associated with the government and the Awami League.

They did not spare the residence of Hasina or a statue of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of Bangladesh and arguably its most revered figure. They destroyed the Parliament House, probably viewed as a symbol of the regime they were protesting against.

Departing from the secularism upheld by the discredited previous government, the masses began attacking the minority Hindu community. The attack on Hindus was consolidated by the resurfacing of the fundamentalist Muslim organisation Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh, which had been marginalised under Hasina's rule.

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Khaleda Zia, which was in Opposition, also came to the forefront. Notably, the BNP has historically been aligned with Islamic ideals while remaining opposed to India.

By distancing itself from Bangladesh's history of liberation and India's role in its freedom movement, symbolised by the overthrowing of Mujibur Rahman's statue and similar attacks, the movement indirectly seems to have dissociated itself from the previous government's relations with India, sending a diplomatic signal.

As facts continue to emerge, it has become clear that Hasina's rule had morphed into a one-party regime, characterised by rampant corruption and effectively sidelining parliamentary democracy.

Significantly, the protests and mass violence in Bangladesh reflect a combination of forces, comprising livelihood issues related to job opportunities and the revival of Islamic fundamentalism, which was suppressed under the Hasina regime. While the revoking of the ban on Jamaat may signify the erosion of Bangla culture and language, which was fiercely protected during the historic Bhasha Andolan (language movement) on February 21, 1952, this issue will remain a challenging and contentious one for Bangladeshi citizens.

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Let us explore further why students in Bangladesh took to the streets over the issue of 30 percent job reservation and how it spread as a mass movement. The students viewed the job quota as a threat to their future opportunities, which implies that there is a lack of employment opportunities, despite the official claims of a prosperous and high-growth economy.

As explained by a researcher, exports contributed more than one-fifth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth between 2000 and 2010. The major share of exports came from the garments industry, providing 85 percent of aggregate exports in 2022–23.

In Bangladesh, garments happen to be a cheap labour industry (as well as outsourcing for foreign companies) where workers are consistently underpaid, both with the monopsony power exercised by foreign buyers and the wage compression exercised by domestic employers.

The same researcher reveals that the unemployment rate in Bangladesh in 2022 was the highest among those with advanced education, reaching 12.2 percent, while individuals with intermediate and basic education faced unemployment at 8.1 percent and 4.5 percent rates respectively during the same year. This by itself explains the resentment among young people.

While actual unemployment levels would be significantly higher if one considers the informally engaged workforce, the data above reflects the frustration of people, particularly of young students, who feared the prospect of further unemployment under the newly instituted quota regime.

The large numbers of mostly young people who joined the mob violence came with a sense of bitterness and a desire for retribution, as evident in their acts of looting and destruction of property owned by Awami League leaders and their sympathisers, which also included minority Hindus.

Economic deprivation is common for many in the country, including those employed in the export-oriented garment industry. The economic deprivation provided the foundation for mobilising protests, expanding the quota-related student movement to encompass broader themes, including religion.

Also read: Is the ground more fertile or does it produce a better yield because of its caste?

The damage extended beyond property, with the death toll nearing 500 due to army firing, and numerous fatalities resulting from attacks on targeted individuals and groups, particularly those labelled as 'the other'.

The British muddle

Can we draw a parallel between the uprising in Bangladesh and the disturbing riots in Britain?

As already mentioned, the initial wave of protests in Britain came from anti-immigration groups. Their agenda was already set in terms of the desired goal of exclusion of the 'other' who do not qualify as the 'white-skinned' majority of British citizens.

In recent years, there has been an expansion of exclusionary norms adopted by British hypernationalists, which now encompasses not only dark-skinned African people, many of whom are Muslims, in search of sanctuary and better opportunity but also brown-skinned Muslims from the Middle East. This substantially broadens the range of those sought to be deported or attacked by the protestors, thus extending the notion of the 'other'.

Thus is born a potent mix of colonial nostalgia and White ethnonationalism and fears that the people they used to rule will now make them a minority in their own country.

Racial divides were also prominent in the large-scale migration of Europeans to North America and the Pacific, nearly killing all 'aborigines' and indigenous populations of such places.

In Britain, the urge to get back the lost glory of the empire under colonialism is now visible in the prevailing attacks on immigrants from the rest of the world, mostly with skin colour darker than the White British.

The mood was also prevalent in the nationalist desires leading to Brexit, which led to disruptions in many economic advantages for the country. Finally, the protests are also impacted by the current wave of Islamophobia in Western countries, which has been especially fuelled by the unstable regimes leading to the flow of migrants from the Middle East. This explains the targeting of Muslims and all individuals with dark skin, who are collectively branded as the 'other' and deemed unwanted.

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As it turned out, the 17-year-old boy who killed the three girls was neither a Muslim nor an African immigrant. He was born in Cardiff. His parents are of Rwandan descent.

So it is pertinent to ask whether the current cycle of hatred and violence in Britain is linked to the livelihood issues faced by the protestors. In May 2024, the unemployment rates for new job seekers were 36.4 percent and 18.8 percent respectively for the 16–17 and 18–24 age groups.

Furthermore, with prices skyrocketing, Britain's inflation rate surged to 9.1 percent in 2022, a significant increase from the previous two years, which saw rates around 1 percent, and 2015, when the rate was near zero.

Additionally, living has become more expensive due to privatised transportation and cuts to the National Health Scheme.

Economic causes?

The above facts and circumstances in Britain and Bangladesh confirm an erosion of the opportunities to sustain livelihood at basic levels of subsistence.

This has been of primary importance in instigating the pervading agitations in Bangladesh calling for the exclusion of sections of the minority population in the country and those seeking immigration in Britain.

To avoid a repeat of such upheaval in other countries, there is a need to avoid situations where people reach a sub-subsistence level of livelihood. This can only be attained through governance that ensures full employment, high growth and a fair distribution of output.