IN RECENT MONTHS, India has witnessed a troubling new form of cyber-fraud: victims, especially older citizens, are being "digitally arrested" in their homes by anonymous callers. In one incident, fraudsters posing as Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) officers digitally arrested an 80-year-old man and extorted ₹33 lakh. In Pune, two separate scams targeted a 77-year-old man and a 69-year-old woman, where the scamsters siphoned off ₹39.5 lakh through bogus terror and drug-trafficking allegations. These high-profile stories are not anomalies.
This clandestine fraud operation exploits fear and confusion: callers claim victims are wanted by the police, Enforcement Directorate, or even the Supreme Court, then pressure them to "transfer" their savings into supposedly verified accounts.
The government's response has been urgent. The Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) reports blocking over 1,700 Skype IDs and 59,000 WhatsApp numbers used by digital arrest scammers. Telecom regulators have blocked hundreds of thousands of suspected SIM cards and devices linked to these frauds, and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has publicly warned consumers that "there is no such thing as a 'digital arrest'". In Parliament, MHA officials detailed a nationwide awareness campaign, from newspaper advertisements and metro announcements to radio and television programmes, to educate people about these scams.
At the same time, the judiciary has taken note. A bench led by Justices Kant and Bagchi took suo motu cognisance of the issue after an elderly Haryana couple wrote in. It appointed senior advocate N.S. Nappinai as amicus curiae and directed the CBI to be the primary agency to investigate digital arrest scam cases. A Rajasthan High Court bench also moved suo motu, observed that "digital arrest" has no legal standing in India and urged the state to spread constant public warnings against it.
How do these scams operate?
A digital arrest scam is a highly sophisticated extortion racket where fraudsters impersonate law enforcement officials such as police, CBI, Enforcement Directorate, or even RBI officials, accusing victims of heinous crimes and claiming that warrants or court orders have been issued against them. Many scammers go to great lengths to appear authentic. They use fake uniforms, forged letterheads bearing Ministry of Home Affairs or RBI seals, and mock "police station" video backgrounds. Victims are coerced into "staying online,” usually via WhatsApp or Skype video, for hours under the pretext of questioning. A recent innovation in criminal intent has been the use of deepfake technology or artificial intelligence to mimic the voices of relatives or judges, amplifying the psychological pressure. Constant threats, like "transfer ₹10 lakh now or we will send a team to arrest you", create urgent fear. Before victims can think, they are pressured to move their money, often via Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) or Unified Payments Interface (UPI), into designated bank accounts controlled by the fraudsters.
This scheme straddles a legal grey zone. Notably, "digital arrest" has no basis in Indian law. The newly enacted Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) contains no provision for any virtual or video-call arrest. Further, they are not recognised by law (as of the date of writing), so enforcement relies on generic provisions. In practice, police use a mix of existing provisions to charge the criminals. Under the BNS, they invoke sections for cheating, criminal intimidation, extortion, and impersonating an officer. The Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) can also apply, for instance, fraud by personation via computer or identity theft.
In a July 2025 order in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, the Supreme Court noted that the official process for delivering police notices under Section 35 of the BNS cannot bypass statutory formality. The notices must be served in person, and not through unintended legislative mediums like WhatsApp or video. The judgment does not directly address digital-arrest frauds, but its emphasis on formal service provides a procedural safeguard against attempts to serve or threaten service via messaging applications.
Beyond procedural issues, enforcement faces technical hurdles. Perpetrators often operate from "scam hubs" abroad, using mule bank accounts and telecom loopholes to evade detection. The National Crime Records Bureau does not separately track digital arrests, making it challenging to obtain precise figures. However, based on media reports, government reports and court filings, the scale is massive with tens of thousands of incidents and crores of rupees lost, both increasing every year.
Why do victims fall for these scams?
Why do "digital arrest" scams land with such force? At its core, the con exploits the very trust citizens place in institutions, or is it the fear thereof? Scammers pretend to carry the authority of a powerful state through symbols such as police uniforms, official seals, or court procedures. They pervert that authority into a weapon of intimidation. As the Supreme Court warned, these crimes undermine public trust by abusing the judiciary's name and authority. Each time a criminal impersonates courts and judges, misusing stamps and seals, citizens' faith in due process erodes. If anyone with a fake video can summon you to a virtual police station, the sanctity of lawful arrest is called into question.
The prevalence of these scams starkly reveals India's digital divide and legal illiteracy. Most victims are seniors or rural residents who lack familiarity with online scams. They are often not tech-savvy and may not have experience with digital technologies, and they may be easily deceived by scammers posing as government or law enforcement officers. Many people live alone and panic at the prospect of being charged with a crime. Technology itself compounds this: the same tools (video chat, telecom networks) that connect us also enable prolonged isolation of a victim under constant surveillance. In effect, the criminals exploit what Justice Dhand of the Rajasthan High Court described as an individual’s vulnerability in digital spaces, using "themes of authority, urgency and fear" to deceive even well-educated people.
