ON NOVEMBER 3, 2025, the Delhi High Court delivered a significant judgment in the case Re: Suicide Committed by Sushant Rohilla, Law Student of I.P. University. This case originated from a suo motu petition initiated by the Supreme Court in 2016 after a young law student, Sushant Rohilla, tragically took his own life. His death was reportedly linked to the fact that he had been barred from sitting for his semester examinations due to a shortage of attendance.
The Delhi High Court, while acknowledging the gravity of this incident, took the opportunity to reflect upon the structural and institutional issues within universities that often contribute to student distress. The Court issued important directions to the Bar Council of India (‘BCI’), observing that rigid and mechanical attendance rules must not obstruct a student’s academic or professional progress. It held that:
“No student enrolled in any recognized law college, university or institution in India shall be detained from taking examination or be prevented from further academic pursuits or career progression on the ground of lack of minimum attendance.”
The Court further directed that no law college or university shall prescribe attendance norms exceeding those mandated by the BCI under the Legal Education Rules. Importantly, it emphasized that academic participation should not be limited to classroom presence alone. Activities such as moot courts, debates, internships, social activism, and field research are integral to a law student’s learning experience and must be duly recognized as part of attendance requirements.
This judgment has stirred two important debates within the legal education community:
First, does this judgment of the Delhi High Court have effect beyond the National Capital Territory of Delhi? In other words, can it be applied in other states such as Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, or Rajasthan?
Second, and perhaps more crucially, does this judgment invite law schools to introspect on why students often disengage from classroom learning? Is there a deeper pedagogical crisis that we must confront?
Can the Delhi High Court’s Judgment apply nationally?
At first glance, one might assume that a High Court’s judgment applies only within its territorial jurisdiction. However, Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India expands this view. It provides that the power of a High Court to issue directions, orders, or writs extends to any government, authority, or person within or beyond its territory, provided that the cause of action arises, wholly or in part, within its jurisdiction.
More importantly, when a High Court interprets or issues directions concerning a central law or statutory body created under a central act, such judgments have persuasive or even binding influence across India until set aside by the Supreme Court or another High Court with contrary reasoning.
There are several precedents supporting this understanding:
Shiv Kumar v. Union of India (2014) – The Karnataka High Court observed that the Kerala High Court’s judgment declaring Section 10(A)(i) of the Indian Divorce Act unconstitutional had effect beyond Kerala, since it pertained to a central statute.
Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2009) – The Delhi High Court’s judgment reading down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code had an all-India impact until it was overturned by the Supreme Court in Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2013).
Harshal N. Mirashi v. State of Maharashtra (2020) – Although related to the central Epidemic Diseases Act, the Supreme Court directed the petitioner to seek relief from the respective High Court, recognizing the broad applicability of High Court interpretations of central laws.
Given that the Bar Council of India is a statutory body established under the Advocates Act, 1961, a central legislation, the directions issued by the Delhi High Court logically extend to all recognized law colleges and universities across India. Until such time as the Supreme Court modifies or clarifies these directions, they serve as a guiding precedent for law institutions nationwide.
Beyond attendance: The deeper crisis in Legal Education
While the judgment has rightly questioned the rigidity of attendance policies, it has also indirectly exposed a deeper and more uncomfortable truth about legal education in India.
The real issue is not merely about attendance—it is about engagement. Why are law students increasingly reluctant to attend classes?
The answer lies in the structure and delivery of the curriculum itself. Most law colleges in India continue to follow outdated pedagogical models rooted in rote learning. Students are often expected to memorize sections, provisions, and case names without truly understanding their application. For instance, when the Right to Information Act is taught in classrooms, discussions often remain confined to the text of the statute, the composition of the commissions, and judicial interpretations. Rarely are students trained to draft or file an RTI application to seek real information.
This overemphasis on theoretical knowledge and neglect of practical learning leaves many graduates ill-prepared for the profession. It is not uncommon to find law graduates—after three or even five years of study—struggling to draft a basic petition, identify appropriate forums for filing cases, or understand procedural documentation. Much of this learning is then deferred to their early years of practice, leading to frustration and inefficiency.
The Delhi High Court’s judgment, therefore, should be seen as more than a directive on attendance. It is a mirror reflecting the need for systemic reform in legal education. Law schools must move towards a more experiential model that integrates classroom learning with field engagement, simulation exercises, research-based projects, and community exposure—exactly the kind of approach envisioned by the National Education Policy (‘NEP’) 2020.
A call for reflective reform
The tragedy of Sushant Rohilla should not be remembered merely as a failure of attendance policy, but as a reminder of how alienating legal education has become for many students. Universities must recognise that education is not about enforcing compliance but about nurturing curiosity, empathy, and critical reasoning.
In the mid-1920s, the Bombay government appointed a university reforms committee. This committee sent a detailed questionnaire to Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, among 320 other persons. In one of his responses*, Dr Ambedkar articulated his vision powerfully:
“The aim and functions of University Education should be to see that the teaching carried on there is suited to adults; that it is scientific, detached and impartial in character; that it aims not so much at filling the mind of the student with facts or theories as at calling forth his own individuality, and stimulating him to mental effort; that it accustoms him to the critical study of the leading authorities, with perhaps, occasional reference to first-hand sources of information; and that it implants in his mind a standard of toughness, and gives him a sense of the difficulty as well as the value of reaching at truth.”
This vision remains profoundly relevant today. If law schools are to produce ethical, competent, and socially conscious lawyers, they must align their teaching with this philosophy. The Delhi High Court’s judgment offers an opening—perhaps even an invitation—to reimagine the purpose of legal education in India.
Attendance, after all, is not a measure of learning; engagement is. And engagement cannot be enforced—it must be inspired.
Note:
For his full response and the written evidence, refer to Page 292 onwards in Volume 2 of Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, edited by Hari Narke.