An ocean Indian in name only: Reflections on the Maldivian contretemps

As the Maldives deadline for withdrawal of Indian armed forces comes close, Ravi Nair traces the historical and contemporary dynamics of the geopolitics in the 'Indian' Ocean that have led to this crucial juncture. 

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MOST Indians, including those who should know better, think the Indian Ocean belongs to India.

In this era, when official history is only issued in denominations of 500 and 1,000 years, they would do well to remember that prior to 1515, it was called the Eastern Ocean.

But when those in power and in proximity to it believe that, in 2024, the Indian Ocean is Indian in the geopolitical sense, it is delusional.

The Maldives is a sovereign nation

The contretemps with the Maldives is a recent example.

The air of injured innocence on the part of many in India at the request of the Maldives for the withdrawal of Indian armed forces personnel borders on the ludicrous. The Akhand Bharat (Greater India) groupies conveniently forget the Maldives is a sovereign nation.

The Indian media is replete with all the benefits that accrue to the Maldives thanks to the Indian connection. The Maldivian media, on the other hand, has chosen to downplay the assistance rendered by India in 1988.

The lesson here is that attention cannot be forced on the unwilling. No country, or for that matter, no individual, likes being constantly reminded of what is owed for help rendered in the past.

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Fortunately, the Indian naval chief was more circumspect than his political masters. Gunboat diplomacy of the 19th century by the United States vis-à-vis Japan and the British Empire vis-à-vis China belongs to Neverland in today's world.

Recently, the Maldives signed several new agreements with China— its largest external creditor— on climate, agriculture and infrastructure.

The World Bank, in a report in October 2023, warned that the US $1.37 billion the Maldives already owes Beijing represents about 20 percent of its public debt.

Instead of hectoring Malé, New Delhi would be better served by disseminating information about the debt trap.

India helped the Maldives thwart a coup in 1988

Much is made of India thwarting a coup attempt in 1988 by a ragtag group of Sri Lankan Tamil mercenaries hired by a Maldivian money bag opposed to then President Gayoom.

Indians are not told that the Maldivians initially approached Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Singapore.

Not getting positive responses from Colombo and Islamabad, the Maldives approached London and Washington. Both suggested to the Maldivians that New Delhi be contacted, which was then done.

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The US has a major base in Diego Garcia which is a mere two-hour flight from the Maldives.

The Indian troops were being flown from Agra, a good four-and-a-half hours of flying time in the best of circumstances.

India's legitimate concerns

India has legitimate security concerns about freedom of navigation in this part of the Indian Ocean.

"For India, the Maldives' geographical location is very important. The Maldives is geographically positioned like a 'toll gate' between the Western Indian Ocean chokepoints of the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz on the one hand, and the Eastern Indian Ocean chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca on the other.

"This position is very close to the key international shipping lanes (ISL) which act as conduits for around 50 percent of India's external trade and 80 percent of its energy imports. This is an important factor for India's rival China," writes Ritika V. Kapoor of the National Maritime Foundation.

The Maldives or Bust

The Maldives or Bust strategy is self-defeating and the attempt to conflate the Laccadive Islands with the Maldives fooled no one except perhaps the followers of our own Il Duce!

The catatonic refrain of the Indian media and policy wonks must be jarring to not just the Maldives but all the littoral States of the Indian Ocean Region. It is not that India does not have other strategic options. For example, India has four defence-related agreements with Seychelles.

India is one of the oldest and closest military partners of Seychelles, having provided patrol ships, aircraft and helicopters to its defence forces over the years since the country gained independence from Britain in 1976.

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In 2021, India stated that it would establish 42 new coastal radar stations to strengthen coastal surveillance.

In December 2022, the government approved a major national maritime domain awareness (NMDA) project to create an integrated intelligence grid that can detect and respond to sea-based threats in real time.

For the past few years, India has also maintained a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, with eight ships patrolling the ocean 24/7. India has military logistics agreements with Australia, Japan, the United States— the Quad countries— as well as with France, Singapore and South Korea.

India signed a similar agreement with Vietnam in June 2022. The United Kingdom is stepping up joint activity in the Indian Ocean. India also has access to facilities in Oman.

India's agreement with France extends New Delhi's reach into the southwestern Indian Ocean region, where the French have a military presence, and thus access to the Reunion Islands near Madagascar and Djibouti.

India's agreement with Australia expands Indian outreach into the southern Indian Ocean as well as the Western Pacific. India also has a secretive military base on the Mauritian Island of Agalega.

Southern Air Command is based in Thiruvananthapuram. A mere one hour and 15 minutes from Malé.

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The Indian navy is also no longer composed of hand-me-downs from the British navy. In 2022, the capital budget of the Indian navy increased by 45 percent— 75 percent of the outlay is earmarked for its fleet, which includes ships, submarines and other equipment. Comparatively, the Indian army faced a cut of 12 percent.

Why, then, is India in such a flutter with the Maldivian request? It is not the US or others who will look askance if the Chinese set up military facilities in the Maldives?

The US and the Maldives have had a defence and security arrangement since 2020. The answer perhaps lies elsewhere. As one Indian academic puts it: "Today, it [India] uses the language of power (of which it didn't have much during the cold war) and fraternises with great powers, while espousing the cause of the global South, to be a great power."

India could well read about the original Rough Rider US President, Theodore Roosevelt, "Speak softly and carry a big stick— you will go far."

The new government in the Maldives has asked the Indian armed forces personnel to withdraw by March 15, 2024.

Beware, the Ides of March.