Moreover, these scams highlight a paradox of our times. As V.S. Subrahmanian, professor of computer science at Northwestern University, told Al Jazeera, "digital arrest is just a newfangled form of spear-phishing," a highly targeted social engineering attack. The fraudsters research their victims, often via social media, then weave narratives that prey on personal fears (a boss's arrest, a missing parcel of contraband). If the state's messaging about its own procedures is unclear, ordinary people have little to fall back on. Many Indians may not know that no Indian law permits an officer to arrest someone via video call. That lapse in public education remains a glaring problem.
All the while, victims often do not report immediately out of fear or shame. When they finally come forward, investigators must carefully untangle the orchestrated lies. While the law penalises and remedies each element (cheating, intimidation, etc.), the human toll remains largely hidden. These are people terrified in their own homes, thinking their reputation, freedom, or family may be ruined, only to realise later that criminals mimicked the state itself. The cost is not just in rupees: it is in shattered security.
A citizen-centric way forward
Digital arrest scams cannot be rooted out by policing alone. A holistic, citizen-first approach is needed, one that restores trust, ensures legal clarity, and aids the vulnerable. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) informed the Supreme Court that cyber-criminals have used "digital arrest" to coerce thousands of citizens, mostly elderly, and have robbed roughly ₹3,000 crore across India.
In the aftermath of rising "digital arrest" frauds, the Court has moved beyond mere cognisance to active supervision. It appointed an amicus curiae, directed the CBI to act as the primary agency for investigating such scams, and called upon the RBI, the Department of Telecommunications, and intermediaries to consider concrete regulatory and technical measures, including stricter SIM-issuance norms, action against SIM-box misuse, preservation of telecom data, freezing of bank accounts linked to fraud, and AI-based detection of mule accounts.
The first step must be to explicitly outlaw the core of this fraud. One way is for legislators to amend the BNS (or the IT Act) to criminalise impersonating law enforcement or judicial officers through any digital medium with the intent to defraud. Such offences should be clarified to signal that such scams are not benign fraud but would be construed as serious breaches of public order.
Arrests and summons must follow formal due-process rules. Police departments should audit their procedures and issue strict internal guidelines: for example, no arrest can be effected by any form of call or message. Enforcement agencies must remind citizens that they never demand money or transfers to verify an investigation. Training can help frontline officers themselves recognise these cons and advise their communities.
Prevention depends on awareness. Government and non-governmental organisations can organise cyber-awareness drives in local languages, particularly at senior-citizen clubs, and through various channels, including community television and radio. I4C's "CyberDost" messages and State Bank of India's digital literacy materials are useful, but they need wider distribution. Banks in particular can play a role. Customers should be informed at every access point that legitimate officials will never ask them to move money to an unknown account. Online platforms (WhatsApp, Telegram) could display periodic bulletins or alerts to Indian users with warnings about these scams. Perhaps most importantly, we should invest in teaching legal rights: a simple rule of thumb could be circulated—an arrest can only be made by uniformed police with a warrant, or under a court order, and always in person. This is an institutional responsibility in a digital democracy.
On the tech side, all relevant agencies should strategically coordinate. The Supreme Court has directed the Department of Telecommunications to propose tougher SIM issuance norms. It directed the telecommunication service providers to take necessary measures to prevent the unlawful issuance of SIM boxes. It has directed all states and union territories to establish and operationalise Regional and State Cybercrime Coordination Centres, in coordination with I4C. Furthermore, the Court inquired why the RBI cannot implement fraud-detection systems, powered by artificial intelligence and machine learning, to flag transfers into unusual accounts or rapid withdrawals.
Messaging and social platforms must also be part of the solution. The Supreme Court has directed information technology intermediaries to cooperate with the CBI to assist in rendering traffic and content data for the investigation of digital arrest scam cases. WhatsApp and others could detect and block bulk messages that mimic police or court communications. They could introduce a verified law enforcement channel (like X's blue check) so users know which messages are official. The recent Supreme Court decision on not using WhatsApp for police notices could be mirrored by discouraging scammers from misusing it. For example, Meta might alert users if someone with no official verification claims to be a police officer.
Victims must be treated with understanding. Their complaints should be fast-tracked and investigated. Cybercrime reporting channels (1930 helpline, cybercrime.gov.in) should ensure timely assistance, and not rely solely on automated tickets. Every effort must be made to reassure citizens that the state will protect them from the misuse of its own name.
Combating digital arrests and tech-powered cybercrimes, the unintended byproducts of innovation and technological advancements, requires more than technical fixes. It demands a citizen-centred reorientation of law enforcement and regulations. The goal must be to preempt fear with clarity, a glaring need to examine and fill loopholes in statutes and procedures that the scammers exploit.
Case details: Suo Moto Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 03/2025, In Re: Victims of Digital Arrest Related to Forged Documents, last listed on January 13, 2026.
